

the Notion is therefore essentially this: to be distinct as an explicit identity from its *implicit* objectivity, and thereby to possess externality, yet in this external totality to be the totality's self-determining identity. As such, the Notion is now the *Idea*.

Section Three: The Idea

The Idea is the *adequate Notion*, that which is objectively *true*, or the *true as such*. When anything whatever possesses truth, it possesses it through its Idea, or, *something possesses truth only in so far as it is Idea*. The expression 'idea' has often been employed in philosophy as in ordinary life for 'notion', indeed, even for a mere ordinary conception: 'I have no *idea* yet of this lawsuit, building, neighbourhood', means nothing more than the ordinary conception. Kant has reclaimed the expression Idea for the *notion of reason*. Now according to Kant, the notion of reason is supposed to be the notion of the *unconditioned*, but a notion *transcendent* in regard to phenomena, that is, no *empirical use* can be made of such notion that is *adequate to it*. The notions of reason are to serve for the comprehension of perceptions, the notions of the understanding for understanding them. But in fact, if the latter really are *Notions*, then *they are Notions*—they enable one to comprehend [*begreifen*], and an *understanding* of perceptions by means of notions of the understanding will be a *comprehension* of them. But if understanding is only a determining of perceptions by such categories as for example whole and parts, force, cause, and the like, it signifies only a determining by reflection; and similarly, by understanding can be meant only the specific *representation* of a completely determined sensuous content; thus when someone, having been directed that at the end of the wood he must turn left, replies 'I *understand*', *understanding* means nothing more than the grasping of something in pictorial thought and in memory. '*Notion of reason*', too, is a somewhat clumsy expression; for the Notion is something altogether rational; and in so far as reason is distinguished from understanding and the Notion as such, it is the totality of the Notion and of objectivity. In this sense the Idea is the *rational*; it is the unconditioned, because only that has conditions which essentially relates itself to an objectivity, but an objectivity that it has not itself determined but which still confronts it in the form of indifference and externality, just as the external end still had conditions.

Reserving then the expression 'Idea' for the objective or real Notion and distinguishing it from the Notion itself and still more from mere pictorial thought, we must also reject even more vigor-

ously that estimate of the Idea according to which it is not anything actual, and true thoughts are said to be *only ideas*. If *thoughts* are merely *subjective* and contingent, they certainly have no further value; but in this respect they are not inferior to temporal and contingent *actualities* which likewise have no further value than that of contingencies and phenomena. On the other hand if, conversely, the Idea is not to have the value of truth, because in regard to phenomena it is *transcendent*, and no congruent object can be assigned to it in the world of sense, this is an odd misunderstanding that would deny objective validity to the Idea because it lacks that which constitutes Appearance, namely, the *untrue being* of the objective world. In regard to practical Ideas, Kant recognizes that 'nothing can be more harmful and unworthy of a philosopher than the *vulgar* appeal to an *experience* that allegedly conflicts with the Idea. This very experience would not even exist if, for example, political institutions had been established at the proper time in conformity with Ideas, and if *crude conceptions*, crude just because they had been drawn from experience, had not taken the place of Ideas and so nullified every good intention.' Kant regards the Idea as a necessity and as the goal which, as the *archetype*, it must be our endeavour to set up for a maximum and to which we must strive to bring the condition of the actual world ever nearer.

But having reached the result that the Idea is the unity of the Notion and objectivity, is the true, it must not be regarded merely as a *goal* to which we have to approximate but which itself always remains a kind of *beyond*; on the contrary, we must recognize that everything actual *is* only in so far as it possesses the Idea and expresses it. It is not merely that the object, the objective and subjective world in general, *ought to be congruous* with the Idea, but they are themselves the congruence of Notion and reality; the reality that does not correspond to the Notion is mere *Appearance*, the subjective, contingent, capricious element that is not the truth. When it is said that no object is to be found in experience that is perfectly congruous with the *Idea*, one is opposing the Idea as a subjective standard to the actual; but what anything actual is supposed in truth *to be*, if its Notion is not in it and if its objectivity does not correspond to its Notion at all, it is impossible to say; for it would be nothing. It is true that the mechanical and chemical object, like the non-spiritual subject and the spirit that is conscious

only of the finite, not of its essence, do not, according to their various natures, have their Notion existent in them *in its own free form*. But they can only be true at all in so far as they are the union of their Notion and reality, of their soul and their body. Wholes like the state and the church cease to exist when the unity of their Notion and their reality is dissolved; man, the living being, is dead when soul and body are parted in him; dead nature, the mechanical and chemical world—taking, that is, the dead world to mean the inorganic world, otherwise it would have no positive meaning at all—dead nature, then, if it is separated into its Notion and its reality, is nothing but the subjective abstraction of a thought form and a formless matter. *Spirit* that was not Idea, was not the unity of the Notion with its own self, or the Notion that did not have the Notion itself for its reality would be dead, spiritless spirit, a material object.

The Idea being the unity of Notion and reality, *being* has attained the significance of *truth*; therefore what now *is* is only what is Idea. Finite things are finite because they do not possess the complete reality of their Notion within themselves, but require other things to complete it—or, conversely, because they are presupposed as objects, hence possess the Notion as an external determination. The highest to which they attain on the side of this finitude is external purposiveness. That actual things are not congruous with the Idea is the side of their *finitude* and *untruth*, and in accordance with this side they are *objects*, determined in accordance with their various spheres and in the relationships of objectivity, either mechanically, chemically or by an external end. That the Idea has not completely leavened its reality, has imperfectly subdued it to the Notion, this is a possibility arising from the fact that the Idea itself has a *restricted content*, that though it is essentially the unity of Notion and reality, it is no less essentially their difference; for only the object is their immediate, that is, merely *implicit* unity. But if an object, for example the state, *did not correspond at all* to its Idea, that is, if in fact it was not the Idea of the state at all, if its reality, which is the self-conscious individuals, did not correspond at all to the Notion, its soul and its body would have parted; the former would escape into the solitary regions of thought, the latter would have broken up into the single individualities. But because the Notion of the state so essentially constitutes the nature of these individualities, it is present in them

as an urge so powerful that they are impelled to translate it into reality, be it only in the form of external purposiveness, or to put up with it as it is, or else they must needs perish. The worst state, still exists, is still Idea; the individuals still obey a dominant Notion.

However, the Idea has not merely the more general meaning of the *true being*, of the unity of *Notion* and *reality*, but the more specific one of the unity of *subjective Notion* and *objectivity*. That is to say, the Notion as such is itself already the identity of itself and *reality*; for the indefinite expression 'reality' means in general nothing else but *determinate being*, and this the Notion possesses in its particularity and individuality. Similarly too, *objectivity* is the total *Notion* that out of its determinateness has withdrawn into its *identity* with itself. In the former subjectivity the determinateness or difference of the Notion is an *illusory being* [*Schein*] that is immediately sublated and has withdrawn into being-for-self or negative unity; it is an *inhering* predicate. But in this objectivity the determinateness is posited as an immediate totality, as an external whole. Now the Idea has shown itself to be the Notion liberated again into its subjectivity from the immediacy in which it is submerged in the object; to be the Notion that distinguishes itself from its objectivity, which however is no less determined by it and possesses its substantiality only in that Notion. This identity has therefore rightly been defined as the *subject-object*, for it is as well the formal or subjective Notion as it is the object as such. But this must be understood more precisely. The Notion, having truly attained its reality, is this absolute judgement whose *subject*, as self-related negative unity, distinguishes itself from its objectivity and is the latter's being-in-and-for-self, but essentially relates itself to it through itself; it is therefore its *own end* [*Selbstzweck*] and the *urge* to realize it; but for this very reason the subject does not possess objectivity in an immediate manner, for if it did it would be merely the totality of the object as such lost in objectivity; on the contrary, objectivity is the realization of the end, an objectivity posited by the activity of the end, an objectivity which, as *positedness*, possesses its subsistence and its form only as permeated by its subject. As objectivity, it has in it the moment of the *externality* of the Notion and is therefore in general the side of finitude, change and Appearance, a side, however, which meets

with extinction in its retraction into the negative unity of the Notion; the negativity whereby its indifferent mutual externality exhibits itself as unessential and a positivity, is the Notion itself. The Idea is, therefore, in spite of this objectivity utterly *simple* and *immaterial*, for the externality exists only as determined by the Notion and as taken up into its negative unity; in so far as it exists as indifferent externality it is not merely at the mercy of mechanism in general but exists only as the transitory and untrue. Although therefore the Idea has its reality in a material externality, this is not an abstract *being* subsisting on its own account over against the Notion; on the contrary, it exists only as a *becoming* through the negativity of indifferent being, as a simple determinateness of the Notion.

This yields the following more precise definitions of the Idea. First, it is the simple truth, the identity of the Notion and objectivity as a *universal* in which the opposition and subsistence of the particular is dissolved into its self-identical negativity and is equality with itself. Secondly, it is the *relation* of the explicit subjectivity of the simple Notion and its objectivity which is *distinguished* therefrom; the former is essentially the *urge* to sublimate this separation, and the latter is the indifferent positedness, the subsistence that is in and for itself null. As this relation, the Idea is the *process* of sundering itself into individuality and its inorganic nature, and again of bringing this inorganic nature under the power of the subject and returning to the first simple universality. The *identity* of the Idea with itself is one with the *process*; the thought which liberates actuality from the illusory show of purposeless mutability and transfigures it into the Idea must not represent this truth of actuality as a dead repose, as a mere *picture*, lifeless, without impulse or movement, as a genius or number, or an abstract thought; by virtue of the freedom which the Notion attains in the Idea, the Idea possesses within itself also the *most stubborn opposition*, its repose consists in the security and certainty with which it eternally creates and eternally overcomes that opposition, in it meeting with *itself*.

In the first instance, however, the Idea is once again only *immediate* or only in its *Notion*; objective reality is, it is true, conformable to the Notion, but it is not yet liberated into the Notion, and the latter does not exist explicitly *for itself as Notion*. Thus though the Notion is *soul*, it is soul in the guise of an

immediate, that is, its determinateness does not appear *as* soul itself, it has not grasped itself as soul, it does not possess its objective reality within itself; the Notion is as a soul that is not yet *fully a soul*.

At this first stage the Idea is *Life*: the Notion that, distinguished from its objectivity, simple within itself, pervades its objectivity and, as its own end, possesses its means in the objectivity and posits the latter as its means, yet is immanent in this means and is therein the realized end that is identical with itself. This Idea, on account of its immediacy, has *individuality* for the form of its existence. But the reflection-into-self of its absolute process is the sublation of this immediate individuality; thereby the Notion which, as universality in this individuality, is the *inwardness* of the latter, converts the externality into universality, or posits its objectivity as being the same as itself.

In this second stage, the Idea is the Idea of the *true* and the *good*, as *cognition* and *volition*. In the first instance, it is finite cognition and finite volition, in which the true and the good are still distinguished and each appears as yet only as a *goal*. The Notion has, in the first instance, liberated *itself* into itself and as yet given itself only an *abstract objectivity* for its reality. But the process of this finite cognition and action converts the initially abstract universality into a totality, whereby it becomes a *complete objectivity*. Or, to consider it from the other side, finite, that is, subjective spirit, *makes* for itself the *presupposition* of an objective world, just as life *has* such a presupposition; but its activity consists in sublating this presupposition and converting it into a positedness. In this way its reality is for it the objective world, or conversely, the objective world is the ideality in which it cognizes itself.

Thirdly, spirit cognizes the Idea as its *absolute truth*, as the truth that is in and for itself; the infinite Idea in which cognition and action are equalized, and which is the *absolute knowledge of itself*.

CHAPTER I

LIFE

The Idea of Life is concerned with a subject matter so concrete, and if you will so real, that with it we may seem to have overstepped the domain of logic as it is commonly conceived. Certainly, if logic were to contain nothing but empty, dead forms of thought, there could be no mention in it at all of such a content as the Idea of life. But if absolute truth is the subject matter of logic, and *truth* as such is essentially *in cognition*, then *cognition* at least would have to be discussed. So-called pure logic is usually followed up with an *applied* logic—a logic dealing with *concrete cognition*, not to mention the mass of *psychology* and *anthropology* that it is often deemed necessary to interpolate into logic. But the anthropological and psychological side of cognition is concerned with its *manifested aspect* [*Erscheinung*], in which the Notion on its own account has not yet come to have an objectivity the same as itself, that is, to have itself for object. The part of logic that treats of this concrete side does not belong to *applied logic* as such; if it did, then every science would have to be dragged into logic, for each is an applied logic in so far as it consists in apprehending its subject matter in forms of thought and the Notion. The subjective Notion has presuppositions which present themselves in psychological, anthropological and other forms. But to logic belong only the presuppositions of the pure Notion in so far as they have the form of pure thoughts, of abstract essentialities, that is, the determinations of *being* and *essence*. Similarly, in respect of *cognition*, the Notion's apprehension of itself, logic will not deal with other shapes of its presupposition but only with that which is itself Idea; this latter, however, necessarily falls to be dealt with in logic. Now this presupposition is the *immediate* Idea; for since cognition is the Notion in so far as this is for itself but as a subjectivity is in relation to an objectivity, the Notion is related to the Idea as *presupposed* or *immediate* Idea. But the immediate Idea is *life*.

To this extent the necessity of treating of the Idea of life in logic would be based on the necessity, otherwise recognized, too, of treating here of the concrete Notion of cognition. But this Idea

has come upon the scene through the Notion's own necessity; the *Idea*, that which is *true* in and for itself, is essentially the subject matter of logic; since it is at first to be considered in its immediacy, it must be apprehended and cognized in this determinateness in which it is *life*, in order that its treatment shall not be an empty affair devoid of determinate content. All that we need perhaps to remark is how far the logical view of life differs from any other scientific view of it; this is not the place, however, to concern ourselves with how life is treated in the unphilosophical sciences, but only with differentiating logical life as pure *Idea* from natural life which is dealt with in the *philosophy of nature*, and from life in so far as it stands in connexion with *spirit*. The former of these, as the life of nature, is life as projected into the *externality of existence* and having its *condition* in inorganic nature, and where the moments of the *Idea* are a multiplicity of actual formations. Life in the *Idea* is without such *presuppositions* which are in the form of shapes of actuality; its presupposition is the *Notion* as we have considered it, on the one hand as subjective, on the other hand as objective. In nature life appears as the highest stage, a stage that nature's externality attains by withdrawing into itself and sublating itself in subjectivity. In Logic it is simple inwardness and sublating itself in subjectivity. In Logic it is simple inwardness [In sich sein], which in the *Idea* of life has attained an externality that genuinely corresponds to it; the *Notion* that earlier appeared on the scene as subjective *Notion* is the soul of life itself; it is the urge that mediates for itself its reality throughout objectivity. Nature, having reached this *Idea* from the starting point of its externality, transcends itself; its end does not appear as its beginning, but as its limit, in which it sublates itself. Similarly, in the *Idea* of life the moments of its reality do not receive the shape of external actuality but remain enclosed within the form of the *Notion*.

In *spirit*, however, life appears partly as opposed to it, partly as posited as at one with it, this unity being reborn as the pure offspring of *spirit*. For here life is to be taken generally in its proper sense as *natural life*, for what is called the *life of spirit* as *spirit*, is its peculiar nature that stands opposed to mere life; just as we speak, too, of the nature of *spirit*, although *spirit* is not a natural being and is rather the opposite of nature. Life as such, then, is for *spirit* partly a *means*, and as such *spirit* opposes it to itself; partly *spirit* is a living individual and life is its body; and again, this unity of *spirit* with its living corporeality is born from *spirit*

itself as an *ideal*. None of these relations to *spirit* concerns logical life and life is to be considered here neither as instrument [*Mittel*] of a *spirit*, nor as a moment of the ideal and of beauty. In both cases, as *natural life* and as life standing in relation *with spirit*, life possesses a *determinateness of its externality*, in the first case through its presuppositions which are other formations of nature, in the second case through the ends and the activity of *spirit*. The *Idea* of life by itself is free from the former presupposed and conditioning objectivity as well as from relation to the latter subjectivity.

Life, considered now more closely in its *Idea*, is in and for itself absolute *universality*; the objectivity that it possesses is permeated throughout by the *Notion* and has the *Notion* alone for substance. What is distinguished as part, or in accordance with some other external reflection, has within itself the whole *Notion*; the *Notion* is the *omnipresent* soul in it, which remains simple self-relation and remains a one in the multiplicity belonging to objective being. This multiplicity, as self-external objectivity, has an indifferent subsistence, which in space and time, if these could already be mentioned here, is a mutual externality of wholly diverse and self-subsistent elements. But in life externality is at the same time present as the *simple determinateness* of its *Notion*; thus the soul is an omnipresent outpouring of itself into this multiplicity and at the same remains absolutely the simple oneness of the concrete *Notion* with itself. The thinking that clings to the determinations of the relationships of reflection and of the formal *Notion*, when it comes to consider life, this unity of its *Notion* in the externality of objectivity, in the absolute multiplicity of atomistic matter, finds all its thoughts without exception are of no avail; the omnipresence of the simple in manifold externality is for reflection an absolute contradiction, and as reflection must at the same time apprehend this omnipresence from its perception of life and therefore admit the actuality of this *Idea*, it is an *incomprehensible mystery* for it, because it does not grasp the *Notion*, and the *Notion* as the substance of life. This simple life, however, is not only omnipresent; it is absolutely the *subsistence* and *immanent substance* of its objectivity; but as subjective substance it is the *urge*, and moreover the *specific urge*, of the *particular* difference, and no less essentially the one and universal urge of the specialized difference that reduces this its particularization into unity and maintains it

therein. It is only as this *negative unity* of its objectivity and particularization that life is a self-related life that is for itself, a soul. As such it is essentially an individual, which relates itself to objectivity as to an *other*, to a non-living nature. Consequently the original *judgement* of life consists in this, that it detaches itself as an individual subject from objectivity, and in constituting itself the negative unity of the Notion, makes the *presupposition* of an immediate objectivity.

Life is therefore first to be considered as a *living individual* that is for itself the subjective totality and is presupposed as indifferent to an objectivity that confronts it as indifferent.

Secondly, it is the *life process*, the process of sublating its presupposition, positing as negative the objectivity that is indifferent to it and actualizing itself as that objectivity's power and negative unity. By so doing it makes itself into the universal that is the unity of itself and its other.

Hence life is thirdly the *genus process*, the process of sublating its individualization and relating itself to its objective existence as to *itself*. Accordingly, this process is on the one hand the return to its Notion and the repetition of the first diremption, the becoming of a new individuality and the death of the first, immediate one; but on the other hand, the *Notion* of life that has *withdrawn into itself* is the becoming of the Notion that is in relationship with itself and exists universally and freely for itself—the transition into *cognition*.

A. THE LIVING INDIVIDUAL

1. The Notion of life, or universal life, is the immediate Idea, the Notion whose objectivity corresponds to it; but its objectivity corresponds to it only in so far as the Notion is the negative unity of this externality, that is to say, *posits* it as corresponding to the Notion. The infinite relation of the Notion to itself is as negativity a self-determining, the diremption of itself *into itself as subjective individuality and itself as indifferent universality*. The Idea of life in its immediacy is as yet only the creative universal soul. By reason of this immediacy, its first negative relation of the Idea within it is the self-determination of itself as *Notion*—the *implicit* positing that only becomes *explicit* or *for itself* through its return into itself—a creative *presupposing*. Through this self-determining, the *universal* life becomes a *particular*; it has thereby sundered

itself into the two extremes of the judgement, which immediately becomes a syllogism.

The determinations of the opposition are the general determinations of the *Notion*, for it is the Notion which has been sundered; but the *filling* of these determinations is the Idea. One extreme is the *unity* of the Notion and reality, which is the Idea, as the *immediate* unity that at an earlier stage appeared as *objectivity*. But here it is in a different determination. There it was the unity of Notion and reality, where the Notion has passed over into the reality in which it is merely lost; it did not stand over against the reality, or in other words, because the Notion is for the reality only an inner, it is merely a reflection *external* to it. That objectivity is therefore the immediate itself in an immediate form. Here, on the contrary, it has proceeded only from the Notion, so that its essence is positedness, and it exists as a *negative*. It is to be regarded as the *side of the universality of the Notion*, consequently as *abstract* universality, essentially only *inhering* in the subject and in the form of immediate *being* which, posited on its own account, is indifferent to the subject. Thus the totality of the Notion which attaches to the objectivity is, as it were, only *lent* to it; the last self-substance that objectivity possesses as against the subject is this *being* which, in its truth, is only the above moment of the Notion, the Notion that, as *presupposing*, is in the first determinateness of an *implicit* positing, which does not yet exist as a positing, as the unity that is reflected into itself. Self-substantial objectivity, therefore, having proceeded from the Idea, is immediate being only as the *predicate* of the judgement of the Notion's self-determination—a being that is indeed distinct from the subject, but at the same time is essentially posited as *moment* of the Notion.

In respect of content this objectivity is the *totality* of the Notion; but this totality is confronted by the subjectivity or negative unity of the Notion, which constitutes the true centrality, namely the Notion's free unity with itself. This *subject* is the Idea in the form of *individuality*, as simple but negative self-identity—the *living individual*.

This is in the first place life as *soul*, as the Notion of itself that is completely determined within itself, the initiating, self-moving *principle*. The Notion in its simplicity contains determinate externality as a *simple* moment enclosed within it. But, further,

this soul in its immediacy is immediately external and possesses an objective being of its own—a reality that is subjugated to the end, the immediate means, in the first instance, objectivity as predicate of the subject; but further, objectivity is also the middle term of the syllogism; the corporeality of the soul is that whereby the soul unites itself with external objectivity. The living being possesses corporeality in the first instance as reality that is immediately identical with the Notion; thus it has this corporeality in general by nature.

Now because this objectivity is predicate of the individual and taken up into the subjective unity, the earlier determinations of the object, the mechanical or chemical relationship does not attach to it, still less the abstract relationship of reflection, of whole and parts and the like. As externality it is indeed capable of such relationships, but to that extent it is not a living being; when the living thing is regarded as a whole consisting of parts, or as a thing operated on by mechanical or chemical causes, as a mechanical or chemical product, whether it be regarded merely as such product or also as determined by an external end, then the Notion is regarded as external to it and it is treated as a dead thing. Since the Notion is immanent in it, the purposiveness of the living being is to be grasped as inner; the Notion is in it as determinate Notion, distinct from its externality, and in its distinguishing, pervading the externality and remaining identical with itself. This objectivity of the living being is the *organism*; it is the means and instrument of the end, perfect in its purposiveness since the Notion constitutes its substance; but for that very reason this means and instrument is itself the realized end, in which the subjective end is thus immediately brought into unity with itself. In respect of its externality the organism is a manifold, not of parts but of members. These members, as such, (a) subside only in the individuality; in so far as they are external and can be apprehended in this externality, they are separable; but when separated, they revert to the mechanical and chemical relationships of common objectivity. (b) Their externality is opposed to the negative unity of the living individuality; the latter is therefore the urge to posit the abstract moment of the Notion's determinateness as a real difference; since this difference is immediate, it is the urge of each single, specific moment to produce itself, and equally to raise its particularity to universality, sublate the other moments external to it and

produce itself at their expense, but no less to sublate itself and make itself a means for the others.

2. This process of the living individuality is restricted to that individuality itself and still falls entirely within it. Above, in the syllogism of external purposiveness, we considered its first premiss, namely that the end relates itself immediately to objectivity and makes it a means, and we found that in this premiss the end does indeed remain similar to itself and has withdrawn into itself in the objectivity, but that the objectivity has not yet in its own self sublated itself, and therefore the end is to that extent not yet in and for itself in this premiss, and only becomes so in the conclusion. The process of the living being with itself is this same premiss, but in so far as the latter is also conclusion, and in so far as the immediate relation of the subject to objectivity, which objectivity thereby becomes a means and instrument, is at the same time the negative unity of the Notion in its own self; the end realizes itself in this its externality by being the subjective power over that externality and the process in which the externality displays its self-dissolution and its return into this the negative unity of the end. The restlessness and mutability of the external side of the living being is the manifestation in it of the Notion, which as in its own self negativity only has an objectivity in so far as the latter's indifferent subsistence reveals itself as self-sublating. The Notion therefore produces itself by its urge in such a manner that the product, the Notion being its essence, is itself the producing agent; that is to say the product is product only as the externality that equally posits itself as negative, or is product only in being the process of production.

3. Now the Idea just considered is the Notion of the living subject and its process; the determinations, which are in relationship with each other, are the self-related negative unity of the Notion and objectivity, which is the Notion's means, but in which it has returned into itself. But since these are moments of the Idea of life within its Notion, they are not the specific Notion-moments of the living individual in its reality. The objectivity or corporeality of this individual is a concrete totality; the above moments are the sides out of which life constitutes itself; they are therefore not the moments of this life that is already constituted by the Idea. But the living objectivity as such of the individual, since it is ensouled by the Notion and has the Notion for its substance, also possesses

for its essential difference the determinations of the Notion, *universality*, *particularity* and *individuality*; accordingly the *shape* [*Gestalt*], in which they are *externally* distinguished, is divided or incised (*insectum*) on the basis of that difference.

Thus it is in the first place *universality*, the purely internal vibration of vitality, or *sensibility*. The Notion of universality, as we have found it above, is simple immediacy, which however is this only by being within itself absolute negativity. This Notion of *absolute difference* with its negativity *dissolved* in *simplicity* and self-similar, is brought to view [*Anschauung*] in sensibility. It is inwardness [*Insichsein*], not as abstract simplicity but as an infinitely *determinable* receptivity, which in its *determinateness* does not become something manifold and external, but is simply reflected into itself. *Determinateness* is present in this universality as simple *principle*; the individual external determinateness, a so-called *impression*, returns from its external and manifold determination into this simplicity of *self-feeling*. Sensibility may therefore be regarded as the determinate being of the inwardly existent soul, since it receives all externality into itself, while reducing it to the perfect simplicity of self-similar universality.

The second determination of the Notion is *particularity*, the moment of the *posited* difference, the opening up of the negativity that is locked up in simple self-feeling, or is an ideal, not yet a real, determinateness in it, that is, *irritability*. On account of the abstraction of its negativity, feeling is an urge; it *determines* itself; the self-determination of the living being is its judgement or its self-limitation [*Verendlichung*], whereby it relates itself to the external as to a *presupposed* objectivity and is in reciprocal *activity* with it. Now as a *particular* living being it is on one side a *species* alongside other species of living beings; the *formal* reflection of this *indifferent diversity* into itself is the formal *genus* and its systematization; but the individual reflection is this, that the particularity, the negativity of its determinateness, as a direction outwards, is the self-related negativity of the Notion.

According to this third determination the living being is an *individual*. The precise determination of this reflection-into-self is such that in irritability, the living being is its own externality to itself, to the objectivity which it possesses immediately as its means and instrument, and which is externally determinable. The reflection-into-self sublates this immediacy—on the one side

as a theoretical reflection, that is, in so far as the negativity is present as the simple moment of sensibility that was considered in the latter and which constitutes *feeling*—on the other side as real reflection, in that the unity of the Notion posits itself in its *external objectivity* as negative unity; this is *reproduction*. The first two moments, sensibility and irritability, are abstract determinations; in reproduction life is *concrete* and is vitality; in it, as in its truth, life for the first time has also feeling and the power of resistance. Reproduction is the negativity as simple moment of sensibility, and irritability is only a living power of resistance, so that the relationship to the external is reproduction and individual identity with self. Each of the individual moments is essentially the totality of all; their difference constitutes the ideal form determinateness, which is posited in reproduction as concrete totality of the whole. This whole is, therefore, on the one hand opposed as a third, namely as a *real* totality, to the former determinate totalities, while on the other hand it is their implicit essential nature, and at the same time that in which they are embraced as moments, and in which they have their subject and their subsistence.

With reproduction as the moment of individuality, the living being posits itself as an *actual* individuality, a self-related being-for-self; but at the same time it is a *real relation outwards*, the reflection of *particularity* or irritability *towards an other*, towards the *objective* world. The process of life, which is enclosed within the individual, passes over into a relation to the presupposed objectivity as such, in consequence of the fact that when the individual posits itself as a *subjective* totality, the *moment of its determinateness* as a *relation* to externality becomes a *totality* as well.

B. THE LIFE-PROCESS

The living individual, in shaping itself inwardly, tenses itself against its original act of presupposition, and opposes itself as an absolute subject to the presupposed objective world. The subject is its own end [*Selbstzweck*], the Notion, which has its means and subjective reality in the objectivity that is subjugated to it. As such, it is constituted as the Idea in and for itself and as a being that is essentially self-subsistent, in face of which the presupposed external world has the value only of something negative and lacking

self-subsistence. In its self-feeling the living being has this *certainty* of the intrinsic *nullity* of the *otherness* confronting it. Its urge is the need to sublimate this otherness and to give itself the truth of this certainty. The individual is, as subject, in the first instance no more than the *Notion* of the Idea of life; its subjective inward process in which it draws on its own resources, and the immediate objectivity which it posits conformably to its *Notion* as a natural means is mediated by the process that relates itself to the completely posited externality, to the objective totality standing *indifferently* alongside it.

This process begins with *need*, that is, with a moment that is twofold. First the living being determines itself, in so doing posits itself as denied, and thereby relates itself to an *other* to it, to the indifferent objectivity; but secondly, it is equally not lost in this loss of itself but maintains itself therein and remains the identity of the self-similar *Notion*; thus it is the urge to posit this *other* world as *its own*, as similar to itself, to sublimate it and to objectify *itself*. By doing this, its self-determination has the form of objective externality, and as it is at the same time identical with itself it is absolute *contradiction*. The immediate shape is the Idea in its simple *Notion*, objectivity that is conformable to the *Notion*; as such, it is *good* by nature. But since its negative moment realizes itself as an objective particularity, that is, since each of the essential moments of its unity is realized as a separate totality, the *Notion* is *sundered* into an absolute disparity with itself; and since, all the same, it is absolute identity in this disharmony, the living being is *for itself* this disharmony and has the feeling of this contradiction, which is *pain*. *Pain* is therefore the prerogative of living natures; because they are the existent *Notion*, they are an actuality of infinite power such that they are within themselves the *negativity* of themselves, that this *their negativity* is *for them*, and that they maintain themselves in their otherness. It is said that contradiction is unthinkable; but the fact is that in the pain of a living being it is even an actual existence.

This diremption of the living being within itself is *feeling*, the diremption being taken up into the simple universality of the *Notion*, into sensibility. From pain begin the *need* and the *urge* that constitute the transition by which the individual, which is explicitly the negation of itself, becomes also explicitly its own identity—an identity that exists only as the negation of the former

negation. The identity that is in the urge as such is the subjective certainty of itself, in accordance with which it relates itself to its external, indifferently existing world as to an Appearance, to an intrinsically *Notionless* and unessential actuality. This actuality has to await the subject, which is the immanent end, before it receives the *Notion* into itself. The indifference of the objective world to the determinateness, and consequently to the end, constitutes its external capability of being conformable to the subject; whatever other specifications it may possess, its mechanical determinability, the absence of the freedom of the immanent *Notion*, constitutes its impotence to maintain itself against the living being. In so far as the object confronts the living being in the first instance as an indifferent externality, it can act upon it mechanically; but in doing so it is not acting as on a living being; where it enters into relationship with a living being it does not act on it as a cause, but *excites* it. Because the living being is an urge, externality cannot approach or enter it except in so far as it is in its own very nature already *in the living being*; therefore the action on the subject consists merely in the latter finding the externality presented to it *conformable*. This externality may not be conformable to the subject's totality, but at least it must correspond to a particular side of it, and this possibility resides simply in the fact that the subject in its external relationship is a particular.

Now the subject, as specifically related in its need to the externality, and so itself an externality or instrument, uses *violence* on the object. Its particular character, its finitude in general, falls into the more specific manifestation of this relationship. The external element in this is the process of objectivity in general, mechanism and chemism. But this process is immediately broken off and the externality transformed into internality. The external purposiveness that is produced at first by the activity of the subject in the indifferent object is sublated by reason of the fact that the object, relatively to the *Notion*, is not a substance, and that therefore the *Notion* cannot become merely the object's external form, but must posit itself as its essence and immanent pervading determination, in conformity with the *Notion*'s original identity.

With the seizure of the object, therefore, the mechanical process passes over into the inner process by which the individual *appropriates* the object in such a manner as to deprive it of its peculiar nature [*Beschaffenheit*], convert it into a means for itself, and give

its own subjectivity to it for substance. This assimilation accordingly coincides with the individual's process of reproduction considered above; in this process the individual in the first instance draws upon itself in making its own objectivity its object; the mechanical and chemical conflict of its members with external things is an objective moment of itself. The mechanical and chemical side of the process is a beginning of the dissolution of the living being. Since life is the truth of these processes, and therefore as a living being is the concrete existence of this truth and the power dominating these processes, it takes them within its embrace, pervades them as their universality, and their product is completely determined by it. This conversion of them into the living individuality constitutes the return of this latter into itself, so that production, which as such would be transition into another, becomes reproduction, in which the living being posits itself as self-identical *for itself*.

The immediate Idea is also the immediate, not the *explicit*, identity of the Notion and reality; through the objective process the living being gives itself its feeling of *self*; for in that process it posits itself as what it is in and for itself, namely, as a self-identity and the negative unity of the negative in its otherness, which is posited as indifferent to it. In this coming together of the individual and its objectivity, that at first was presupposed as indifferent to it, the individual, which on one side has constituted itself an actual unity, has none the less *sublated its particularity* and raised itself to *universality*. Its particularity consisted in the diremption by which life posited as its species the individual life and the objectivity external to it. Through the external life process it has thus posited itself as real universal life, that is, as *genus*.

C. THE GENUS

The living individual, at first disengaged from the universal Notion of life, is a presupposition that is not as yet authenticated by the living individual itself. Through its process with the simultaneously presupposed world, it has posited itself *on its own account* as the negative unity of its otherness, as the foundation of itself; as such it is the actuality of the Idea, in such a manner that now the individual brings itself forth out of *actuality*, whereas before it proceeded only from the *Notion*, and that

its genesis which was an act of *presupposing*, now becomes its production.

But the further determination that it has attained by the sublation of the opposition is that of being the *genus* as identity of itself with its previously indifferent otherness. This Idea of the individual, since it is this essential identity, is essentially the particularization of itself. This its diremption, in accordance with the totality from which it proceeds, is the duplication of the individual—a presupposing of an objectivity that is identical with it, and a relationship of the living being to itself as to another living being.

This universal is the third stage, the truth of life in so far as this is still confined within its sphere. This sphere is the self-related process of the individual, where externality is its immanent moment; secondly, this externality is itself, as a living totality, an objectivity that for the individual is its own self, an objectivity in which, not as *sublated* but as *persisting*, the individual has the certainty of itself.

Now because the relationship of the genus is the identity of individual self-feeling in what is at the same time another self-subsistent individual, it is *contradiction*; thus the living being is again an *werge*. Now the genus is indeed the consummation of the Idea of life, but at first it is still within the sphere of immediacy; this universality is therefore *actual* in an *individual* shape—the Notion, whose reality has the form of immediate objectivity. Consequently, though the individual is indeed *in itself* genus, it is not *explicitly* or *for itself* the genus; what is *for* it is as yet only another living individual; the Notion distinguished from itself has for object, with which it is identical, not itself as Notion but a Notion that as a living being has at the same time external objectivity for it, a form that is therefore immediately reciprocal.

The identity with the other individual, the individual's universality, is thus as yet only *internal* or *subjective*; it therefore has the longing to posit this and to realize itself as a universal. But this *werge* of the genus can realize itself only by sublating the single individualities which are still particular relatively to one another. In the first instance, in so far as it is these latter which, *in themselves* universal, satisfy the tension of their longing and dissolve themselves into the universality of their genus, their realized identity is the negative unity of the genus that is reflected into itself out of

its diremption. It is thus the individuality of life itself, *generated* no longer from its Notion, but from the *actual* Idea. In the first instance, it is itself only Notion that has yet to objectify itself, but it is the *actual Notion*—the *germ of a living individual*. The germ is visible evidence to *ordinary perception* of what the Notion is, and it demonstrates that the *subjective Notion* has *external actuality*. For the germ of the living being is the complete concretion of individuality, in which all its diverse aspects, properties and articulated differences are contained in their *entire determinateness*, and the initially *immaterial*, subjective totality is undeveloped, simple and non-sensuous; the germ is thus the entire living being in the inner form of the Notion.

The reflection of the genus into itself is from this side the means whereby it obtains *actuality*, the moment of negative unity and individuality being thereby posited in it—the propagation of the living species. The Idea, which as life, is still in the form of immediacy, thus falls back into actuality and this its reflection is only repetition and the infinite progress, in which it does not emerge from the finitude of its immediacy. But this return into its first Notion has also the higher side, that the Idea has not merely run through the mediation of its processes within its immediacy, but by this very act has sublated this immediacy and thereby raised itself to a higher form of its existence.

That is to say, the process of the genus, in which the single individuals sublate in one another their indifferent immediate existence and in this negative unity expire, has further for the other side of its product the *realized genus*, which has posited itself identical with the Notion. In the genus process, the separated individualities of individual life perish; the negative identity in which the genus returns into itself, while it is on the one hand the process of *generating individuality*, is on the other hand the *sublating of it*, and is thus the genus coming together with itself, the *universality* of the Idea in process of *becoming for itself*. In the copulation the immediacy of the living individuality perishes; the death of this life is the procession of spirit. The Idea, which as genus is *implicit*, is now *explicit*, in that it has sublated its particularity which constituted the living species, and has thereby given itself a *reality* that is *itself simple universality*. As such it is the Idea that *relates itself to itself as Idea*, the universal that has universality for its determinateness and existence—the Idea of cognition.

CHAPTER 2

THE IDEA OF COGNITION

Life is the immediate Idea, or the Idea as its *Notion* not yet realized in its own self. In its *judgement*, the Idea is *cognition* in general.

The Notion is, as Notion, *for itself* in so far as it *freely* exists as abstract universality or as genus. As such, it is its pure self-identity, which inwardly differentiates itself in such a manner that the differentiated moment is not an *objectivity*, but is likewise liberated into subjectivity or the form of simple self-likeness, and hence the object of the Notion is the Notion itself. Its *reality* in general is the *form of its determinate being*, and the point of interest is the determination of this form; on this determination rests the difference between what the Notion is *in itself* or as *subjective*, and what it is when submerged in objectivity, and then in the Idea of life. In the latter it is indeed distinguished from its external reality and posited *for itself*, yet this its being-for-self it possesses only as the identity that is a relation to itself as submerged in its subjugated objectivity, or to itself as indwelling, substantial form. The elevation of the Notion above life means that its reality is the Notion form liberated into universality. Through this judgement the Idea is duplicated into the subjective Notion whose reality is the Notion itself, and into the objective Notion that is in the form of life. *Thinking, spirit, self-consciousness*, are determinations of the Idea where it has itself for object, and its determinate being, that is, the determinateness of its being, is its own difference from itself.

The *metaphysics of the spirit*, or, as it was more commonly expressed, of the *soul*, revolved round the determinations of substance, simplicity, immateriality—determinations in which the *general idea* of spirit taken from *empirical* consciousness, was laid down as subject, and it was then asked, What predicates agree with our observations? This kind of procedure could get no further than the procedure of physics, which reduces the world of phenomena to general laws and reflective determinations since it too was based on spirit merely in its *phenomenal* aspect; in fact this procedure was bound to fall short even of the scientific character of