

THE LEGACY OF HEGEL

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
MARQUETTE HEGEL SYMPOSIUM
1970

EDITED BY

J. J. O'MALLEY, K. W. ALGOZIN,
H. P. KAINZ AND L. C. RICE



MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE / 1973

© 1973 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
 All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
 reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form

ISBN 90 247 1528 8

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Editors' Preface</i>	VII
THINKING WITH HEGEL <i>James Collins</i>	1
HEGEL EDITING AND HEGEL RESEARCH <i>Otto Pöggeler</i>	8
A CRITICAL SURVEY OF HEGEL SCHOLARSHIP IN ENGLISH: 1962-1969 <i>Frederick G. Weiss</i>	24
THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC <i>Eric Weil</i>	49
COMMENT ON WEIL'S 'THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC' <i>John N. Findlay</i>	65
HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS <i>John N. Findlay</i>	72
COMMENT ON FINDLAY'S 'HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS' <i>Frank Collingwood</i>	90
HEGEL AND MARX <i>Jean-Yves Calvez, S.J.</i>	98
COMMENT ON CALVEZ'S 'HEGEL AND MARX' <i>David McLellan</i>	105
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RELIGIOUS MYSTERY: AN ESSAY IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION <i>Kenneth L. Schmitz</i>	108
RELIGION AS REPRESENTATION <i>Louis Dupré</i>	137

HEGEL AND THE SECULARIZATION HYPOTHESIS <i>Kentley R. Dove</i>	144
COMMENT ON DOVE'S 'HEGEL AND THE SECULARIZATION HYPOTHESIS' <i>Howard P. Kainz</i>	156
HEGEL AND JUDAISM: A FLAW IN THE HEGELIAN MEDIATION <i>Emil L. Fackenheim</i>	161
COMMENT ON FACKENHEIM'S 'HEGEL AND JUDAISM' <i>James Doull</i>	186
LABOR, ALIENATION, AND SOCIAL CLASSES IN HEGEL'S REAL- PHILOSOPHY <i>Shlomo Avineri</i>	196
COMMENT ON AVINERI'S 'LABOR, ALIENATION, AND SOCIAL CLASSES IN HEGEL'S REALPHILOSOPHY' <i>Otto Pöggeler</i>	216
REMARKS ON THE PAPERS OF AVINERI AND PÖGgeler <i>Robert L. Perkins</i>	220
HEGEL AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM, ANARCHISM, SOCIA- LISM: A DEFENSE OF THE RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE AGAINST MARX AND HIS CONTEMPORARY FOLLOWERS <i>James Doull</i>	224
COMMENT ON DOULL'S 'HEGEL AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM, ANARCHISM, SOCIALISM' <i>Shlomo Avineri</i>	249
ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION ON PROBLEMS OF TRANSLATING HEGEL <i>Howard P. Kainz</i> , editor	253
THE HEGELIANS OF SAINT LOUIS, MISSOURI AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE UNITED STATES <i>John O. Riedl</i>	268
IDEAS AND IDEAL <i>Nathan Rotenstreich</i>	288
HEGEL: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS IN ENGLISH, ARRANGED CHRONOLOGICALLY <i>Frederick G. Weiss</i>	298

EDITORS' PREFACE

The present volume represents the proceedings of the Marquette Hegel Symposium, held at Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on June 2-5, 1970. The Symposium, celebrating the two-hundredth anniversary of Hegel's birth, was presented under the combined sponsorship of the Philosophy Department of Marquette University, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Johnson Foundation of Racine, Wisconsin. Its general theme embraced not only specific topics of interest in contemporary Hegel studies, but also the wider aspects of the influences and impact of Hegel's thought upon contemporary philosophical, political, and social problems. Principal contributors and panelists were selected for their scholarly achievements in Hegel studies and also in keeping with the broad view of the Hegelian legacy in current thought. All sessions of the Symposium were plenary, and designed for maximum discussion and interchange among participants. The Symposium Committee regrets that it has not been feasible to incorporate the transcript of the discussions (except for the round-table discussion on editing and translating Hegel) into this volume.

The papers presented in each day's sessions are published here with editorial changes and corrections made by their respective authors. The papers by Professors Otto Pöggeler and Eric Weil were originally translated by members of our Committee: the present versions incorporate many changes and corrections made by their authors. The comments on each paper were brought into their present form only after the Symposium, and in the light of the discussions which took place during it. The papers by Professors John Riedl and Nathan Rotenstreich were not delivered at the Symposium, and are thus included here as appendices. A bibliographical survey of recent Hegel scholarship by Professor Frederick Weiss was circulated among all the Symposium participants for comment: it appears here (as the third appendix) updated and with numerous revisions.

Lastly, the forward, "Thinking with Hegel," was prepared by Professor James Collins with the all-but-complete manuscript of this volume in hand.

The Symposium Committee would like to express its especial gratitude to Professor Paul Byrne, chairman of the Philosophy Department, and to the many other members of the Department whose planning and effort went into the Symposium. Thanks also are due to Professor James Collins, at Saint Louis University, for his many suggestions and useful comments along the way to our preparing the manuscript for publication. Preparation of the manuscript for this volume was supported by a grant from the Marquette University Committee on Research.

Joseph J. O'Malley
Kcith W. Algozin
Howard P. Kainz
Lee C. Rice

THINKING WITH HEGEL

James Collins

We are inveterate commemorators, whether concerning our private lives or the common history of humanity. Especially when there looms upon the horizon a round-number anniversary of an outstanding political or religious figure, a poet or musician, a scientist or philosopher, we feel summoned to make some special response of celebration and interpretation. The quality of such a commemorative response is not measured by its lavish appearance, but rather by the range and perceptiveness of the effort to rethink a great man's accomplishments and his facets of significance for ourselves. The more we penetrate into his work and vision, taken in their own form as well as their shaping impact upon subsequent history, the more we enrich our sense of human resources to draw upon in meeting the problems of present existence. A commemoration signifies both that the source in question has an unsuspected fecundity, still to be realized, and that its realization comes about in the course of our active wrestling with issues rather than in the artificial calm of pure recall.

What are some of the appropriate kinds of questions to raise in an attempt to do commemorative justice to the bicentennial of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's birth in 1770? I think it is essential to investigate at least five broad areas, upon which our understanding and use of his philosophy depend. They are: the state of the text, the progress of translation, internal problems of genesis-method-system, comparative relationships with other philosophers in the past, and critical points of connection with our contemporary modes of philosophizing. It is a measure of Hegel's extraordinary achievement that he should thus put our minds on the stretch, along all these approaches taken together. A quite definite functional meaning of his philosophical greatness is that he requires us to consider so wide a compass of issues, in order to assess his work and inter-workings with ourselves. Thinking philosophically with Hegel is a complex, always growing rela-

tionship which, at a fitting time of commemoration, we can seek to restate along at least these five main lines.

In studying most modern philosophers, we seldom encounter major questions about textual authenticity, such as frequently occur in ancient and medieval philosophy. But Hegel is an important exception to this rule, as we soon discover if we look for the original-language statement of some favorite quotation from him. Often a pithy expression will be found in the main text of an older edition of Hegel, but will be discreetly relegated to the section reserved for additions, conflations, and variant readings, in a critically edited version. Although some introductory expositions of his thought continue to ignore this change of textual status or treat it as philosophically insignificant, such practice is being more widely challenged. Sometimes, the findings of an advanced study of Hegel will turn precisely around the reservations which philosophical analysis must make in the use of some venerable, yet textually questionable, statements and entire sections.

A good function of a commemorative occasion is to pace ourselves on such improvements in textual presentation and historical practice. Using the 1931 centenary of Hegel's birth as a marker, we can observe the gradual formation of an attitude of increased sensitivity about the textual situation on the part of the worldwide community of Hegelian scholars, not just on the part of a few editors. Forty years ago, it was important to have the Jubilee Edition make more widely available the older collected edition of Hegel's writings, edited by his own students and followers. At the same time, it was clearly advantageous to have the textually reliable *Meiner* editions of the books published by Hegel himself. Especially in the case of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* and the *Philosophy of Right*, however, there was a noticeable displacement of many familiar paragraphs. This called attention to the role of Hegel's first-generation editors in conflating their lecture notes and correcting even Hegel's own text, in accord with their philosophical and literary standards. If one then ventured into Hegel's posthumously published lecture courses, the discrepancies increased sharply between texts for which there is manuscript warrant from Hegel himself and the long-standard versions established by his early editors. For instance, there was a very sharp cutback of materials directly attributable to Hegel in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, as well as a doctrinally significant reordering of the topics.

Such changes did not remove all value and authority from the Additions and previous versions of the Lectures, since something of Hegel's thought somehow suffused these records. But better controls were needed over the

"something and somehow" factors. As the comparisons became available, they did generate in the wider company of Hegelian scholars a demand for a truly critical edition in which these kinds of texts would be clearly distinguished, providing a basis for determining their relationships and their roles in any subsequent historical interpretation of this philosophy. The story of the editorial plans and work, from Lasson and Hoffmeister to Pöggeler, is told authoritatively in the present volume by Pöggeler himself.

The crucial part played by translations is often unrealistically overlooked or downgraded. And yet the circulatory life of philosophy depends very considerably for its health upon the use of translations. Philosophy students in non-Germanic countries are usually eager to study the books of Hegel even before their command over the German language is sufficient to permit a reading of them in the original. This desire to move beyond lecture notes and secondary studies to a more direct engagement with the source philosopher deserves encouragement, even when the further acquaintance stops short with a translation. Students can make noticeable progress through this means, coming closer to grips with Hegel's modes of expression and argument. Some readers will then be motivated to read the original texts, but even those who never advance into the German works will have gained a foothold and made Hegel a permanent companion in their own philosophizing.

We are now in an exciting period when a new generation of Hegel translations is appearing. The pressures for such work come from many directions and are indicative of Hegel's surpassing stature as a philosopher. One demand is generated simply by the appearance of the critically edited German works, which expose the shortcomings of translations that were based upon the earlier collected works. It is likely that English readers will not be satisfied until all the Hegel translations match, in their own manner, the critical edition currently being published. T. M. Knox's rendition of the *Philosophy of Right* can serve as a model, and in the present volume Kenley Dove expresses the standard being observed for the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. A second source of discontent with older English versions lies in the general momentum of historical studies on Hegel. No matter what language is used for a truly pioneer and thorough study of some book of Hegel or problem in him, the consequence is likely to be a more careful understanding of central texts and a more rigorous, explicitly declared, policy in translating the key terms. Thus the looseness of previous English translations of *Geist* and *Vorstellung* is not tolerable under

present conditions of scholarship, which require that the defects be corrected and unnecessary obstacles removed.

Another reason for the retranslating of Hegel tells us a good deal about ourselves, as well as about him. Our increased interest in the problem of language is having a marked effect upon the quality demanded of translations. We want them to be sufficiently authentic and in the spirit of the original to enable us to come close to Hegel's own use of language and concern for it. That concern expresses itself formally in a theory about language in general; it is also manifest in Hegel's many arguments probing into the terms and constructions of the German language; and it undergirds his constantly sensitive use of many stylistic modes of language, however difficult the actual text thus becomes for readers. All these qualities have to be skillfully conveyed in translations that hope to function in today's linguistically oriented community of philosophers. It is perfectly legitimate to expect a basic linguistic faithfulness of this complex sort, so that analyses of Hegel's concepts and arguments can be made on more reliable grounds by philosophers who nevertheless do not intend to spend additional effort in studying his original-language expressions. Particularly this consideration leads me to regard the problem of translating Hegel as being crucial for his wider and more authentic inclusion in contemporary philosophical discussions.

At first acquaintance, the history of modern philosophy seems to be a ponderous structure, wherein each system of thought occupies a fixed and fully carved niche to be studied but in no way altered by ourselves. In order to dispel this misleading impression, however, we have only to consider Hegel from the genetic standpoint. It is only within our century that the materials about his early development have become available, and only within the past four decades that the theme of Young Hegel has been intensively cultivated by historians. They have uncovered and emphasized his early, foundational interest in economic and political affairs, literature and the other arts, the inner conflicts among Greek-Jewish-Christian religious ideals and institutional expressions, and the specific philosophical developments from Kant to Fichte and Schelling. Each of these facets yields a new appreciation of Hegel's complex mind and comprehensive aims in philosophy. Precisely how to correlate and emphasize the several lines of his genetic thought presents a problem, as well as a real opportunity, for current researchers. That one's interpretation of the Young Hegel affects many other issues in his later work can be verified – in the instance of his theories of religion and social philosophy – by examining the essays

here contributed by Shlomo Avineri, Emil Fackenheim, and Kenneth Schmitz.

As the lineaments of Hegel's early reflections become more firmly drawn, we are beginning to reformulate some older questions concerning Hegelian method and system. The phenomenology of experience and the lifeworld of spirit no longer spring up mysteriously in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but can now be appreciated as constituting Hegel's first sustained, published effort at synthesizing the many elements of his initial inquiries. As Eric Weil testifies in this symposium, the dialectical-speculative method has to be reappraised in the light of developmental and comparative studies. It is not an artificial trichotomy imposed upon experience at all costs, and neither is it purely abstract and formal in significance. Historical studies are clarifying Hegel's intention of trying to develop a method that will join the concreteness and fluidity of human life with the philosopher's drive toward comprehensive thought. That we return constantly to a reading of this theory of social conflicts and the relations between conscience and the state, as well as to his reflections on the nature of tragedy and satire, attests his strength in these areas of interweaving descriptive richness and methodic criticism. It is frequently assumed, however, that Hegel's method and system produce but a grotesque failure in the philosophy of nature, and that such a defect dispenses us from weighing his more general claims to interpretive power. John Findlay's contribution challenges this assumption, and fortunately the translation of Hegel's writings on the *Philosophy of Nature* enables us to examine the question independently.

The quickening of interest in Hegel is largely fueled by comparative historical studies, relating him to other thinkers and to influential social tendencies. Sometimes, these paths of comparison establish a perspective coming from the past toward him as its culmination: "From Kant to Hegel" serving as a common rubric for developments in classical German philosophy. This retrospective view is by no means an extrinsic relationship and a luxury which the student of Hegel can readily forego. Although Hegel pronounces rather definitively upon Kant and Fichte, Jacobi and Schelling, in any particular context, it is significant that he never ceases to return to his Greek, German, and British sources when the context shifts and new problems arise. This is a sign that, for the interpreters of Hegel as well as for himself, his philosophy continues to receive fresh import from being considered in this relational spirit. What he teaches on the believing-knowing couplet, on the relation between substance and subject, on the problem of the absolute, on negativity and freedom in history, cannot be

properly grasped without taking into account his complex, lifelong struggles with other philosophers on these issues. He finds partial models in Aristotle's self-thinking thought and Spinoza's *tractatus theologico-politicus*, in the Lockean descriptions of understanding and the Kantian antinomies of pure reason. The more capacious our understanding of previous Western philosophies and cultural formations, the more advantageous is our position for following Hegel's critical and consummative mind in its comparative aspects.

The other major perspective regards his philosophy as a point of departure for later thinkers and movements, under the heading of "From Hegel to Marx to Nietzsche to Heidegger." This is the approach represented here by the Marxian studies of Jean Calvez and James Doull. As an initial inducement for reading Hegel, we are told that he constitutes an important part of Marx's background. It is true enough that little sense can be made of Feuerbach's *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* or of Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* and *German Ideology*, without developing some frame of reference in Hegel and the Hegelian Right and Left. Yet after this instrumental function is spelled out, there still remains the challenge of a direct Philosophical study of Hegel, bearing these historical implications and criticisms in mind but not reducing his philosophy to them. Just as an Aristotle and a Kant retain their philosophical integrity and distinctive methods, even when they are seen to contribute something to Hegel's formation, so does the latter maintain his own center of philosophizing with unique problems and insights for us. The art of historical interpretation grows through our always renewed modes of relating the comparative approaches to Hegel with the basic internal analyses of his systemic concepts and reflections upon human experience.

Thinking with Hegel is a manner of philosophizing which regards his work as being too valuable for us to ignore in our present inquiries, even though we do not intend uncritically to espouse and repeat that work. Such reflecting in critical openness to Hegel and his own conception of "pure philosophical thinking" involves historical considerations, but it cannot be confined to them. Just as Hegel is studied both in his original German text and through translation into other languages, so his involvement in contemporary argument proceeds both through historical modes and through direct theoretical analyses. These two sorts of inclusion of Hegel in present inquiries are reflected in the discussions that occurred during the present symposium. As the translating and historical interpreting situations improve, we can expect that there will be greater emphasis

in the English-speaking world upon Hegel as a regular component in alternative methodologies and concept constructions.

Especially since his theory of man is being recognized as more central than was previously supposed, he widens his ports of entry into present-day theorizing. Especially his *Science of Logic* has much to offer on such topics as the nature of language and conceptualization, the analysis and interrelation of different knowledge models, the construction of worlds and the achievement of identity through cross-world meanings, the relations between logic and ontology, and the whole process of systemic unification. What makes the Hegelian treatment of these topics so pertinent and demanding is its continuity with the phenomenology of experience, ethical-social relations, and history. Rather than fall on only one side of the great divide among the focal centers of contemporary philosophizing, Hegel's thought helps to uncover their binding problems and convergent goals.

There is one final sense of "thinking with Hegel" that emerges vividly from the present collection, as well as from other centennial meetings and joint publications. The study of Hegel flourishes only as a broadly based, cooperative activity on the part of the entire community of philosophers. Not only does it cut across linguistic barriers and cultural differences, but it also depends for its vitality and truthfulness upon the methods and judgments of diverse philosophical approaches. Whether or not Hegel succeeded in his own time in unifying various standpoints, it is undeniable that an adequate interpretation and use of his philosophy today require joint research and exchange of arguments, involving many philosophers who use different methods and conceptual frameworks. Hegelianism killed itself off in the last century by becoming a coterie possession of a few people, and nothing would be more swiftly fatal to Hegel studies in our century than to conduct them in a sectarian manner and in an esoteric atmosphere. Hegel the human philosopher belongs to humanity and stands open – both in his own intent and in principle – to our common inspection, criticism, and appreciation. The task of Hegelian scholars (like that of the centennial commemorators of Rembrandt and Beethoven) is to open up more routes for us to perceive and rework his contributions to mankind's self-exploration.

ian") communism, with the cultural revolution in China, and with the various neo-marxian revolutions in the European countries. To the west the English speaking world forms another independent sphere of influence. (The Scandinavian countries belong here, while South America and Japan appear more receptive at present to the influence of the continent.) English "common sense" (in conjunction with the old nominalistic and analytical traditions) has become highly stylized into a philosophizing which rejects all speculative thought as well as an immediate interrelation of theory and practice; it tends, rather, to a pragmatism which permits no questions other than those to which there are unequivocal answers. The three spheres of influence are, however, not as self-sufficient as they would have us believe. It is not just that they overlap (e.g. the influence of German idealism or of hermeneutic philosophy on American theology; the influence of neo-Marxism in the west; the strengthening of analytic philosophy in Germany). Rather, the situation is such that dialectical materialism can be just as foreign to a physicist in the Soviet Union as it is to a representative of logical positivism in the west; and a positivist just as little as a "metaphysician" can respond in an exclusively positivistic way to basic human questions (such as those about life and death and even the question about the meaning of scientific endeavor); and a philosopher whose interest is speculative metaphysics cannot in fact talk about the positive sciences in his work. What at first appears as a manifold of mutually exclusive philosophical "tendencies," could yet belong to a comprehensive philosophical effort, within which there is devotion to different tasks in momentarily one-sided ways.

The treatment of Hegel varies in each of the three geographical regions of contemporary philosophizing. To English analytic philosophy Hegel's thought is a pseudo-philosophy, which produced more unclarity than it eliminated, and which rendered itself politically suspect by its ambiguous relationship to that "open society" which today is felt worthy of support. Nevertheless, whoever inquires about the original philosophical meaning of American pragmatism and returns to the thought of Peirce, sees there a parallel to the starting point of Hegel (which Peirce himself stressed).¹ When, on the other hand, the socialist countries today seek a "more hu-

¹ Karl-Otto Apel, in his introduction to a German edition of Peirce, has stressed this parallelism and has described the roles played in modern society by the three schools of contemporary philosophizing. In other works Apel has shown that these three philosophies may be understood historically "as the continuation of Kant's primacy of practical reason and as the response to Hegel's completion of theoretical metaphysics as a metaphysics of history." Cf. *Charles Sanders Peirce: Schriften I; Zur Entstehung des Pragmatismus*, edited and introduced by Karl-Otto Apel, Frankfurt am Main, 1967, p. 14.

HEGEL EDITING AND HEGEL RESEARCH *

Otto Pöggeler

Today Hegel research and the editing of Hegel are pursued both intensively and extensively. Why this should be so is not immediately clear. The emergence of the complex "Hegel research" is certainly not to be explained merely by the fact that today scientific interest extends to all possible subjects. The attempt both to make Hegel's writings available in a complete edition and to research them with historical philology in a complete edition and to research them with historical philology cannot have that relative indifference to the concerns of the present with which a germanist might edit a medieval text or an orientalist investigate an obscure language. (Though, to be sure, in this indifference or equanimity there can lie hidden a passionate commitment to the universal desire to know and an effort to preserve for it a free space not plotted and superintended by society.) Hegel research has participated directly in the attempt of our time to understand itself. For this has entailed philosophizing, and thus, the development of philosophy both with the aid of Hegel and in opposition to him. How is philosophy practiced in today's shrinking world? And what is Hegel's place in this philosophizing?

When we inquire about contemporary philosophy, we may perhaps distinguish — though with simplification — three geographical regions of philosophizing, three great spheres of influence which, to be sure, overlap and interpenetrate in many ways. There is continental Europe: the philosophy that has arisen here keeps alive its history, and at least some philosophical tendencies still consider justified the pursuit of the great fundamental questions of metaphysics, even if this be done by removing oneself from the classical tradition or, as in "hermeneutics," by stressing the historicity of all thinking. To the east (as seen from continental Europe) philosophy is bound to a politically instituted, marxist *Weltanschauung*. But this *Weltanschauung* has received a new stimulus with the announcement in the Soviet Union of the transition from socialism to ("more humanitar-

* Transl. Keith and Mary Algozin.

manitarian" socialism, the relation between Hegel and Marx becomes problematic in a new way: there is a positive turn toward the young Marx and, through him, toward Hegel. Further, in some eastern European countries, Hegel is the thinker who represents the philosophical tradition itself (insofar as it anticipated dialectical materialism). In continental Europe during the last two decades Hegel has been something like a *Klassiker vom Dienst*, that is, he has been that thinker treated most often in university seminars and lectures, his thought serving as that popular medium in which the various philosophical tendencies could be understood. But continental Europe's interest in Hegel has not meant "Hegelianism"; if Hegel's thought is taken as somehow the "completion of metaphysics," this is only in the sense that in him and with him "metaphysical" thinking in general is to be dismissed.

Meanwhile, seventy years of continuous Hegel research live on in contemporary Hegel scholarship. What different points of departure are present in the contemporary reception of Hegel is shown very concretely, for example, by some Japanese visitors. The older men, who studied in Europe during the first world war, take Hegel as the thinker who in the most far-reaching way – above all in the area of cultural philosophy – collected "experiences" and then with and against Kant broadened, or renewed as a problem, the starting point of transcendental philosophy. Others want to develop an authentic Japanese philosophy from within their own traditions, such as Zen-Buddhism, in dialogue with German idealism and perhaps with Heidegger. The younger men are already to some extent approaching Hegel from Marxism or from logical positivism, etc. At any rate, in seven decades that complex "Hegel research" has been formed from the most various interpretive points of departure. This complex, to be sure, has arisen in a very random manner and is little organized; nevertheless, it both has, and more and more approaches, unity. At the present time there appear each year around eighty dependent works concerning Hegel (transactions of learned societies, chapters in books and anthologies); to this is to be added a scarcely surveyable wealth of autonomous writings.² Of course, it can also be pointed out how some themes of Hegel scholarship travel – how, for example, in the past years the theme "transcendental history in the late Hüsserl and in Hegel" travelled from France

² The *Hegel-Studien* (Bonn, 1961 ff.) attempts to give reports on all articles on Hegel, though as yet it has been unable to cover all of the articles which appear in the different languages. A bibliography of the Hegel writings which have appeared independently lists for a period of five years 280 titles of editions and new editions (*Hegel-Studien*, Vol. 5, Bonn, 1969).

to other Latin countries, and how today the theme "Hegel and Marx on alienation" travels from Europe to the USA, etc.

The Hegel scholarship of our century has from the beginning been linked with editorial concerns: Dilthey's discovery and presentation of the young Hegel went hand in hand with the editing of Hegel's early theological writings by Herman Nohl; the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian return to Hegel involved both a reworking of the Hegelian texts, and the attempt to edit Hegel's lectures in new textual form. Kojève's interpretation of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* would not have been possible if Hegel's draft of his Jena system and Marx's parisian manuscripts had not been edited; and whoever relates Hegel and Hölderlin rests his case on documents previously little noticed. It is important therefore to discuss this relationship between Hegel scholarships and the editing of Hegel both with regard to its particular historical phases and its future possibilities.

I

During his lifetime, Hegel's publications were slow to win recognition. To the public his earliest writings, the critical works of his first years at Jena, stood in the shadow of his friend Schelling. Nor did the *Phänomenologie* bring the breakthrough Hegel had hoped for. Only after the silent Nürnberg years during which he taught at the *Gymnasium* and worked on the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, only in Heidelberg and then, especially, in Berlin, did Hegel display the power to form a widely recognized school of thought. In this he relied upon the outline of his thought, as presented in the *Enzyklopädie* and the *Rechtsphilosophie*, upon his critical reviews for the Heidelberg and the Berlin year-books, and, above all, upon his lectures. When he died suddenly in 1831 at just over sixty years of age, he was torn from the midst of his creative activity, leaving behind many projects and plans. His followers, who had become the most important philosophical school of the time, wanted to perpetuate his thought. So it was natural that immediately after Hegel's death his disciples and friends began an edition of his collected works. It was completed in 1845 and bears the stamp of the philosophical situation of its time: the conflict over the Hegelian system had already broken out and Hegel's followers wanted to erect as an insurmountable bulwark their edition of Hegel's works. Thus, they orientated themselves toward their teacher's finished system, expanding into three volumes that bare outline of Hegelian philosophy, the *Enzyklopädie*, using quotations hastily extracted from Hegel's manuscripts

and from transcriptions of his lectures and then adding to this system his lectures themselves. Hegel's disciples tried to give their master's system the stamp of completion. Therefore, they had to overlook all documents which hinted at incompleteness, tensions, and gaps in Hegel's thought, as well as the documents pertaining to his development. It did not at all occur to them that there could be serious interests in Hegel's development (aside from mere biographical interest and the question as to whether Hegel or Schelling played the leading role in the *Kritischen Journal*). Thus, the approach to the Hegelian manuscripts taken by the "friends of the departed" permitted the disappearance of important texts such as the early commentary on Kant's *Metaphysik der Sitten*, the commentary on Steuart's *Political Economy*, and also those Jena lectures which contained such important documents on the development of the system, especially of the *Phänomenologie*, documents such as the Jena notebook for the course in the history of philosophy and the Heidelberg notebook for the course in aesthetics. Those of Hegel's students who sought to carry on his thought in their own writings treated with great freedom even those texts printed during his lifetime. For stylistic and sometimes for doctrinal reasons they made countless textual changes, even rearranging and omitting texts. The idea of providing a critical edition in today's sense was completely foreign to them. Hegel himself had written to Daub, his friend at Heidelberg, when the latter was reading the revision of the second edition of the *Enzyklopädie*, "by the way, I give you complete freedom to correct, strike out, and insert entirely according to your judgment, wherever it appears obscure, incomprehensible, or repetitious."³

In 1870 one of Hegel's students, the disputations and grandiloquent Karl Ludwig Michelet, expressed the slogan guiding the work of Hegel's followers when he entitled a work celebrating Hegel's one hundredth birthday: *Hegel, der unwiderlegte Weltphilosoph*, that is, "Hegel, the unrefuted world-philosopher." But how it really stood with Hegel at this time is shown clearly by the publisher's announcement which accompanied this volume: Hegel's works were now being sold at a lower price. At the time of Hegel's one hundredth birthday his philosophy was dead. The positive sciences – the historical as well as the natural sciences – had, it appeared, finally outgrown, as an outmoded fashion of human self-under-

³ cf. *Briefe von und an Hegel*, edited by Johannes Hoffmeister, vol. III, Hamburg, 1954, p. 126. Hermann Glockner reissued the old Hegel edition, with some changes, forty years ago as a "Jubilee Edition." As important as this edition has become for the study of Hegel, and indeed because of this, the use of it requires a critical attitude; cf. my review "Das Hegel Werk Hermann Glockners," *Philosophische Rundschau*, 8th series, Tübingen, 1960, 28-52.

standing, speculation in the style of German idealism. The liberation from Hegel seemed to be a liberation of science from philosophy altogether. In this vein the well-known physician and natural scientist Rudolf Virchow said in 1893 in his rectorial address in Berlin: "It is in any case certain that with the death of Hegel the university too was freed from the power of philosophical systems. No philosopher has since then assumed a position of similar control, and – we may say it with appreciation – none has laid claim to such a position."⁴

It was the rise of the sciences and the further development of political and religious life that led to the downfall of Hegelian philosophy. Yet it was soon necessary to inquire about the conditions which foster different scientific, political, moral and religious ways of relating to reality. This inquiry was developed philosophically as neo-Kantianism. Here Kant's critical philosophy was taken chiefly as a theory of knowledge, indeed, as a theory of the positive sciences. It was presupposed that there are sciences and that it is the sciences which decisively determine our comportment to that which is; on the basis of this presupposition philosophy was understood as the foundation of scientific comportment. Along with the task of grounding the natural sciences there arose that of grounding the cultural sciences. But when the search for foundations was extended to the cultural sciences, and when finally the question was asked, about the common root of both the cultural and the natural sciences – indeed, of nature and culture themselves – then one was approaching Hegel. Neo-Kantianism passed over into neo-Hegelianism. Wilhelm Dilthey, who was at first close to neo-Kantianism, later opposed it, orientating himself toward German romanticism and the historical school. He was suffused with the scientific approach, which was principally methodological in character. At first he referred the understanding operative in *Geisteswissenschaften*, not to a "bloodless" transcendental subject, but to concrete life and experience; then he referred it to the constellations of meaning constitutive of spiritual life, which develop historically and can be explained only "hermeneutically." As we know from Dilthey's famous Berlin Academy treatise, it was this approach that enabled him to discover the young Hegel. We may mention at this point the subsequent protest which spread in the universities against the neo-Kantian methodologism at the time of the first world war. In an academy address at Heidelberg Wilhelm Windelband confirmed – although not without a certain critical distance

⁴ "Idee und Wirklichkeit einer Universität": *Gedenkschrift der Freien Universität Berlin, in Dokumente zur Geschichte der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin*, edited by W. Weischedel, Berlin, 1960, p. 422.

— the “renewal of Hegelianism.” Here there gathered under the protection of Max Weber’s liberality and tolerance, those minds which brought Hegel into the battle against the liberalism and methodologism which controlled Heidelberg and beyond. However, they (Julius Ebbinghaus, Hans Ehrenberg, Franz Rosenzweig, Georg Lukács, Ernst Bloch, and others) soon went beyond Hegel to a new (philosophical, religious, or political) orthodoxy. This laid the foundation for the fact that today’s kinship with Hegel is not a Hegelianism, but bears in itself a protest against Hegel. It was Alexandre Kojève who used the Marxian protest against Hegel to discover a previously concealed vitality in Hegelian thought. He did this in such a way that through his Paris lectures on the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* he bound two decades of French philosophizing to Hegel and, in general, left a stronger mark on Hegel research than, for instance, Croce with his distinction between the living and the dead in Hegelian philosophy.

This renewal of Hegel, as achieved in Berlin, Heidelberg, and Paris, was (as I have already remarked) connected in the most diverse ways with the editorial work on the Hegelian texts. It almost seems as if in the first decades of our century there was felt again and again by the exponents of new intellectual tendencies the impulse, or the temptation, to make confrontation with Hegel possible by editing Hegelian texts. Fortunately, not everyone possessed that restraint displayed by Martin Buber when he rejected Dilthey’s suggestion that he edit Hegel’s early writings and, consistent with this, continued his studies outside of the Berlin privy councillor’s sphere of influence. It was a group of important men who attempted the editing of Hegel and Hegel philology. For example, there was, along with Dilthey and his follower, the educator Herman Nohl, Franz Rosenzweig, who began as a historian and philosopher and then found his life’s work in the renewal of Jewish religiosity; and Hans Ehrenberg, who came from the study of economics, by way of confrontation with Hegel, to Protestant theology. Georg Lasson, on the other hand, was immediately connected with the old Hegelian tradition through his father Adolf Lasson. Johannes Hoffmeister, a follower of Friedrich Gundolf and Richard Kroner, attempted to make clear that Hegel was a friend of Hölderlin, and sought again to free Hegel’s philosophy from the bonds of overhasty systematization.

The confrontation with Hegel received a decisive stamp by the editing of Nohl, Rosenzweig, Ehrenberg, Lasson, and Hoffmeister. But although Lasson, along with his work as pastor, began to edit a “critical” edition of Hegel, and although the germanist Hoffmeister tried to continue this edi-

tion as a “new critical edition,” this editorial work never got beyond its beginnings. It never produced a result comparable with the efforts of such scholars as Mommsen, Diels, or Bekker. It was apparent that the task demanded forms of organization quite different from those they had used. The participants, whether they withdrew from the enterprise or dedicated their lives to it, felt this and expressed it: only something like an academy of sciences, in an undertaking thoroughly planned and financed, would be able to produce a genuine critical edition of Hegel’s work.

II

The interest in Hegel’s work has steadily increased right up till today, the two hundredth anniversary of his birth. To be sure, typical Anglo-Saxon philosophizing does pass Hegel by; and French structuralism takes itself to be an opponent of Hegel’s starting point; and in Germany those tendencies have grown stronger which oppose the attempts (whether metaphysical-historical, or hermeneutic and socio-historical, or linguistic) to see history and historical language as that founding element in which philosophy has always moved. But again and again, every philosophizing that tries to be more than methodology and theory of science finds itself referring to Hegel, whether positively, by studying with Hegel the problems of *philosophia perennis* or by taking his thought as a hermeneutic of the western world; or negatively, as in Marxism, where the relation to Hegel has become a matter of life and death since the political condemnation of the Hegelianizing tendencies of Lukács and Bloch. However, there still is not a sufficient textual foundation for the study of Hegel. Twelve years ago the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* commissioned an edition of Hegel’s works to rival the Academy Edition of Kant’s works. The yield of more than fifty years of Hegel research and editorial activity was to be used in this critical edition, which was to collate the almost innumerable isolated and provisional editions of Hegelian texts. But unforeseen difficulties stood in the way of this project; the first volume did not appear until 1968.⁵ There were the following difficulties: when the work was begun there did not as yet exist established, adaptable methods for editing more recent philosophical writers. Because of the different conditions there could be no simple appropriation of the methods of the classical scholars. Only in the last decade did there begin a broader discussion by germanists

⁵ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*, Vol. 4: *Jenaer Kritische Schriften*, edited by H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg, 1968.

of questions about the editing of more recent texts; and even today a germanist would scarcely be concerned philologically with Kant or Hegel (while the classical scholars work on Platonic texts without hesitation). So the principles of editing Hegel had to be worked out experimentally. For example, it was only in an advanced stage of the work that there was given up the normalization of the Hegelian spelling (that is the approximation of the old texts to the modern German spelling). Even later came the decision to deal with the volumes in chronological order.

The editorial work rests upon a complete collection of both the Hegelian manuscripts and the transcriptions of Hegel's lectures. But these manuscripts and transcripts are spread throughout the whole of Europe (including eastern Europe) and America. Searching and collecting (or photocopying) demand time and money. Yet, for example, only when the photocopies of all the Jena manuscripts are immediately at hand can one analyze the handwriting to work out a chronology of Hegel's Jena texts.

As the work proceeded it finally became evident that the Hegel scholarship of the first fifty years of this century had been unable to lay the foundation for a chronological Hegel edition, namely, a historical interpretation of the development of Hegel's thought. For example, the theory of the genesis of the *Phänomenologie* used by Haering, Hoffmeister, and Hypolite to resolve an old conflict had to be given up as untenable. The chronology of Hegel's sketches of the Jena system has been overthrown; until now it was assumed that the *Logik*, *Metaphysik*, and *Naturphilosophie* were written in 1801, followed by *Realphilosophie I*, written in 1803/04, and *Realphilosophie II*, written in 1805/06. It was then asked how Hegel could fall from the high "dialectical" level of the *Logik*, *Metaphysik*, and *Naturphilosophie* of 1801 back into the Schelling-like forms of *Realphilosophie I* of 1803/04, only then to find his way back to his own starting point in *Realphilosophie II*. But this, the chief problem of interpretation, turned out to be a pseudo-problem, generated by a false chronology and incorrect editing. It was in 1804 that the *Logik*, *Metaphysik*, and *Naturphilosophie* were written; so Hegel's sketches of his system display a steady development. The manuscripts from 1803/04 are not a *Realphilosophie* at all; Hoffmeister only interpreted and edited them as such on the basis of the *Realphilosophie* of 1805/06. So while at the time of his death in 1955 Hoffmeister still believed that the Hegelian manuscripts and works were, in essence, sufficiently edited and that it was now time to undertake the editing of the lectures, it had to be recognized that there was lacking even the basic prerequisite for editing Hegel's manuscripts and works,

namely, an adequate history of the development of Hegelian thought and a chronological arrangement of his manuscripts.

In order to facilitate the work of editing, the Hegel Archive was established in 1958. For the first ten years it was located in Bonn; in 1968 it became part of Ruhr University at Bochum; and in 1969 it was moved to this new university in Germany's largest industrial region. The Archive has the following tasks:

Above all it is to furnish the prerequisites necessary for a critical edition of Hegel's works. The concentration of labor at this one place is to guarantee continuity in the methodology, planning, and execution of the work.

The Archive collects all Hegel's publications, and photocopies of both his manuscripts and the transcriptions of his lectures. It collects also all the literature that Hegel used and all literature concerning Hegel. At the present time the Archive has in its Hegel library over three thousand books and over fifteen thousand photocopies. By the end of 1971 we are to have acquired the basic collection of necessary books and photocopies. Then the Archive is to be made available to a wider public, offering in a unique way the possibility of studying a classical German philosopher from the sources. Eighty years ago Dilthey demanded an *Archiv der Literatur* to preserve the literary remains of philosophers; under different conditions and with the restriction to Hegel, the Hegel Archive seeks to meet Dilthey's demand. Dilthey knew that the literary remains of even the great philosophers had been scattered; that, for example, Kant's papers had been used to wrap coffee and herring. Today, to be sure, such papers are not used as wrapping paper; yet they have become collectors' items, a means of building prestige and capital. In this way, too, the papers are too often lost to scholarship. For the most part the possession of the papers is set; high prices make purchase of the larger collections impossible. Still, with photography, the manuscripts can be reproduced for scholarship.

Further, the Hegel Archive seeks to contribute to the promotion and coordination of Hegel research; it does this above all through the journal *Hegel Studien*. Since in recent years Hegel research has become more and more extensive, a survey of it is indispensable for those who want to work on definite questions, taking the research of others into account. Such a survey is possible through bibliographical reviews and abstracts of the individual contributions from the various countries and linguistic regions. It is important that the editing work remain in close contact with Hegel research. The best Kant scholars worked on the Kant edition; today such an arrangement is impossible because of the overload which burdens the

university teacher. This makes it all the more important that the younger men who take over the job of editing remain in constant contact with the Hegel scholarship of our time. Constant reciprocity alone can be fruitful. For example, a new chronology of the Jena manuscripts forces interpreters of Hegel to ask new questions; on the other hand only a satisfactory interpretation of Hegel, one which gives the history of his development, can certify this chronology. The one implies the other; they will arise simultaneously or not at all.

III

In 1893 Wilhelm Dilthey suggested to the Prussian Ministry of Education and the Berlin Academy of Sciences that there be issued an edition of Kant's works. He stressed that all of the prerequisites for editing Kant's entire intellectual legacy existed then in a way that could never be duplicated. In the preface to the Kant edition Dilthey formulated these prerequisites in this way: "a strong interest, extending to all branches (of Kant's legacy), men who have dedicated their lives to these studies, and a wealth of works which have been devoted to this legacy." Although Dilthey certainly did not foresee that the coming decades would bring at least two world wars, he did see clearly that, given the usual dispersion of philosophical remains, the possibility of collecting together the papers Kant left behind would not soon return. Now appears to be the time to take for Hegel the step which was taken for Kant. There has been a widespread interest in Hegel for more than fifty years; his papers are for the most part gathered together (even if the last war, once again, brought great losses; for example, lost forever are the transcripts of Hegel's lectures which were in the Königsberg municipal library).

The complete edition should make easier the study of Hegel and should make possible a new understanding of Hegel. In order to do this it must completely encompass the existing Hegelian texts – even the preliminary studies and sketches, the various drafts or editions, and the variant readings of single formulations. In general, all of the documents which give us Hegel's thought are significant and informative. Thus, the Hegel edition does not face the danger which confronted the Nietzsche edition of the Nietzsche Archive at Weimar: there philological receptiveness acquiesced to the piety of Nietzsche's sister, who had preserved her brother's every scrap of paper, and so, did not advance beyond the insignificant early texts to Nietzsche's real works; overlooked was Nietzsche's genius for snatching up everything preliminary into that will concentrated upon the single

task it had finally grasped. Hegel's texts are in all essential respects chronologically ordered, that is, they are grouped together according to the stages of his life and work. Within the individual phases which thus emerge (for example, the group of Jena texts) there can be doctrinal divisions. As opposed to the Academy editions of Kant's and Fichte's works, the Hegel edition will not separate from Hegel's publications the unpublished texts of the literary remains. Every volume will carry an editorial statement about the texts, supplying their dates of composition, chronological order, and tradition. This, of course, is not intended as an interpretation of Hegel's historical development. The *Anmerkungen* will identify quotations, elaborate on historical facts, etc., without becoming a commentary on the Hegelian text.

Dilthey proposed the Kant edition in 1893; he wrote his preface to the first volume in 1902. But even today we do not have that part of the Kant edition entitled *Vorlesungen*. It is to be hoped that the Hegel edition will be completed in a shorter time, that the ca 40 volumes can be published in about 40 years. Since it is clear that the framework of the historical development must still be worked out even for the early Hegelian texts, the editorial activity has concentrated on the volumes up to the *Phänomenologie* and the Nürnberg *Wissenschaft der Logik*. These volumes should be published in the next ten years. Already published is Volume 4 (*Jenaer Kritische Schriften*). At the printers are volume 1 (*Jugendschriften I*), volume 3 (*Exzerpte 1785-1800*), volume 7 (*Jenaer Systementwürfe II*) and volume 6 (*Jenaer Systementwürfe I*). A French translation of this edition is being prepared. Further, there are to be published student editions in German as well as French, which should make the Hegelian text available to a wider public (for example, in the German student edition by adapting the Hegelian text to contemporary spelling).

IV

It is estimated by those who are involved that, were the work of editing to be pursued continuously at its present rate, the Hegel edition could be finished in about 2007. One wonders what the world will be like when a complete edition of Hegel stands on the library shelves. It would be interesting above all to know whether this world will still be able to do anything with Hegel; more, what this world will in fact do with Hegel. But broad, rambling speculations are idle. Nevertheless, it is important to ask how Hegel philology can fit into Hegel research and how Hegel research can fit into philosophy.

With regard to the Kant edition he planned, Dilthey said that only by its means would there be possible a history of the development of Kant's thought. Dilthey stressed the history of Kant's development even though he knew that it would have been utterly foreign to Kant himself to see his work from this perspective (indeed, Kant did not want any of his pre-critical writings included in a Kant edition). In his preface to the Kant edition Dilthey links his interest in Kant's historical development to an "ultimate goal," "the historical understanding of the life's work of Kant," a goal to be achieved "by the ever-repeated confrontation between the historical situation in which Kant's thought occurred and the entire fruit of his intellectual activity as it has come down to us." The new complete Hegel edition should make possible such a historical understanding of Hegel's work as well. To be sure, Hegel philology will take a path other than that of Kant philology. Neo-Kantianism and Kant philology took Kant's critical work as the firm foundation from which to approach the pre-critical work; only gradually did Kant philology learn to relativize this starting point and examine in its own right the early thought which Kant later sought critically to surpass. Likewise, the editors of Hegel sought a firm foundation in the Hegelian system; but even Hegel's first followers and opponents looked upon the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* as the system's "crisis." Since Dilthey, the moving force of the interpretation of Hegel's development has been the antagonism between system and history (to which the young Hegel was devoted). Nevertheless, although Hegel always took his earlier drafts with him whenever he changed his residence, there can be no doubt that he too never wanted to see his thought from the perspective of its development. Friedrich Schlegel, indeed, planned an "autobiography," and Schlegel and Schleiermacher investigated Plato's development; but Hegel never recognized Schlegel and Schleiermacher as thinkers. While he applied the genetic point of view to the whole history of philosophy, the genetic view of a single philosopher was foreign to him. In general he was concerned to relate history to its taxonomy. So historical understanding (upon which there falls a special accent in the work of editing) can be only one of our possible approaches to Hegel. Other ways of approaching the subject-matter Hegel dealt with must have a place beside this one, while not combining with it in the same way in which Hegel sought to make system and history coincide.

Above all Dilthey also expected from research devoted to Hegel's development the scientific objectification of the approach to Hegel. "The age of the struggle with Hegel is over; the age of his historical recognition has arrived," Dilthey wrote in 1888 in that same review of *Briefe von und*

an Hegel, in which he first pointed to the significance of the Hegelian literary remains. We may here leave undecided whether what Dilthey's expectation implies, namely the ideal of a final historical explanation, is not altogether unrealistic; the fact is that in the eighty years since Dilthey's prognosis there has not occurred by means of historical research the expected objectification of the approach to Hegel. In the first place, the historical scholarship was shattered along with its most important results – the presumptuous ascription of the *Systemprogramm* to Schelling, the chronology of Hegel's Jena manuscripts, and the description of the genesis of the *Phänomenologie*. But above all, the historical scholarship increased rather than decreased the controversies which arise from the confrontation with Hegel.

This is shown very clearly, for example, in the case of the so-called *Altesten Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus*. Rosenzweig edited this Hegelian text in 1917 and sought to establish that it derived from Schelling, that is, that Hegel's notes were a mere copy. Then for a while Hölderlin was regarded as the author. Now it is asked whether indeed Hegel is not the author. Until now Hegel scholars have supposed that the thinking displayed in this *Programm* was not Hegel's. Thus to establish Hegel as the author, it would have to be shown that the young Hegel thought in the manner of the *Systemprogramm* but not in the manner attributed to him by Hegel scholars. The *Systemprogramm* proves to be an attempt to institute the idealistic philosophy in order that a revolution of German thought or spirit might yet achieve that revolutionizing of the traditional structures which had failed politically in France. The young Hegel wrote to Schelling, "on the basis of the Kantian system and its utmost completion, I expect in Germany a revolution from principles now at hand and needing only to be universalized in order to be applied to all accumulated knowledge." Manifestly from the point of view of historical philology the controversy about the *Systemprogramm* is not so simply resolved. Yet this controversy does bring to light new themes of Hegel's early thought. Indeed, this controversy forces us to correct decisively the usual schemata drawn from the presentation of the history of German idealism. If Hegel himself wrote the *Systemprogramm*, or even thought in the manner of this *Programm*, then it was he who understood Hölderlin's criticism of idealism and Hölderlin's mythic poetry (while the young Schelling, to whom alone this understanding is attributed, quarreled more with Hölderlin, as the tradition also reports). In Jena Hegel opposed Schelling from a thoroughly independent position; he did not need to be led by Schelling to a new philosophical starting point; rather, Schelling's starting point could have

been grasped by Hegel from within that criticism of Fichte which he shared with Hölderlin.⁶

The same is true of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. The solution to the controversy proposed by Haering was philologically indisputable but philosophically frivolous. Today the new chronology of Hegel's Jena manuscripts makes it possible to write a history of the development of Hegelian logic and metaphysics and, on the basis of the latter, of the *Phänomenologie*. Such attempts, however, introduce new motifs into Hegel's interpretation. In Kierkegaard's doctrine of the stages, in the young Marx's history of nature and of society, in Dilthey's critique of historical reason, and in the French philosophy inspired by Kojève, Hegel's *Phänomenologie* was taken primarily as "history," his logic as the useless shell which still clung to this philosophical egg of Columbus. But attention to Hegel's historical development reveals how much the *Phänomenologie* owes to the logico-metaphysical problematic and remains embedded in it.⁷ In this way philology becomes the advocate of Hegel himself; it lets Hegel's own voice be heard in the dialogue in which we seek with him and against him the correct point of departure for philosophy.

In a sketch of Kierkegaard's Hegel arrives in the underworld and Socrates immediately takes an interest in him. Socrates hears with astonishment that for Hegel the truth is the whole and that, if one would philosophize at all, he must study Hegel's system – indeed, must study this system as developed in the edition of Hegel's students. In the Socratic spirit we still pursue truth; but our lives are so short – should we really permit Hegel to speak for twenty volumes? And in the future should we permit him to speak for forty volumes to be produced only after forty years of historical-philological labor? But manifestly there is in scholarship a point of no return: once a science has taken up a subject, be it the eyes of insects or the works of Hegel, it must pursue its work to the end. Curtailment is failure – at least in our society, which still has such little self-understanding with regard to the place of its scientific and technical possibilities. Besides, Hegel research has in fact only the choice between many dispersed attempts at editing, which bring no final result, and the adequate organ-

⁶ Cf. my article: "Hegel, der Verfasser des ältesten Systemprogramms des deutschen Idealismus," *Hegel Studien*, Supplement 4 (Hegel Tage, Urbino, 1965), Bonn, 1969, 17-32.

⁷ For a discussion of the *Phänomenologie* cf. my essay "Die Komposition der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*," *Hegel Studien*, Supplement 3 (Hegel Tage, Royaumont, 1964), Bonn, 1966, 27-74. With regard to the chronology of Hegel's Jena writings cf. Heinz Künnerle, "Zur Chronologie von Hegels Jenaer Schriften," *Hegel Studien*, Vol. 4, Bonn, 1967, 125-176.

ization of that editorial activity which has been under way for the past seventy years.

If we succeed in synchronizing and pursuing systematically the historical-philological-editorial work on Hegel's writings, then the achievement of Hegel research can certainly be increased greatly. Of course there is in this a danger as well as an opportunity. The danger is that Hegel's philosophy might no longer survive as philosophy, but only as the object of scientific, i.e. philological interest. The opportunity is that the utilization of Hegel's work in philosophy could strengthen a thinking that is not only aware of being called to the methodological control of given scientific behavior, but asks also about the sense in the totality of our lives of the powers which determine our lives (e.g. science, technology, art, politics). Whether we exploit this opportunity depends essentially upon the strength of our philosophizing, the strength of our philosophical confrontation with Hegel, and, in general, the strength of our tradition.