

STUDIEN UND MATERIALIEN
ZUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE

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GEORGE J. SEIDEL

Activity and Ground:
Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel



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12. Politics

It is difficult to know whether to approach Hegel's views on politics from the side of man as self-maker, or approach man from the angle of Hegel's political views. The philosopher takes an essentially Greek view of the matter: there is a close interrelationship between ethics and politics.¹ There is, in Hegel's view, as was pointed out in the introduction to this work, an organic connection between the individual and society. Hence, whichever way one approaches the problem, he will enter and come out at the same point, namely the intimate conjunction between individual and society.

The political concerns of the young Hegel were largely directed against something termed "positivity," an obscure term which combines an authoritarian state with an established religion. As he notes, positive religion, supported by the state, for example, as an established church, is tied up with politics, and is opposed to freedom.² The religion of Jesus, he is convinced was not this; but Jesus' disciples quickly turned the teachings of their master into a positive sect.³ And as the small group became large, more positive ordinances were required; and this separated the Christian more and more from family, friends, and civic responsibility, so that eventually the sect became a state within a state.⁴ The influence of Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* can easily be detected in Hegel's view of early Christianity in the Roman Empire.⁵

Hegel's interest in the political, its relation to the individual and to religion, is present from the beginning to the end of his thought. He early criticizes Fichte's philosophy of community, saying that for Fichte freedom must cancel itself in order to be freedom.⁶ The state is indifferent to, but not against, the individual. Justice, then, must be something living, and respect the human person.⁷ What is man, the member of society? What is the human person? Already in 1795 Hegel had become convinced that "The general concept of human nature is no longer adequate."⁸ His struggle with a redefinition of man in his early writings is largely a struggle with the view of man which emerges from Kant's ethics, a man torn between duty and inclination. Thus, in his *Spirit of Christi-*

anity and its Lot, he notes that according to Kant man is to act out of duty, even to the thwarting of his inclinations. Hegel argues that this is but to make oneself a slave to his own reason; which is simply to destroy the freedom concerning which Kant is so insistent. Further, there is at least one "duty" which is also inclination; namely, love. Love cannot really be commanded, because in love any thought of duty simply falls aside. The unification of inclination with law makes law lose its form as law. Law taken up into love loses its *Gestalt*.⁹ Already one can discern Hegel's dislike of unresolved dualisms, and his preference for reconciliation. There are, however, several interesting ramifications to this. One can love others only if one loves oneself. However, from this it does not follow that one has a duty to love oneself. Hegel was convinced that this was a trap into which Fichte's notion of freedom as *Willkür* inevitably fell. In love, duty and inclination are joined. And to make inclination into duty is simply to engender a self-destructive selfishness.¹⁰ What Hegel saw in the Kantian drive for perfect autonomy, or in the Fichtean *Willkür*, was a will enslaved to its own rational decrees. Only an oblique reference to the social ("Act so that your maxim could become a universal law for all mankind") would save this sort of "autonomy" from a slavery to caprice and impulse as self-centered, unstable, and self-destructive as the impulses of inclination from which it would attempt to escape. Thus, Hegel speaks of the freedom of a person related only to himself as an abstract freedom.¹¹ He distinguishes between the abstract self-resolving of *Wille* and the caprice of *Willkür*, which both abstracts from everything and is yet dependent upon both internal and external material. Both *Wille* and *Willkür* he sees as abstract and one-sided. Form and content are required for genuine freedom.¹² Hegel was not, perhaps, the first philosopher (or spiritual writer) to note the danger of a false self; but he was one of the first to characterize its structure. He was also not the first philosopher to recognize that love in its totally undifferentiated form is simply not enough. It must be specified, as Hegel began to realize already in his discussion of the Sermon on the Mount in the *Jugendschriften*. It is no accident that the somewhat romantically-tinged notion of love,

which is initially used to overcome Kant, slips into the background in Hegel's more mature thought.

Hegel's basic criticism of the ethics of Kant and Fichte is contained in his criticism of the "ought" (*Sollen*), which leads only to a bad infinity. It is an ought without a ground. Why ought I? Because I ought. But why ought I? Because I ought. And so on, ad infinitum. One ought because one ought. Unfortunately, this is no philosophical reason. In terms of purely speculative reason Kant could provide no philosophical answer to the question, only common moral experience. Why ought I? Perhaps because of society. And here Hegel took the Greek view. A good society helps. However, Hegel was enough of a good Christian to realize that the state can do no more than to legislate against evildoers (St. Paul), not legislate morality. This latter is mere positivity. Similarly, "holiness" or the love of God cannot somehow be placed over and above morality.¹³ There is a danger here of doing harm to others in the name of the "love of God." Religion can never dispense with morality in the name of religion. This is also positivity.¹⁴ And in keeping with the distinction he draws between morality and religion, Hegel is equally opposed to the state using religion simply to bolster up public morals.¹⁵

Hegel's view of the role of the individual in society is, in a way, already set for him by his predecessors. Man is a doer and a maker. In the face of hostile nature, man must dominate it; and thus the whole that is man in relation to nature is split into idea and reality, which means that the dominance will lie either with the one side or the other.¹⁶ Man is a maker. But he is, in the process, also a self-maker.¹⁷ There is, however, nothing cheap about Hegel's self-making. Hegel is not a pure social functionalist, one who would say (after the fashion of a Durkheim or a Marx) that the meaning of the individuality a man possesses is determined by the function he performs in society. Hegel represents this position in the *Phenomenology*, in the section dealing with the realization of rational self-consciousness. The self sacrifices itself in order to achieve the full realization of its-self in the society. It achieves the satisfaction of its own needs and desires through the work of others; and others'

needs and desires are fulfilled through what the self does. The self that is thus sacrificed is given back to the self in self-recognition.¹⁸ The baker or teacher has a recognized place in the community, in virtue of the function he or she performs. Does this, then, mean that it is not possible to know what he or she is until the self sees what it does or what is has produced? To perform an action, Hegel insists, it is necessary to know the purpose of the action, as well as my ability to perform it, before it takes place. Further, one may be a baker; but he is not simply a baker. A society understood totally in terms of function would be no more than a spiritual zoo (*geistige Tierreich*).¹⁹ From this it may also be seen that Hegel rejects a strict organismic view of society (à la Herbert Spencer).²⁰ The little dialectical vignette noted above occurs, however, at the level of Reason; and, hence, is something which gets aufgehoben; it is not Hegel's final view of the matter. Hegel's self-making is not so cheap. A person is not simply the work he performs (baker or writer) or the functional position he occupies (mayor or clergyman) in the society; but, rather, what he has made of himself in terms of spirit, in terms of a free self-consciousness more and more aware of the truth.

What is aufgehoben is not only canceled, but also preserved and raised to a higher level. Work or labor in Hegel remains one of the central categories for understanding man and his relation to society.²¹ It is not merely the means whereby man gains his sustenance and satisfies his needs, or simply the means whereby he transforms the world of nature into products for human use; it is also the means of his self-making, as also the basis for his recognition by other selves. It is through his own self-making that man comes to define his-self. And in Hegel's view a thing must define itself, to be properly defined.²² Labor is the work of spirit. It was by means of work or labor that the slave gained his freedom. Intimations of Hegel's later treatment of the master-slave relationship can be found already in the *System der Sittlichkeit*; for example, in his discussion of the relation between enjoyment (*Genuss*) and work.²³ What establishes the relation between the master and slave is nature. The nature which the slave mediates for his master is exactly the same

as what in nature makes the slave to be a slave, namely fear for his own life (nature).²⁴ Nature, however, as that which mediates slave to master and master to slave, gradually ceases to mediate. It is replaced by work or labor as the mediating principle. For the slave dominates and overcomes nature by the work that he does on it in making over the products of nature for the enjoyment of his master. By mediating nature for the master through his (the slave's) work, the master becomes further and further separated from nature. Eventually, rather than the slave being dependent upon the master, the master becomes dependent upon the slave for the latter's mediation of nature for him (the master). The slave becomes the master, and gains a measure of freedom, while the master becomes the slave.²⁵ There is a sentence in Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie*, related to this, which is ominously prophetic: the separation of one man's production from another's makes work more and more mechanical, so that soon man can step aside and install machines in his place.²⁶ The machine, as the new slave of modern man, along with the attendant problems of humanity in a machine age, were glimpsed, however obscurely, already by Hegel.

Freedom is to characterize the existence of the individual in society. In fact, only in society is man free.²⁷ Hegel admits that it is impossible to explain freedom; it is shy of the light (*Lichtscheue*); it simply breaks forth in those that are free, revealing what it is, and what they are.²⁸ Hegel joins freedom and necessity in his peculiar fashion. Real necessity is also contingency, since its content is limited. Considered "in itself," contingency and necessity are united, dissolved in the necessity of becoming. Man is necessarily free. But he is not absolutely free, otherwise the necessity to be free would be absolute also; and then man could not be unfree. Hegel's position is that man is necessarily free; but there are certain (dialectical) necessities attached to the exercise of that freedom. It is a structured or contextual freedom; for it does and must have a content, unlike the freedom of the Stoic in the *Phenomenology*, who thinks he is free simply because he is free to think. Such an empty, contentless freedom is not freedom at all in Hegel's view. But if freedom is

contextual, the context within which it is to be primarily worked out is society. The will is an intelligence aware of itself as determining a content which is its own, as well as existent. However, one is not truly free, he adds, merely with a self-sought content, but rather with a more general one related to society (*Sittlichkeit*), religion, the state, etc.²⁹ He sees rights and duties, as he sees freedom and necessity, as necessarily correlative: no duties, no rights; no rights, no duties.³⁰ Rather than restricting man's freedom, duty frees, according to Hegel; it frees man from dependence upon natural impulse; it frees from indefinite subjectivity for specific actuality.³¹ Rights, though actually exist only in a community (*Gesellschaft*); what thereby gets limited and sacrificed is caprice (*Willkür*) and violence.³² The purpose of laws in the society is to curb evildoers, not legislate morality, as we have seen. There is, nevertheless, a close and intimate, an organic, relation between individual and society. Individual ethics (*Moralität*) is subjective ethics, whereas social ethics (*Sittlichkeit*) is an objective ethics within the context of a society, or objective spirit.³³ The difference between the individual and society, in Hegel's view, is purely a matter of form: subjectivity is itself the absolute form; the existing actuality, the substance. However, this difference is the "immediately disappearing difference of the form."³⁴ In other words, the individual is to integrate himself into the society, in the same way that the society assimilates him. Hegel's definition of the state as "the actuality of concrete freedom" expresses this succinctly. The word concrete (*con-crescere*), used here, is significant. For it means that there is a "growing together," so that eventually individuals in pursuing their own ends also pursue state ends; for included in the actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) is the Notion (*Begriff*), which includes ends, purposes, and goals. One can see how Hegel's notion of the *List der Vernunft* can operate in the social world of practical politics. Many people can agree on the same thing for different reasons. But since these "reasons" derive ultimately from the same Notion, to which all citizens are to some extent acculturated, these "reasons" can coalesce into that indeterminate freedom which is reason's cunning.

One might, of course, wonder what sort of state Hegel has in mind in his *Rechtsphilosophie*. The question is not an easy one to answer. At one point he seems to say that people get the kind of constitution (rather than the kind of leaders) they deserve.³⁵ At times, Hegel's "just state" (*Recht*) seems to favor a monarchy, with an added bureaucracy; at other times, he appears to favor a constitutional monarchy or a parliamentary form of government.³⁶ There have been those who accused Hegel of being a crypto communist or fascist. Given Hegel's attitude toward Fichte's political thought, and his radical criticism of Fichte's attempt to translate Rousseau's social contract theory into the philosophical terms of an equality achieved by each restricting his freedom in relation to the freedom of others,³⁷ a leftist Hegel seems very unlikely. The older Hegel had mellowed a great deal from his early enthusiasm toward the ideals of the French Revolution. Hegel does, perhaps, lean somewhat more toward the right than the left. But if he is conservative, this does not make him a champion of the Prussian *status quo*.³⁸ Hegel's "just state" is no specific form of government; but, rather, a way of understanding any and every form of government. He criticizes all the forms of government from one point of view or another.³⁹ If one is to criticize Hegel's conception of the state, it must be done on the score of his limited view of the state. It is always the nation-state that he has in mind. There is no envisioning of an international state, or even of international law.⁴⁰ The notion of a super-power, in effect, a conjunction of smaller states, was simply not within the ken of his experience or imagination.

One measure of the different view which Hegel takes regarding the relation between the individual and society may be seen by comparing the problem of Antigone in the *Phenomenology* with his treatment of the same problem in the *Rechtsphilosophie*. In the struggle between Antigone, who represents the private law of the hearth, and the heart, and Creon, who represents the public law of the land, and forbids that the bodies of traitors and rebels (Antigone's brother) should be buried, it is Antigone who wins out.⁴¹ It may, of course, appear that in being punished for violating the law, by burying her brother, Antigone is the loser; however, Hegel's

dialectic indicates that Creon has gone too far, and is, in fact, the loser. In the *Rechtsphilosophie*, on the other hand, Hegel is still aware of the element of tragedy in the case of Antigone; the treatment also retains the overtones of a war between the sexes. However, Antigone is not the clear winner, as she was in the *Phenomenology*. The reaction against individualism has already set in.⁴²

The reaction against the revolutionary takes shape already in the *Phenomenology*, in the dialectic on the French Revolution. Hegel's basic principle in all such matters is that spiritual revolutions (*innere Umwälzung*) always precede actual, political ones.⁴³ Thus, Hegel begins his treatment of the steps leading up to the revolution with the noble (Rousseau), who, in written language, declares that the noble (civilization) is savage; and the savage (peasants) noble.⁴⁴ The difficulty with the revolutionary, with any revolution according to Hegel, is that in order successfully to reject that against which the revolutionary is rebelling, he must have fully assimilated it. But to the extent that he has fully assimilated it, he cannot reject it fully. Thus, Louis XVI becomes Robespierre becomes Napoleon. The revolution is a failure, as, in Hegel's view, every revolution must be.

Hegel may have danced around the freedom tree, planted by the once happy trio of Schelling, Hölderlin, and Hegel, in the courtyard of the Tübingen *Stift*. However, a Hegel sympathetic with the ideals of the early romantics was bound to take a different and less sympathetic view of matters (French) revolutionary after the events of the Reign of Terror and Napoleon marching through Jena in 1806. All this is related to Hegel's growing negative reaction to Rousseau. Spirit, he was convinced, is present in civilizations and cultures as well as in Nature. Hegel had similar doubts about a state of innocence. He found innocence both uninteresting and unrealistic, as will be seen in greater detail in treating Hegel's view on religion. An innocent (*tadellos*) state Hegel finds deedless (*tatenlos*). Innocence, at a personal level, Hegel characterizes as doing nothing (*Nichttun*), like the existence of a stone, not even that of a child.⁴⁵

There is, however, something curious about Hegel's philosophy of

history. One might be led to believe that he favors only the great of this world (Napoleon as "world spirit astride a horse"). The line of dialectic, however, moves through the slave, not through the master, through the peasant, not through Louis XVI, through Antigone, not through Creon, etc. Hegel's sympathies are clearly on the side of the little man. The great man is a great man only because he happens to be the right man at the right time; and the fact that he is the "right" man at the right time is governed by the society which creates and, to whatever extent, permits and supports him. Thus, no matter how much the state may fail to fulfill the function (the meaning of *Idea* in Hegel's thought) of state, no matter how much it may fail to fulfill the Notion (purpose) or state, so that the soul leaves the body, as he says, and heads off into the abstract, and the individuals in that society get atomized, still the Notion of state still constitutes essentially the individuals' nature.⁴⁶ In other words, no matter how bad the Prussian state may be, it is invariably better able to command the respect and obedience of its citizens than Rousseau's unrealistic state of nature or the Hobbesian *homo homini lupus*.

Hegel's economic theory is, one would have to admit, conservative. He recognizes property as the determinate being (*Dasein*) of personality.⁴⁷ Private property is a right, implying, and demanding, a mutual recognition on the part of the other.⁴⁸ Only briefly does Hegel refer to something like the modern corporation.⁴⁹ And the character of a conglomerate, reduced to the nature of a public trust by a system of taxation, is simply foreign to his experience. His economic theory is based upon the notion of desires and needs. And in his society entrepreneurs are generally to be left free, along with a requisite social responsibility; he recognizes that there must be some control on the fulfillment of desires.⁵⁰ That Hegel's notion of property is set firmly within the context of the will and freedom may be seen from his consideration of the human body under the rubric of property (*Eigentum*). He views the body in the same fashion as Fichte: it is mine only to the extent that it does my will.⁵¹

Hegel's consideration of politics in the *Jugendschriften* is, as we have seen, intimately connected with religion. Hegel was aware of Kant's

view regarding the relation between church and state as separate entities.⁵² Hegel's own attitude toward unresolved dualisms has often been noted. He sees as unrealistic any attempt to separate the two in such a way that the state simply operates in the temporal realm, the church in the spiritual. He insists on the inner and outer reality of both church and state. They are different forms of consciousness, surely; and a union which would blur over the difference would, indeed, be equally incorrect. Nevertheless, Hegel cannot see how the two can be kept strictly separate. There is an interrelationship of mutual interpenetration.⁵³ He notes this mutual influence by insisting that a society with a bad concept of God is also a bad state. For, after all, the basis for religion, as for the state, is the same (God). It is merely freedom realized in different ways.⁵⁴ Church and state are intimately joined. For outside the social realm true religion is not to be found. The reason why they are intimately joined is because the state (*Reich des Wesens*) and religion (*Weit des Glaubens*) are together in the Notion.⁵⁵ Religion is, after all, the substantiality of social life and of the state, which means that for religion to fulfill its function in society it must have a genuine content (*Inhalt*), both in the state and in the citizens of the state.⁵⁶ Hegel would deny any separation between sacred and secular; however, he would also be extremely cautious about any sort of complete union of the two. Hegel is a radical Incarnationalist: the sacred (*göttliche Geist*) must permeate the secular. On the other hand, the union of a religion of unfreedom in a free state is out of court.⁵⁷

Hegel is sometimes accused of being a secularist, of sacralizing the secular and secularizing the sacred. He is as insistent as he can be upon the divine element in society, as well as in nature. There is objective spirit here. But Hegel is not blind to the banal and worthless side of human culture. Spirit can be at a very low ebb in some societies and civilizations. One can see the sacred in the secular only if it is actually there. So far as the charge that Hegel secularizes the sacred is concerned, it must be admitted that he is a radical Incarnationalist. But again, like the relation which he holds between church and state, there is not a

union of identity (in the sense of das Gleiche) between the two realms, but rather a mutual interpenetration of the two. Hegel's dislike of unresolved dualisms is always counterbalanced by his equal dislike of identities which deny difference.

12. Politics

1. Although Hegel will also say that even the Greeks did not have the true idea of freedom; this came only with Christianity. Enzyk., no. 482 (p. 388). In Christianity each is before God; the Greeks still had slavery. Grégoire, Études hégéliennes, pp. 286-287.
2. Jugendschriften, pp. 39 ff., 44. Nevertheless, Hegel will hold to the principle of cujus regio eius religio. Sittlichkeit, p. 87. In a monarchy religion must stand near the monarch. Sittlichkeit, p. 91. He remarks on the bloodshed in the name of religion (and the state). Jugendschriften, p. 140.
3. Jugendschriften, pp. 141, 162.
4. Jugendschriften, pp. 166-167, 180. Positivity is also numbers (p. 171). It manifests pretensions against understanding, reason, and necessary laws (p. 142).
5. For the influence of Gibbon on Hegel (though in the Jugendschriften, pp. 305, 366, Hegel both agrees and disagrees with Gibbon's rationalism) see: Haering, Hegel: sein Wollen und sein Werk, II, 220-225. G. E. Müller insists upon the importance of Gibbon's influence in Hegel's Jugend-

schriften, as also upon the section on the Unhappy Consciousness in the Phenomenology. "Fünf Ursprünge von Hegels Religionsphilosophie," Studia Philosophica, 22 (1962) 74-75.

6. In his Differenzschrift, Ges. Werke IV, 54.

7. Sittlichkeit, p. 82.

8. Jugendschriften, p. 141. According to Christa Dulckheit-v. Arnim, this is to be understood against the backdrop of the 19th century reaction to the mechanistic view of man-in-world of the Enlightenment. "Die ontologischen Grundlagen der hegelschen Menschenlehre," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 68 (1959) 140.

9. Jugendschriften, pp. 265-268. In love alone is the subject one with the object (p. 376). Love is not an imperative, not a universal, as opposed to a particular, not a conceptual unity, but a unity of spirit, divinity; it is to feel oneself in the All of the infinite (p. 296).

Thus Hegel sees Jesus as having opposed the positivity of Judaism; but instead of proposing Kant's autonomy against such heteronomy, as he had done earlier, Hegel finds in Jesus the positing of the subjectivity of love. Jugendschriften, pp. 276-277.

10. This is one of Hegel's criticisms of early Christianity. When it became positive, the ideal of perfection was no longer morality, but true divinity with God as a mere transcendental object. Jugendschriften, p. 226. This anticipates his treatment of the Unhappy Consciousness in the Phenomenology.

11. Rechtsphil., no. 40.

12. Rechtsphil., no. 12-16. There is very likely a Pauline background (as well as a Schellingian one) for this distinction. In his Religionsphilosophie lectures, he notes the two wills (natürliche Wille, that of desire; and the notion of willing, Willkür) in St. Paul. Phil. der Rel., IV, 107.

13. Jugendschriften, pp. 17-18. Anticipations of Hegel's treatment of the Beautiful Soul theme in the Phenomenology can already be detected here.

14. A situation (or love) ethic is but a refined form of self-love. Jugendschriften, p. 18. In the Phenomenology Hegel considers those who would

follow the "law of the heart." He notes two things: unfortunately reality does not always follow the law of the heart; likewise, such following of the dictates of the heart is always individual and cannot count as the universality of law. It ultimately leads to a genuine homo homini lupus. Phän., pp. 266-274 (Phen., pp. 391-400).

15. Jugendschriften, p. 175.

16. Jugendschriften, p. 244.

17. "The totality of work is complete individuality plus identity with the opposed, in which totality the relation is posited and aufgehoben," Sittlichkeit, p. 18. Thus E. L. Fackenheim (Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought) interprets Hegel not as the last of the post-Kantian idealists, but as the first of the contemporary philosophers, a sort of pre-existentialist. There is, of course, much truth to this; the later idealisms, especially of Schelling and Hegel, are very different from the enthusiastic first blushes of absolute idealism.

18. Phän., pp. 256-257 (Phen., pp. 375-376).

19. Phän., pp. 287 ff. (Phen., pp. 421 ff.).

20. Although he does speak of the state as a political organism (Rechtsphil., no. 269), and earlier of the constitution and the state as an organism (Rechtsphil., no. 267).

21. As Herbert Marcuse rightly points out. Reason and Revolution, p. 78.

22. Logik II, 457. This is why the definition of man, by man, as a being with ear-lobes is not a satisfactory definition. Logik II, 455.

23. He sees enjoyment as the subsumption of the Begriff under the Anschauung, and work as the subsumption of the Anschauung under the Begriff. Sittlichkeit, p. 16. Curious use of Kantian terms. On the master-slave relationship more specifically, see pp. 34-36. It is interesting to note in this work that the duel, between those who would identify life with honor, takes place after the master-slave dialectic, as its testing (Prüfung), Sittlichkeit, pp. 48-51, rather than before, as in the Phenomenology.

24. Phän., p. 149 (Phen., p. 239). One might argue that what assists Hegel's dialectic on this score is Schelling's notion of the "pre-estab-

lished harmony." There is a harmony between nature taken as unconscious (desire, life, body) and nature as non-conscious spirit (mediated by the slave for the master).

25. Phän., p. 148 (Phen., p. 238). The master-slave schema is variously applied by Hegel. It is applied to Judaism, which Hegel characterizes as a slave religion (Knechtschaft eines Fremden, Jugendschriften, p. 386), as also certain forms of Christianity (for example, monasticism). One might question the source for this metaphor. A likely candidate might be the body-soul relation in Plato's Phaedo, the soul as master, the body as slave, the body dragging the soul down, since the soul must use the body in perception. And, like Plato's Phaedo, the master-slave dialectic need not end in death. It can end in philosophy (in Hegel, Stoicism).

26. Rechtsphil., no. 198.

27. Rechtsphil., no. 153. Society is also a moral person, an actual self-consciousness, having self-knowledge; hence, it is also an object of knowledge. Rechtsphil., no. 149.

28. Logik II, 180-183.

29. Enzyk., no. 468-469. As Jean Hyppolite says, the spirit of a people is what reconciles the ought-to-be (Sollen) with what is. The spirit of a people - Sitte - the Greek ethos. Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire de Hegel, Paris: Riviére, 1948, p. 16. Regarding the relation between the freedom of the individual and society, he says, "Mais précisément pour le jeune Hegel la liberté n'est pas le libre arbitre de l'individu; elle exprime une relation harmonieuse entre l'individu et sa cité..." Ibid., p. 28. L. J. Goldstein notes that for Hegel the state is the necessary context of freedom, the place in which ethical values are internalized; and this defines the real possibilities open to the individual. "The Meaning of 'State' in Hegel's Philosophy of History," Journal of Philosophy, 12 (1962) 69-72. He insists, further, that the meaning of "state" in Hegel is, in the language of more recent writers, "culture." Ibid., p. 66. E. F. Carriv compares the meaning of Sittlichkeit in Hegel with Plato's Justice and Kant's Moralität. "Hegel's 'Sittlichkeit'," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., 36 (1935-1936) 223-236. Ulrich Bernstein

insists that Hegel's view of the state and of society is "integrally bound up with fundamental metaphysical, logical, epistemological and ethical theories" of the Lutheran tradition. "Hegel's Lutheran Background," Review of Religion, 3 (1938-1939) 383-384.

30. Enzyk., no. 486.

31. Enzyk., no. 502.

32. Rechtsphil., no. 149.

33. Rechtsphil., no. 105 ff.

34. Rechtsphil., no. 152.

35. Rechtsphil., no. 274.

36. G. R. G. Mure suggests that Hegel's state is really closer to the English Parliamentary system, though with a Prussian application in mind. The Philosophy of Hegel, London: Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 169-176.

37. Enzyk., no. 539.

38. There is, as Jacob Fleischmann says, no indication that Hegel thought the Prussian state reached even a fraction of moral purposes. There is for him, a higher factor: universal spirit is above the rise and fall of states. "Hegel's Theory of the Will," Scripta Hierosolymitana, 4 (1960)

314. Cf. also the exchange between T. M. Knox and E. F. Carr, "Hegel and Prussianism," Philosophy, 15 (1940) 51-63, 190-196, 313-317.

39. Rechtsphil., no. 279.

40. There can be no real international law, since law depends for its actuality upon different states. Rechtsphil., no. 330. As G. R. G. Mure says, "Hegel never had any more sympathy for the Kantian ideal of everlasting peace to be achieved through the union of nations in a world-state than he had for empire." The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 57, n. 2.

41. Phän., pp. 325 ff. (Phen., pp. 473 ff.).

42. Rechtsphil., no. 166. This becomes even clearer in the note on Solger attached to no. 140.

43. Phän., p. 414 (Phen., p. 599).

44. Phän., p. 371 (Phen., p. 542).

45. Phän., p. 334 (Phen., p. 488). He characterizes innocence as dumb,

unconscious without will. Phil. der Rel., I/2, 32. Cf. also Jugend-schriften, p. 58.

46. Logik II, 410.

47. Rechtsphil., no. 51. He distinguishes between alienation (Veräusserung), Ibid., no. 53, giving up (Aufgeben) something already external, which is yet my property (Cf. Hegel's own note to no. 43 of the Rechtsphil., p. 330), and abandonment (Entäusserung) of something to the status of a res nullius. Rechtsphil., no. 65. The basis for this distinction is the will. Ibid., no. 64. Joachim Ritter points out the close connection between Hegel's concept of personality and the juridical right to dispose of things, especially in the Rechtsphilosophie. "Personne et propriété selon Hegel," Archives de Philosophie, 31 (1968) 179-201.

48. Enzyk., no. 488-492.

49. Enzyk., no. 534.

50. Rechtsphil., no. 184 ff.

51. "... nur insofern es mein Wille ist." Rechtsphil., no. 47. So far as the body is "immediate existence," he says, it is not in conformity with spirit; for it to be a willing instrument or "besouled" means that it must be taken over by spirit. Ibid., no. 48.

52. Cf. Rechtsphil., appendix no. 8, B.

53. Rechtsphil., no. 270, Zusatz. Church and state are not to exist as separate wholes. Logik II, 409. They are like soul and body. Thus Hegel says that charity is to be taken care of by the civil society, rather than being left up to the casual almsgiving of the private citizen. Rechtsphil., no. 242.

54. Phil. der Rel., I, 303, 247.

55. Phän., pp. 315-316 (Phen., pp. 460-461).

56. Enzyk., no. 552.

57. Enzyk., no. 552, 567. As he characterizes the view of the church of Rome. As Hermann Luebbe notes, the proper relation between church and state is neither separation nor union, but a "rapport." "Hegel, critique de la société politisée," Archives de Philosophie, 31 (1968) 24.