

quantitative determination which shows itself at the same time as a difference of quality. In this unity of the substrate with itself the measure determination is sublated and its quality is an external state determined by the quantum. This process is equally the progressive determination of measure in its realization and also the reduction of measure to the status of a moment.

CHAPTER 3

THE BECOMING OF ESSENCE

A. ABSOLUTE INDIFFERENCE

Being is the abstract equivalence [*Gleichgültigkeit*]¹—for which, since it is to be thought of by itself as *being*, the expression indifference [*Indifferenz*] has been employed—in which there is supposed to be as yet no determinateness of any kind; pure quantity is indifference as open to all determinations provided that these are external to it and that quantity has no immanent connection with them; but the indifference which can be called absolute is the indifference which, *through the negation* of every determinateness of being, i.e., of quality, quantity, and their at first immediate unity, measure, is a process of *self-mediation* resulting in a simple unity. Any determinateness it still possesses is only a *state*, i.e. something qualitative and external which has the indifference for a *substrate*.

But what has thus been determined as qualitative and external is only a vanishing determinateness; quality as thus external to being is the opposite of itself and as such is only the sublation of itself. In this manner, the determinateness is still only posited in the substrate as an empty differentiation. But it is just this empty differentiation which is indifference itself as a result; and indifference is thus concrete, a mediation-with-self through the negation of every determination of being. As this mediation it contains negation and relation, and what was called state is its immanent, self-related differentiation; it is precisely externality and its vanishing which make the unity of being into indifference and they are therefore *within* this indifference, which therewith ceases to be only a substrate and *in its own self* only abstract.

B. INDIFFERENCE AS INVERSE RATIO OF ITS FACTORS

We have now to see how this determination of indifference is posited within the indifference itself and how the latter is therewith posited as being for itself.

1. The reduction of measure relations which at first ranked as self-subsistent measures, establishes their common substrate;

this is their continuation into one another and hence the indivisible self-substant measure which is *wholly* present in its differentiations. For this difference, there are present the determinations of quality and quantity which the measure contains, and everything turns solely on how these are posited in it. This, however, is determined by the fact that the substrate is in the first place a result and only *in principle* [*an sich*] a mediation; but because this mediation is not yet posited as such *in the measure itself*, this latter is in the first place a substrate and with respect to determinateness, *indifference*.

Consequently, at first it is essentially the merely quantitative external difference which is present in it; there are two distinct quanta of one and the same substrate which in this way would be their *sum* and therefore would itself be determined as quantum. But the indifference is this fixed measure, the implicit, absolute limit, only in *relation* to those differences in such a manner that it would not be in its own self a quantum or opposed in any way, either as a sum or even as an exponent, to other quanta whether sums or indifferences. It is only the abstract determinateness which falls into the indifference; the two quanta, in order that they may be posited in it as moments, are variable, indifferent, greater or smaller relatively to one another. Bounded however by the fixed limit of their sum, they are related to each other not externally but negatively, and this now is the qualitative determination of their relationship. They are consequently *inversely proportional*. This relation is distinguished from the earlier formal inverted relation or inverse ratio by the fact that here the whole is a real substrate and each of the two sides is posited as having to be itself *in principle* [*an sich*] this whole.

According to the stated qualitative determinateness, the difference is present, further, as *two qualities*, one of which is sublated by the other; but because both are held in a unity which they together constitute, neither is separable from the other. The substrate itself, as an indifference, is likewise in itself the unity of both qualities; therefore each side of the relation, too, contains both sides within itself and is distinguished from the other side only by a more of the one quality and a less of the other, and *vice versa*. The one quality is through its quantum only *preponderant* in the one side, and so, too, the other quality in the other side.

Consequently each side is in its own self an inverted relation. As formal, this relation recurs in the two distinct sides. These sides thus continue themselves into each other also in respect of their qualitative determinations; each quality is self-related in the other and is present in each of the two sides, only in a different quantum. Their quantitative difference is that indifference in accordance with which they continue themselves into each other and this continuation as the self-sameness of the qualities is in each of the two unities. The sides, however, each as the whole of the two determinations and hence containing the indifference itself, are thus at the same time posited as self-substant relatively to each other.

2. As this indifference, being is now the specification of measure no longer in its immediacy, but measure as developed in the manner just indicated; it is *indifference* first as *in itself*, the whole of the determinations of being which are resolved into this unity and secondly, as a *determinate being*, as a totality of the posited realization, in which the moments themselves are implicitly the totality of the indifference, borne by this latter as their unity. But because the unity is only an *indifference*, and hence is held fast only as an *implicit* unity, and the moments are not yet explicitly *self-determined*, i.e. are not yet determined as sublating themselves into a unity *within themselves* and *through one another*, what is here present is simply the *indifference* of the unity itself *towards itself* as a developed determinateness.

This self-substant measure as thus indivisible is now to be considered in more detail. It is immanent in all its determinations and in them remains in unity with itself and unaffected by them; but (α) as remaining *implicitly* the totality, it possesses the determinatenesses which are sublated in it, only as groundlessly *emerging* in it. The *implicit* being of the indifference and this *real* being of the latter are unconnected; the determinatenesses show themselves in the indifference in an immediate manner and the indifference is wholly present in each of them. Consequently, the difference between them is posited in the first place as sublated, therefore as only *quantitative*, but not as the self-repulsion of the indifference, and the indifference is not posited as self-determining but as being determinate and determined only *externally*. (β) The two moments are in an inverted quantitative relation—a to and fro in the scale of magnitude; but this fluctuation is determined

not by the indifference, which is just the indifference of this fluctuation, but is determined herewith only externally. The principle of determination resides not in the indifference, but in something lying outside it. The absolute, as indifference, has in this aspect the second defect of the *quantitative* form, namely that the determinateness of the difference is not determined by the absolute itself; just as it has the first defect in the fact that the differences simply *emerge* in it, that is to say, the absolute's positing is immediate in character, is not the mediation of the absolute with itself. (γ) The quantitative determinateness of the moments which are now *sides* of the relation constitutes this mode of their *substance*; through this indifference their determinate being is freed from the transition of the qualitative sphere. But in distinction from this their real being, they have an implicit substance in the fact that they are *in themselves* the indifference itself, each being itself the unity of the two *qualities* into which the qualitative moment splits itself. The difference between the two sides is restricted to this, that one quality is posited in the one side with a more and in the other with a less, and the other quality similarly, but conversely. Hence each side is in its own self the totality of the indifference. Each of the two qualities taken singly on its own account also remains the same sum which the indifference is; it continues itself out of the one side into the other and is not bounded by the quantitative limit which is thereby posited in it. In consequence of this the determinations come into immediate opposition and this develops itself into a contradiction which we have now to consider.

3. Namely, each quality enters *within* each side into relation to the other, and does so in such a manner that, as has been determined, this relation too is to be only a quantitative difference. If the two qualities are self-subsistent—taken, say, as if they were sensuous things independent of each other—then the whole determinateness of indifference falls asunder; their unity and totality would be empty names. But they are at the same time expressly determined as comprised in a single unity, as inseparable, each as having meaning and reality only in this one qualitative relation to the other. But now, *because their quantitativity is simply and solely of this qualitative nature, each reaches only as far as the other*. If the qualities are regarded simply as distinct quanta, then the one would reach beyond the other and would have in its *more*

an indifferent determinate being which the other would not have. But in their qualitative connectedness, each is only in so far as the other is. From this it follows that they are in *equilibrium*; that by as much as the one increases or decreases, the other likewise would increase or decrease and in the same proportion.

Therefore on the basis of their *qualitative* connection there can be no question of a *quantitative* difference or of a *more* of the one quality. The more by which *one* of the correlated moments would exceed the *other* would only be a baseless determination, or else this *more would only be the other itself again*; but in this their equality, both would have vanished, for their determinate being was supposed to be based solely on the inequality of their quantum. Each of these hypothetical factors vanishes, whether it is supposed to be *beyond* or *equal* to the other. This vanishing appears to quantitative conception as a disturbance of the equilibrium so that the one factor becomes greater than the other; thus there is posited the sublation of the quality of the other and its lack of any support. One factor becomes preponderant as the other diminishes with an accelerated velocity and is overpowered by the first, which therefore constitutes itself the sole self-subsistent quality; but this being so, there are no longer two specific moments and factors but only the one whole.

This unity thus posited as the totality of the process of determining, in which it is itself determined as indifference, is a contradiction in every respect; it therefore has to be *posited* as sublating this its contradictory nature and acquiring the character of a self-determined, self-subsistent being which has for its result and truth not the unity which is merely indifferent, but that immanently negative and absolute unity which is called essence.

Remark: Centripetal and Centrifugal Force

The relationship of a whole which is supposed to have its determinateness in the quantitative difference of two factors determined qualitatively against each other, is applied to the elliptical motion of the celestial bodies. This example exhibits primarily only two qualities in inverse relation to each other, not two sides, each of which is itself the unity of both and their inverse relation. The fact, the inverse relation, rests on a firm empirical foundation, but the theoretical explanation of it involves a consequence which is overlooked, namely the destruction of the basic fact; or if, as is

an external relation; on the contrary, as ground, it makes itself into a positedness, its simple essentiality unites with itself in the positedness and is, in this sublation of itself, the vanishing of its difference from its positedness, and is thus simple essential immediacy. Ground, therefore, does not remain behind as something distinct from the grounded, but the truth of grounding is that in it ground is united with itself, so that its reflection into another is its reflection into itself. Consequently, the fact is not only the *unconditioned* but also the *groundless*, and it emerges from ground only in so far as ground has '*fallen to the ground*' and ceased to be ground: it emerges from the groundless, that is, from its own essential negativity or pure form.

This immediacy that is mediated by ground and condition and is self-identical through the sublation of mediation, is *Existence*.

Section Two: Appearance [Erscheinung]

Essence must appear

Being is the absolute abstraction; this negativity is not something external to being, which is being, and nothing but being, only as this absolute negativity. For the same reason, being only is as self-sublating being and is essence. But, conversely, essence as simple equality with itself is likewise *being*. The *doctrine of being* contains the first proposition: being is *essence*. The second proposition: *essence is being*, constitutes the content of the first section of the *doctrine of essence*. But this being into which essence makes itself is *essential being*, Existence; it is a being that has come forth from negativity and inwardness.

Thus essence *appears*. Reflection is the *showing of illusory being within essence itself*. [*Die Reflexion ist das Scheinen des Wesens in ihm selbst.*] Its determinations are enclosed within the unity simply and solely as posited, sublated determinations; or, reflection is essence which, in its positedness, is immediately identical with itself. But since this essence is ground, it gives itself a real determination [*bestimmt es sich real*] through its reflection, which is self-sublating or which returns into itself; further, since this determination, or the otherness, of the ground relation sublates itself in the reflection of the ground and becomes Existence, this endows the form determinations with an element of self-subsistence. Their illusory being completes itself to become *Appearance*.

The essentiality that has advanced to immediacy is, in the first instance, *Existence*, and an existent or *thing*—as an undifferentiated¹ unity of essence with its immediacy. It is true that the thing contains reflection, but its negativity is, in the first instance, extinguished in its immediacy; but because its ground is essentially reflection, its immediacy sublates itself and the thing makes itself into positedness.

Secondly, then, it is *Appearance*. Appearance is that which the thing is in itself, or its truth. But this merely posited Existence which is reflected into otherness is equally the transcending of itself in its infinitude; to the world of appearance is opposed the

¹ 'unterschiedne' in Lasson's edition is a misprint.

world that is reflected into itself, the *world of essence* [*an sich seiende Welt*].

But the being that appears and essential being, simply stand in relation to one another. Thus Existence is, thirdly, essential *relation*; what appears manifests what is essential, and this is in its Appearance.

The relation is the still imperfect union of reflection-into-otherness and reflection-into-self; the perfect interpenetration of both is *actuality*.

CHAPTER I

EXISTENCE

Just as the proposition of ground states that whatever is has a ground, or is something posited or mediated, so too we must formulate a proposition of Existence, and in these terms: *whatever is, exists*. The truth of being is to be, not a first immediate, but essence that has emerged into immediacy.

But when further it was also said, '*Whatever exists has a ground and is conditioned*', then equally it must also be said that it has no ground and is unconditioned. For Existence is the immediacy that has emerged from the sublating of the mediation by which ground and condition are related, and in emerging it sublates this emergence itself.

In so far as the proofs of the *existence* of God may be mentioned here, we may begin by recalling that besides immediate being and Existence (the being that proceeds from essence), there is yet a third being that proceeds from the Notion, namely, *objectivity*. Proof is, in general, *mediated cognition*. The various kinds of being demand or imply their own kind of mediation, so that the nature of proof, too, will differ in respect of each. The *ontological proof* proposes to start from the Notion; it makes the sum total of all realities its basis and then proceeds to subsume existence, too, under reality. It is therefore the mediation that is syllogism and that does not as yet come up for consideration here. We have already considered above Kant's objections to this proof and have remarked that Kant understands by Existence, the determinate being whereby something enters into the context of the totality of experience, that is, into the determination of an *otherness* and into relation to an *other*. Thus something, as existent, is mediated by an other, and existence in general is the side of its mediation. Now what Kant calls a concept, namely, something taken as only simply *self-related*, or conception as such, does not contain its mediation; in abstract self-identity, opposition is left out. The ontological proof would now have to demonstrate that the absolute concept, namely the concept of God, attains to a determinate being, to a mediation, or how simple essence mediates itself with

mediation. This is effected by the stated subsumption of existence under its universal, namely, reality, which is assumed as the middle term between God in his concept, on the one hand, and existence on the other. This mediation, in so far as it has the form of a syllogism, is, as we have said, not under discussion here. But the preceding exposition has shown what is the true nature of this mediation of essence with Existence. The nature of proof itself will be considered in the doctrine of cognition. Here we have only to indicate what is relevant to the nature of mediation in general.

The proofs of the existence of God adduce a *ground* for this existence. It is not supposed to be an objective ground of God's existence; for this existence is in and for itself. Thus it is merely a *ground for cognition*. It thereby declares itself to be a ground that *vanishes* in the object which at first appears to be grounded by it. Now the ground that is derived from the contingency of the world implies the regress of the contingency into absolute essence; for the contingent is that which is in itself *groundless* and self-sublating. In this way, therefore, absolute essence does in fact proceed from the groundless; the ground sublates itself and with this there also vanishes the illusion of the relation that was given to God, to be that which is grounded in an other. This mediation is therefore true mediation. But this nature of its mediation is unknown to that ratiocinative [*beweisende*] reflection; on the one hand, it takes itself to be something merely subjective and by so doing removes its mediation from God himself, but, on the other hand, it does not for that reason recognize the mediating movement, that it is and how it is in *essence itself*. Its true relationship consists in this, that it is both of these things in one: mediation as such but, of course, at the same time a subjective, external, that is, self-external, mediation, which *sublates itself again within itself*. But in the above proof, existence is given the false relationship of appearing only as *mediated* or posited.

Thus, on the other side, Existence also cannot be considered merely as an *immediate*. Taken in the determination of an immediacy, the comprehension of God's existence has been declared to be unprovable and knowledge of it to be *only* an immediate consciousness, a *belief* in it. Knowing is supposed to have reached this conclusion, that it knows *nothing*, that is to say, that it *surrenders* again its *mediating* movement and the determinations that crop up in it. This is also evident from the foregoing; only we must add

that reflection, in ending with the sublating of itself, does not therefore have for result *nothing* (for in that case the positive knowledge of essence as an *immediate* relation to it would be *separate* from that result and a spontaneous emergence, an act starting only from itself); on the contrary, this end itself, this *falling to the ground* of the mediation, is at the same time the *ground* from which the immediate proceeds. Language, as was remarked above, combines the meaning of this *downfall* [*Untergang*] and of ground; the essence of God, it is said, is the *abyss* [*Abgrund*] for finite reason. This it is, indeed, in so far as finite reason surrenders its finitude and sinks its mediating movement therein; but this *abyss*, the negative ground, is also the *positive* ground of the emergence of simply affirmative being [*Seienden*], of essence which is in its own self immediate; mediation is an *essential movement*. Mediation through ground sublates itself, but does not leave the ground behind as a substrate; in that case, what proceeded from the ground would be something posited, having its essence elsewhere, namely in the ground; but on the contrary, this ground, as an abyss, is the vanished mediation; and conversely, it is only the vanished mediation that is at the same time ground, and only through this negation the self-equal and immediate.

Existence, then, is not to be taken here as a *predicate* or as a *determination* of essence, the proposition of which would run: essence exists, or *has* existence; on the contrary, essence has passed over into Existence; Existence is essence's absolute emptying of itself or self-alienation, nor has it remained behind on the further side of it. The proposition should therefore run: essence is Existence; it is not distinct from its Existence. Essence has *passed over* into Existence in so far as essence as ground no longer distinguishes itself from itself as the grounded, or in so far as this ground has sublated itself. But this negation is equally essentially its position, or absolutely positive continuity with itself; Existence is the reflection of *the ground* into itself, its identity-with-self achieved in its negation, and therefore the mediation that has posited itself as identical with itself and thereby is an immediacy.

Now because Existence is essentially mediation-with-self, the *determinations* of the mediation *are present in it*, but in such a manner that they are also reflected into themselves and their subsistence is essential and immediate. As the immediacy that

THE ESSENTIAL RELATION

The truth of Appearance is the *essential relation*, the content of which has immediate self-subistence; *simply affirmative* [*seintende*] immediacy, and *reflected* immediacy or self-identical reflection. At the same time, it is in this self-subistence a relative content, only and solely as reflection into its other, or as unity of the relation with its other. In this unity the self-substant content is a posited, sublated content; but it is just this unity which constitutes its essentiality and self-subistence; this reflection into other is reflection into itself. The relation has sides because it is reflection into an other; thus it contains within itself its own difference, and the sides are a self-dependent subsistence, since in their mutually indifferent diversity they are disrupted within themselves, so that the subsistence of either side equally has its meaning only in relation to the other or in their negative unity.

The essential relation is therefore not as yet the true third to *essence* and *Existence*, though it already contains the determinate union of both. Essence is realized in it in such a manner that it has for its subsistence self-substant existents; and these have withdrawn from their indifference into their essential unity, so that they have this alone for their subsistence. The reflective determinations of positive and negative are likewise reflected into themselves only as reflected into their opposites; but they have no other determination but this their negative unity. The sides of the essential relation, on the other hand, are posited as self-substant totalities. It is the same opposition as that of positive and negative, but at the same time as an inverted world. The side of the essential relation is a totality which, however, as essentially an opposite, has a *beyond* of itself; it is only Appearance; its Existence is not its own, but rather that of its other. It is therefore disrupted within itself; but this its sublatedness consists in its being the unity of itself and its other, therefore a whole, and precisely for this reason it has self-substant Existence and is essential reflection-into-self.

This is the *Notion* of the relation. But at first the identity it

contains is not yet complete; the totality which each related side is within itself is at first an inner; the side of the relation is in the first instance posited in *one* of the determinations of the negative unity; the self-substance belonging to each of the two sides is that which constitutes the form of the relation. Its identity is therefore only a *relation*, its self-substance falling outside it, namely in the sides; the reflected unity of this identity and the self-substant Existences, namely, *substance*, is not yet before us. Accordingly, although the Notion of the relation has shown itself to be the unity of reflected and immediate self-subistence, this *Notion* is itself at first still *immediate*; its moments therefore are immediate in respect of each other, and their essential relation is unity, a unity which is only the true unity accordant with the Notion in so far as it realizes itself, that is, has *posited* itself as this unity through its movement.

The essential relation is therefore immediately the relation of *whole* and *parts*—the relation of reflected and immediate self-substance, so that both sides only are as at the same time reciprocally conditioning and presupposing each other.

In this relation as yet neither of the sides is posited as moment of the other, and therefore their identity is itself one side; in other words, their identity is not their negative unity. Secondly, therefore, the relation passes over into the relationship in which one side is moment of the other and in it as in its ground, the veritable self-substant element of both: the relation of *force* and its *expression*.

Thirdly, the inequality still present in this relation now sublates itself and the final relation is that of *inner* and *outer*. In this difference, which has become wholly formal, the relation itself falls to the ground and there emerges *substance* or the *actual* as the *absolute* unity of immediate and reflected Existence.

A. THE RELATION OF WHOLE AND PARTS

The essential relation contains first, the self-substance of immediacy, *reflected into itself*; as such it is the *simple form* whose moments, though Existences, too, are at the same time posited, moments held in the unity. This self-substance which is reflected into itself is at the same time reflection into its opposite, namely, *immediate* self-substance; and its subsistence is essentially as

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much this identity with its opposite as it is its own self-subsistence. Secondly, with this identity the other side, too, is immediately posited: the immediate self-subsistence which, determined as the other, is within itself a manifold variety, but such that this manifoldness essentially *also* has within it the relation of the other side, the unity of the reflected self-subsistence. The first side, the whole, is the self-subsistence which constituted the world in and for itself; the second side, the parts, is the immediate Existence which was the world of Appearance. In the relationship of whole and parts the two sides are these self-subsistences but in such a manner that each has the other reflected in it and at the same time only is as this identity of both. Now because the essential relation is at first only the first, immediate relation, the negative unity and the positive self-subsistence are connected by '*also*'; both sides are indeed posited as *moments*, but *equally* as existent *self-subsistences*. Accordingly the distribution of these two posited moments is as follows. First, the whole, the reflected self-subsistence, is an existent; and the other, the immediate self-subsistence, is in it as a moment—here the whole, the unity of both sides, constitutes the *substrate*, and the immediate Existence is a *positedness*. Conversely, on the other side, namely the side of the parts, the immediate, internally manifold Existence, is the self-subsistent substrate; on the other hand the reflected unity, the whole, is only an external relation.

2. This relation thus contains the self-subsistence of the sides, and equally their sublatedness, and it contains both simply in one relation. The whole is the self-subsistent, the parts are only moments of this unity; but equally they, too, are the self-subsistent and their reflected unity only a moment; and each is, in its *self-subsistence*, simply the *relative* of an other. This relation is therefore in its own self immediate contradiction, and sublates itself.

Considered more closely, the whole is the reflected unity which has an independent subsistence of its own; but this its subsistence is equally repelled from it; the whole is, as negative unity, negative relation-to-self; it is thus alienated from itself; it has its *subsistence* in its opposite, in the manifold immediacy, the parts. *The whole accordingly consists of parts*, so that it is not anything without them. It is therefore the whole relation and the self-subsistent totality; but for this very reason it is only a relative,

for that which makes it a totality is rather its other, the parts; and it has its subsistence not within itself but in its other.

Thus the parts likewise are the whole relation. They are immediate, *as against* reflected, self-subsistence and do not subsist in the whole but on their own account. Further, they have this whole as their moment within themselves; it constitutes their relation, for without a whole there are no parts. But because they are the self-subsistent, this relation is only an external moment towards which they are, in and for themselves, indifferent. But at the same time the parts, as a manifold Existence, collapse within themselves, for this Existence is reflectionless being; they have their self-subsistence only in the reflected unity which is both this unity and also the existent manifoldness; that is to say, they have self-subsistence only *in the whole*, but at the same time, the whole is a self-subsistent other to the parts.

The whole and the parts therefore *condition* each other; but the relation here considered is at the same time higher than the relation of *conditioned* and *condition* to each other as it had determined itself above. Here this relation is *realized*, that is, it is *posited* that condition is the essential self-subsistence of the conditioned in such a manner that it is *presupposed* by the latter. Condition as such is only the *immediate* and is only *implicitly* presupposed. But the whole, though it is the condition of the parts, also contains this, that it, too, only is in so far as it has the parts for presupposition. Since, then, both sides of the relation are posited as conditioning each other, each is an immediate self-subsistence within itself, but its self-subsistence is equally mediated or posited by the other. The *whole relation* is, through this reciprocity, the return of the conditioning into itself, the non-relative, the *unconditioned*.

Now since each side of the relation has its self-subsistence not in itself but in its other, what is present is only a single identity of both in which both are only moments; but since each is in its own self self-subsistent, there are two self-subsistent Existences which are indifferent to each other.

In accordance with the first respect, that of the essential identity of both sides, *the whole is equal to the parts and the parts to the whole*. There is nothing in the whole which is not in the parts, and nothing in the parts which is not in the whole. The whole is not abstract unity, but unity as of a *diverse manifoldness*; but this unity, as that in which the elements of the *manifold* are related to one

another, is the determinateness of each element through which it is part. The relation has, therefore, an inseparable identity and one self-subsistence only.

But further, although the whole is equal to the parts it is not equal to them as parts; the whole is reflected unity, but the parts constitute the determinate moment or the *otherness* of the unity and are the diverse manifold. The whole is not equal to them as this self-subsistent diversity, but to them *together*. But this their 'together' is nothing else but their unity, the whole as such. The whole is, therefore, in the parts only equal to itself, and the equality of the whole and the parts expresses only the tautology that *the whole as whole* is equal not to the parts but to *the whole*.

Conversely, the parts are equal to the whole; but because they are in themselves the moment of otherness, they are not equal to it as the unity, but in such a manner that *one* of the manifold determinations of the whole attaches to the part, or that they are equal to the whole as a manifold; that is to say, they are equal to it as a *divided whole*, that is, to *the parts*. Here we have the same tautology, that the *parts as parts* are equal, *not to the whole* as such, but in it to *themselves, the parts*.

In this way, the whole and the parts fall indifferently apart; each of these sides relates itself only to itself. But as thus held apart they destroy themselves. The whole which is indifferent to the parts is the *abstract identity* which is not internally differentiated; this is a whole only as *internally differentiated*, and moreover in such a manner that these manifold determinations are reflected into themselves and have immediate self-subsistence. And the identity of reflection has shown through its movement that it has this *reflection into its other* for its truth. Similarly the parts, as indifferent to the unity of the whole, are only the unrelated manifold, *that which is within itself other*, which as such is the other of itself and only sublates itself. This self-relation of each of the two sides is their self-subsistence; but this their self-subsistence which each has *for itself* is rather their self-negation. Accordingly each side has its self-subsistence not within itself but in the other; this other, which constitutes the subsistence, is its presupposed immediate which is *supposed* to be the first, and its beginning; but this first of each side is itself *not* a first, but has its beginning only in the other.

The truth of the relation consists therefore in the *mediation*;

its essence is the negative unity in which both the reflected and the simply affirmative [*seiende*] immediacy are sublated. The relation is the contradiction which withdraws into its ground, into the unity which, as returning, is reflected unity; but since this latter has equally posited itself as sublated it is negatively related to itself, sublates itself and makes itself into a simply affirmative [*seiende*] immediacy. But this its negative relation, in so far as it is a first and an immediate, is mediated only through its other and is equally posited. This other, the simply affirmative immediacy, is equally only as sublated; its self-subsistence is a first, but only in order to vanish, and it has an existence that is posited and mediated.

In this determination the relation is no longer that of *whole* and *parts*; the immediacy which belonged to its sides has passed over into positedness and mediation; each is posited, in so far as it is immediate, as self-sublating and passing over into the other, and in so far as it is itself negative relation, as at the same time being conditioned by the other as its positive; just as its immediate transition, too, is equally a mediated transition, being a sublating that is posited by the other. Thus the relation of whole and parts has passed over into the relation of *force and its expression*.

Remark: Infinite Divisibility

The antinomy of the infinite divisibility of matter was considered above¹ under the Notion of quantity. Quantity is the unity of continuity and discreteness; it contains in the *self-subsistent* one its fusion with other ones, and in this uninterrupted *continuing identity* with itself it equally contains the *negation of it*. The immediate relation of these moments of quantity being expressed as the essential relation of whole and parts (the one of quantity being part, but its continuity, the whole, which is composed of parts), the antinomy then consists in the contradiction which presented itself in the relation of whole and parts and has been resolved. For whole and parts are just as essentially related to each other, constituting only one identity, as they are mutually indifferent and have independent self-subsistence. The relation therefore is this antinomy, that the one moment in freeing itself from the other immediately introduces the other.

The existent, then, being determined as a whole, has parts, and the parts constitute its subsistence; the unity of the whole is only

¹ pp. 190 sqq.

ground of the essential relation which, as relation, merely has not yet withdrawn into this its identity and whose ground is not yet posited.

From this it follows that the determination of the absolute is to be the *absolute form*, but at the same time not as the identity whose moments are only simple determinatenesses, but as the identity each of whose moments is within itself the *totality* and hence, as indifferent to the form, is the complete *content* of the whole. But conversely, the absolute is the absolute content in such a manner that the content, which as such is an indifferent manifoldness, has within it the negative form relation by virtue of which its manifoldness is only *one* substantial identity.

The identity of the absolute is thus the absolute identity, since each of its parts is itself the whole, or each determinateness is the totality, that is, determinateness as such has become an utterly transparent illusory being, a difference which has *vanished in its positedness*. Essence, Existence, the world-in-itself, whole, parts, force—these reflected determinations appear to ordinary thinking as a true being which is valid in and for itself; but the absolute as against them is the ground in which they have been engulfed. Now because in the absolute, the form is only simple self-identity, the absolute does not *determine* itself; for determination is a form difference which, in the first instance, counts as such. But because at the same time it contains all difference and form-determination whatever, or because it is itself the absolute form and reflection, the *difference of the content* must also appear in it. But the absolute itself is *absolute identity*; this is its *determination*, for in it all manifoldness of the world-in-itself and the world of Appearance, or of inner and outer totality, is sublated. In the absolute itself is no *becoming*, for it is not being; not is it a self-*reflecting* determining, for it is not essence which determines itself only inwardly; nor is it an *uttering* or *expressing of itself* [*sich äussern*], for it is the identity of inner and outer. But the movement of reflection thus stands *over against* the absolute identity of the absolute. In this identity it is sublated and thus is only the inner of it; but as inner, it is *external* to it. At first, therefore, this movement consists only in sublating its act in the absolute. It is the beyond of the manifold differences and determinations and their movement, a beyond which *lies at the back of the absolute*; consequently, though it accepts them, it also destroys them; it is thus the *negative exposition* of the absolute

CHAPTER I

THE ABSOLUTE

The simple substantial identity of the absolute is indeterminate, or rather in it every determinateness of *essence* and *Existence*, or of *being* in general, as well as of *reflection*, has dissolved itself. Accordingly, the process of *determining what the absolute is* has a negative outcome, and the absolute itself appears only as the negation of all predicates and as the void. But since equally it must be pronounced to be the position of all predicates, it appears as the most formal contradiction. In so far as both the negating and the positing belong to external reflection, this is a formal and unsystematic dialectic which has no difficulty in picking up here and there a variety of determinations, and on the one hand demonstrates with equal ease their finitude and mere relativity as, on the other hand, since it thinks vaguely of the absolute as the totality of determinations, declares these to be immanent in it; at the same time it is unable to raise either the positions or the negations to a genuine unity. But we have to exhibit what the absolute is; but this 'exhibiting' can be neither a determining nor an external reflection from which determinations of the absolute would result; on the contrary, it is the *exposition*, and in fact the *self-exposition*, of the absolute and only a *display of what it is*.

A. THE EXPOSITION OF THE ABSOLUTE

The absolute is not merely being, nor even *essence*. The former is the first, unreflected immediacy, the latter is reflected immediacy; further, each is a totality within itself but a determinate totality. In essence, being emerges as Existence; and the connexion between being and essence has progressed to the relation of inner and outer. The inner is essence, but as *totality*, which essentially has the determination of *connexion with being* and immediately to be *being*. The outer is being, but with the essential determination of being *connected with reflection*, and equally to be immediately a relationless identity with essence. The absolute itself is the absolute unity of both; it is that which constitutes in general the

previously mentioned. In its true presentation this exposition is the preceding whole of the logical movement of the sphere of *being and essence*, the content of which has not been raked together from outside as something given and contingent, or submerged in the abyss of the absolute by a reflection alien to that content; on the contrary, it has determined itself internally through its inner necessity, and as being's own *becoming* and as the *reflection* of essence, has withdrawn into the absolute as into its ground.

But at the same time this exposition has itself a *positive* side; for in so far as in it the finite falls to the ground, it demonstrates that its nature is to be connected with the absolute, or to contain the absolute within itself. But this side is not so much the positive exposition of the absolute itself as rather the exposition of the *determinations*, namely, that these have the absolute for their abyss, but also for their *ground*, in other words, that which gives a subsistence to them, to the illusory being, is the *absolute* itself. The illusory being is not *nothing*, but is a reflection, a *relation* to the absolute; or, it is illusory being in so far as *in it the absolute is reflected*. This positive exposition thus arrests the finite before it vanishes and contemplates it as an expression and image of the absolute. But the transparency of the finite, which only lets the absolute be glimpsed through it, ends by completely vanishing; for there is nothing in the finite which could preserve for it a distinction against the absolute; it is a medium which is absorbed by that which is reflected through it.

This positive exposition of the absolute is therefore itself only an illusory activity, a reflective movement [*ein Scheinen*]; for what is truly positive in the exposition and the expounded content, is the absolute itself. Any further determinations that may occur, the form into which the absolute reflects itself, is a nullity that the exposition picks up *from outside* and from which it gains a *beginning* for its activity. Such a determination has in the absolute, not its beginning, but only its *end*. Consequently, this expository process though it is an absolute act through its *relation* to the absolute into which it *withdraws*, is not so as regards its *starting point* which is a determination external to the absolute.

But the exposition of the absolute is, in fact, its *own* act, which *begins from itself* and *arrives at itself*. The absolute, merely as absolute identity, is *determinate*, namely, as the identical; it is

posited as such by reflection as against opposition and manifoldness; or it is only the *negative* of reflection and the process of determining as such. Therefore not only is this expounding of the absolute something imperfect, but so also is this *absolute* itself which is only *arrived at*. Or, the absolute that is only an *absolute identity*, is only the *absolute of an external reflection*. It is therefore not the absolute absolute but the absolute in a determinateness, or it is *attribute*.

But the absolute is not merely attribute because it is the *subject matter* of an external reflection and therefore something determined by it. Or, reflection is not only *external* to it; but because it is *external* to it, it is *immediately internal* to it. The absolute is the absolute only because it is not abstract identity, but the identity of being and essence, or the identity of inner and outer; it is therefore itself the absolute form which makes it reflect itself into itself [*es in sich scheinen macht*] and determines it into attribute.

B. THE ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTE

The expression which has been used, the *absolute absolute*, denotes the absolute that in *its form* has *returned* into itself, or whose form is identical with its content. The attribute is the merely *relative absolute*, a connexion which signifies simply the absolute in a *form determination*. For at first, before its completed exposition, the form is *only internal*, or what is the same thing *only external*, in general, at first *determinate* form or negation as such. But because form is at the same time form of the absolute, the attribute is the whole content of the absolute; it is the totality which previously appeared as a world, or as one of the *sides* of the *essential relation*, each of which is itself the whole. But the two worlds, the world of Appearance and the world-in-and-for-itself, were supposed to be *opposed* to each other in their essence. True, one side of the relation was equal to the other, the whole was equal to the parts, the expression of force the same content as force itself, and the outer altogether the same as the inner. But at the same time, each of these two sides was supposed to have as well an *immediate* subsistence of its own, one as simply affirmative, the other as reflected immediacy. In the absolute, on the other hand, these distinguished immediacies are reduced to an illusory being, and the *totality* which the attribute is is *posited as its true*