

Introduction

§ 1

The subject-matter of the philosophical science of right is the *Idea of right* – the concept of right and its actualization.¹

Philosophy has to do with Ideas and therefore not with what are commonly described as mere concepts. On the contrary, it shows that the latter are one-sided and lacking in truth, and that it is the concept alone (not what is so often called by that name, but which is merely an abstract determination of the understanding) which has *actuality*, and in such a way that it gives actuality to itself. Everything other than this actuality which is posited by the concept itself is transitory *existence* [*Dasein*], external contingency, opinion, appearance without essence, untruth, deception, etc. The *shape* which the concept assumes in its actualization, and which is essential for cognition of the concept itself, is different from its *form* of being purely as concept, and is the other essential moment of the Idea.

Addition (H). The concept and its existence [*Existenz*] are two aspects [of the same thing], separate and united, like soul and body. The body is the same life as the soul, and yet the two can be said to lie outside one another. A soul without a body would not be a living thing, and vice versa. Thus the existence [*Dasein*] of the concept is its body, just as the latter obeys the soul which produced it. The buds have the tree within them and contain its entire strength, although they are not yet the tree itself. The tree corresponds entirely to the simple image of the bud. If the body does

not correspond to the soul, it is a wretched thing indeed. The unity of existence [*Dasein*] and the concept, of body and soul, is the Idea. It is not just a harmony, but a complete interpenetration. Nothing lives which is not in some way Idea. The Idea of right is freedom, and in order to be truly apprehended, it must be recognizable in its concept and in the concept's existence [*Dasein*].

§ 2

The science of right is a *part of philosophy*. It has therefore to develop the *Idea*, which is the reason within an object [*Gegenstand*], out of the concept; or what comes to the same thing, it must observe the proper immanent development of the thing [*Sache*] itself. As a part [of philosophy], it has a determinate *starting point*, which is the *result* and truth of what *preceded* it, and what preceded it is the so-called *proof* of that result. Hence the concept of right, so far as its *coming into being* is concerned, falls outside the science of right; its deduction is presupposed here and is to be taken as *given*!

Addition (G). Philosophy forms a circle.² It has an initial or immediate point – for it must begin somewhere – a point which is not demonstrated and is not a result. But the starting point of philosophy is immediately relative, for it must appear at another end-point as a result. Philosophy is a sequence which is not suspended in mid-air; it does not begin immediately, but is rounded off within itself.

According to the formal, non-philosophical method of the sciences, the first thing which is sought and required, at least for the sake of external scientific form, is the *definition*. The positive science of right cannot be much concerned with this, however, since its chief aim is to state *what* is right and legal [*Rechts*], i.e. what the particular legal determinations are.

This is the reason for the warning: 'omnis definitio in iure civili periculosa.'³ And in fact, the more incoherent and internally contradictory the determinations of a [system of] right are, the less possible it will be to make definitions within it; for definitions should contain universal determinations, but in the present context, these would immediately make the contradictory element – in this case, what is unjust [*das Unrechtliche*] –

²Translator's note: 'In civil law all definitions are hazardous.'

visible in all its nakedness. Thus, in Roman law [*das römische Recht*], for example, no definition of a *human being* would be possible, for the slave could not be subsumed under it; indeed, the status [*Stand*] of the slave does violence to that concept. The definitions of 'property' and 'proprietor' would seem equally hazardous in many situations. – But the deduction of the definition may perhaps be reached by means of etymology, or chiefly by abstraction from particular cases, so that it is ultimately based on the feelings and ideas [*Vorstellung*] of human beings. The correctness of the definition is then made to depend on its agreement with prevailing ideas [*Vorstellungen*]. This method leaves out of account what is alone essential to science – with regard to content, the *necessity of the thing* [*Sache*] in and for itself (in this case, of right), and with regard to form, the nature of the concept. In philosophical cognition, on the other hand, the chief concern is the *necessity* of a concept, and the route by which it has become a *result* [is] its proof and deduction. Thus, given that its *content* is necessary *for itself*, the second step is to look around for what corresponds to it in our ideas [*Vorstellungen*] and language. But this concept as it is for itself in its *truth* may not only be different from our *representation* [*Vorstellung*] of it: the two must also differ in their form and shape. If, however, the representation is not also false in its content, the concept may well be shown to be contained in it and present in essence within it; that is, the representation may be raised to the form of the concept. But it is so far from being the measure and criterion of the concept which is necessary and true for itself that it must rather derive its truth from the concept, and recognize and correct itself with the help of the latter. – But if, on the other hand, the former manner of cognition with its formal definitions, inferences, proofs, and the like has now virtually disappeared, the other mode which has replaced it is a bad substitute: that is, Ideas in general, and hence also the Idea of right and its further determinations, are taken up and asserted in immediate fashion as *facts of consciousness*, and our natural or intensified feelings, our *own heart* and *enthusiasm*, are made the source of right.⁴ If this is the most convenient method of all, it is also the least philosophical – not to mention

highest development [*Ausbildung*] of Roman law as a science 'that it has long since been noticed that the classical jurists had a philosophical education'; but 'few people are aware' (although the many editions of Herr Hugo's textbook have ensured that more people are now aware) 'that no category of writers is so eminently deserving as these same Roman jurists to be likened to the mathematicians in respect of logical deduction from first principles or to the new founder of metaphysics in respect of the strikingly distinctive way in which they develop their concepts – the latter being confirmed by the *remarkable* fact that there are nowhere so many *trichotomies* as in the classical jurists and in Kant'. – That logical consistency which Leibniz praises is certainly an essential characteristic of the science of right, as of mathematics and every other science of the understanding; but this logical consistency of the understanding has nothing to do with the satisfaction of the demands of reason and with philosophical science.¹⁴ Apart from this, however, the very *inconsistency* of the Roman jurists and praetors should be regarded as one of their greatest virtues, for it enabled them to dissociate themselves from unjust and abominable institutions, although they were at the same time compelled to invent verbal distinctions on the sly¹⁵ (as when they called *bonorum possessio* what nevertheless amounted to an inheritance)¹⁵ and even silly excuses (and silliness is equally an inconsistency) in order to preserve the letter of the Twelve Tables, for example by the fiction or pretence¹⁶ that a daughter was a son' (see [J. G.] Heineccius, *Antiquitatum Romanarum* ... *liber* I [Frankfurt, 1771], tit. II, § 24).¹⁶ – But it is ludicrous to see the classical jurists lumped together with Kant because of a few *trichotomous* divisions – particularly those cited in Note 5 to Herr Hugo's remarks – and to see this kind of thing called 'development of concepts'.

¹⁴Translator's note: Hegel uses here the Latin adverb *callide*.

¹⁵Translator's note: Hegel uses the Latin and Greek terms *fraus* and *βρομολογία*.

¹⁶Translator's note: Hegel uses the Latin terms *fraus* and *fraus*.

§ 4

The basis [*Boden*] of right is the *realm of spirit* in general and its precise location and point of departure is the *will*; the will is *free*, so that freedom constitutes its substance and destiny [*Bestimmung*] and the system of right is the realm of actualized freedom, the world of spirit produced from within itself as a second nature.

Addition (H.G.). The freedom of the will can best be explained by reference to physical nature. For freedom is just as much a basic determination of the will as weight is a basic determination of bodies. If matter is described as heavy, one might think that this predicate is merely contingent; but this is not so, for nothing in matter is weightless: on the contrary, matter is weight itself. Heaviness constitutes the body and is the body. It is just the same with freedom and the will, for that which is free is the will. Will without freedom is an empty word, just as freedom is actual only as will or as subject. But as for the connection between the will and thought, the following remarks are necessary. Spirit is thought in general, and the human being is distinguished from the animal by thought. But it must not be imagined [*sich vorstellen*] that a human being thinks on the one hand and wills on the other, and that he has thought in one pocket and volition in the other, for this would be an empty representation [*Vorstellung*]. The distinction between thought and will is simply that between theoretical and practical attitudes. But they are not two separate faculties; on the contrary, the will is a particular way of thinking – thinking translating itself into existence [*Dasein*], thinking as the drive to give itself existence.¹⁷ This distinction between thought and will can be expressed as follows. When I think of an object [*Gegenstand*], I make it into a thought and deprive it of its sensuous quality; I make it into something which is essentially and immediately mine. For it is only when I think that I am with myself [*bei mir*], and it is only by comprehending it that I can penetrate an object; it then no longer stands opposed to me, and I have deprived it of that quality of its own which it had for itself in opposition to me. Just as Adam says to Eve: 'You are flesh of my flesh and bone of my bone',¹⁸ so does spirit say: 'This is spirit of my spirit, and its alien character has disappeared.' Every representation [*Vorstellung*] is a generalization, and this is inherent in thought. To generalize something means to think it. 'I' is thought and likewise the universal. When I say 'I', I leave out of account every particularity such as my character, temperament, knowledge [*Kenntnis*], and age. 'I' is totally empty; it is merely a point – simple, yet active in this simplicity. The colourful canvas of the world is before me; I stand opposed to it and in this [theoretical] attitude I overcome

[*aufheben*] its opposition and make its content my own. 'I' is at home in the world when it knows it, and even more so when it has comprehended it. So much for the theoretical attitude. The practical attitude, on the other hand, begins with thought, with the 'I' itself, and seems at first to be opposed [to the world] because it immediately sets up a separation. In so far as I am practical or active, i.e. in so far as I act, I determine myself, and to determine myself means precisely to posit a difference. But these differences which I posit are nevertheless also mine, the determinations apply to me, and the ends to which I am impelled belong to me. Now even if I let go of these determinations and differences, i.e. if I posit them in the so-called external world, they still remain mine: they are what I have done or made, and they bear the imprint of my mind [*Geist*]. This, then, is the distinction between theoretical and practical attitudes; the relationship between them must now be described. The theoretical is essentially contained within the practical; the idea [*Vorstellung*] that the two are separate must be rejected, for one cannot have a will without intelligence. On the contrary, the will contains the theoretical within itself. The will determines itself, and this determination is primarily of an inward nature, for what I will I represent to myself as my object [*Gegenstand*]. The animal acts by instinct, it is impelled by something inward and is therefore also practical; but it has no will, because it does not represent to itself what it desires. It is equally impossible to adopt a theoretical attitude or to think without a will, for in thinking we are necessarily active. The content of what is thought certainly takes on the form of being; but this being is something mediated, something posited by our activity. These distinct attitudes are therefore inseparable: they are one and the same thing, and both moments can be found in every activity, of thinking and willing alike.

With regard to the freedom of the will, we may recollect the older method of cognition. It simply presupposed the *representation* [*Vorstellung*] of the will and attempted to set up a definition of the will by extracting it from this representation; then, in the manner of the older empirical psychology, the so-called *proof* of the will's freedom was derived from the various feelings and phenomena [*Empfindungen und Erscheinungen*] of ordinary consciousness, such as remorse, guilt, and the like, which could allegedly be explained only in terms of a free will. But it is more convenient simply to adhere to the notion that freedom is given as a *fact* of consciousness in which we must simply believe.² The deduction that the will is free and of what the will and freedom are – as already remarked in § 2 above –

is possible only within the context of the whole [of philosophy]. The basic features of this premise are that *spirit* is initially *intelligence* and that the determinations through which it proceeds in its development, from *feeling* to *representational thinking* [*Vorstellen*] to *thought*, are the way by which it produces itself as *will* – which, as practical spirit in general, is the proximate truth of intelligence. I have given an account of these matters in my *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (Heidelberg, 1817), §§ 363–399, and hope to deal with them in greater detail on a future occasion.³ It is all the more necessary for me to contribute in this way to what I hope will be a more thorough cognition of the nature of spirit, because, as I pointed out in the *Encyclopaedia* (Remarks to § 367), it is hard to imagine that any philosophical science can be in so bad and neglected a condition as that *doctrine of spirit* which is usually called 'psychology'.⁴ – And as for those elements [*Momente*] of the concept of the will which are mentioned in this and the following paragraphs of the Introduction and which result from the premise referred to above, it is possible to form an idea [*Vorstellen*] of them by consulting the self-consciousness of any individual. In the first place, anyone can discover in himself an ability to abstract from anything whatsoever, and likewise to determine himself, to posit any content in himself by his own agency; and he will likewise have examples of the further determinations [of the will] within his self-consciousness.

§ 5

The will contains (a) the element of *pure indeterminacy* or of the 'I's pure reflection into itself, in which every limitation, every content, whether present immediately through nature, through needs, desires, and drives, or given and determined in some other way, is dissolved; this is the limitless infinity of *absolute abstraction* or *universality*, the pure thinking of oneself.

Those who regard thinking as a particular and distinct *faculty*, divorced from the will as an equally distinct *faculty*, and who in addition even consider that thinking is prejudicial to the will –

especially the good will – show from the very outset that they are totally ignorant of the nature of the will (a remark which we shall often have occasion to make on this same subject).¹ – Only *one aspect* of the will is defined here – namely this *absolute possibility of abstracting* from every determination in which I find myself or which I have posited in myself; the flight from every content as a limitation. If the will determines itself in this way, or if representational thought [*die Vorstellung*] considers this aspect in itself [*für sich*] as freedom and holds fast to it, this is *negative freedom* or the freedom of the understanding. – This is the freedom of the void, which is raised to the status of an actual shape and passion. If it remains purely theoretical, it becomes in the religious realm the Hindu fanaticism of pure contemplation;² but if it turns to actuality, it becomes in the realm of both politics and religion the fanaticism of destruction, demolishing the whole existing social order, eliminating all individuals regarded as suspect by a given order, and annihilating any organization which attempts to rise up anew.³ Only in destroying something does this negative will have a feeling of its own existence [*Dasein*]. It may well believe that it wills some positive condition, for instance the condition of universal equality or of universal religious life, but it does not in fact will the positive actuality of this condition, for this at once gives rise to some kind of order, a particularization both of institutions and of individuals; but it is precisely through the annihilation of particularity and of objective determination that the self-consciousness of this negative freedom arises. Thus, whatever such freedom believes [*meint*] that it wills can in itself [*für sich*] be no more than an abstract representation [*Vorstellung*], and its actualization can only be the fury of destruction.

Addition (H,G). It is inherent in this element of the will that I am able to free myself from everything, to renounce all ends, and to abstract from everything.⁴ The human being alone is able to abandon all things, even his own life: he can commit suicide. The animal cannot do this; it always remains only negative, in a determination which is alien to it and to which it merely grows accustomed. The human being is pure thinking of himself, and only in thinking is he this power to give himself universality, that is, to distinguish all particularity, all determinacy. This negative freedom

or freedom of the understanding is one-sided, but this one-sidedness always contains within itself an essential determination and should therefore not be dismissed; but the defect of the understanding is that it treats a one-sided determination as unique and elevates it to supreme status. This form of freedom occurs frequently in history. The Hindus, for example, place the highest value on mere persistence in the knowledge of one's simple identity with oneself, on remaining within this empty space of one's inwardness like colourless light in pure intuition, and on renouncing every activity of life, every end, and every representation [*Vorstellung*]. In this way, the human being becomes *Brahman*. There is no longer any distinction between the finite human being and Brahman; instead, every difference [*Differenz*] has disappeared in this universality. This form [of freedom] appears more concretely in the active fanaticism of both political and religious life. An example of this was the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution, during which all differences of talents and authority were supposed to be cancelled out [*aufgehoben*]. This was a time of trembling and quaking and of intolerance towards everything particular. For fanaticism wills only what is abstract, not what is articulated, so that whenever differences emerge, it finds them incompatible with its own indeterminacy and cancels them [*hebt sie auf*]. This is why the people, during the French Revolution, destroyed once more the institutions they had themselves created, because all institutions are incompatible with the abstract self-consciousness of equality.

§ 6

(β) In the same way, 'I' is the transition from undifferentiated indeterminacy to *differentiation, determination*, and the *positing* of a determinacy as a content and object. – This content may further be given by nature, or generated by the concept of spirit. Through this positing of itself as something *determinate*, 'I' steps into existence [*Dasein*] in general – the absolute moment of the *finite* or *particularization* of the 'I'.

This second moment of *determination* is just as much *negativity* and cancellation [*Aufheben*] as the first – for it is the cancellation of the first abstract negativity. – Just as the particular is in general contained within the universal, so in consequence is this second moment already contained within the first and is merely a *positing* of what the first already is *in itself*. The first moment – that is, the first as it is for itself – is not true infinity

or the concrete universality of the concept, but only something determinate and one-sided. For since it is abstraction from all that it is abstract and one-sided constitutes its determinacy, deficiency, and finitude. – The differentiation and determination of the two moments referred to is to be found in the philosophy of Fichte and likewise in that of Kant etc., except that in Fichte – to confine ourselves to his presentation – 'I', as the unbounded (in the first proposition of his *Theory of Knowledge* [*Wissenschaftslehre*]), is taken purely and simply as something positive (and thus as the universality and identity of the understanding). Consequently, this abstract 'I' for itself is supposed to be the truth; and limitation – i.e. the negative in general, whether as a given external limit or as an activity of the 'I' itself – is therefore something added to it (in the second proposition).¹ – The further step which speculative philosophy had to take was to apprehend the negativity which is immanent within the universal or the identical, as in the 'I' – a step the need for which is not perceived by those who fail to apprehend the dualism of infinity and finitude, even in that immanent and abstract form in which Fichte understood it.

Addition (H.G.). This second moment appears as the opposing one. It is to be apprehended in its universal mode: it belongs to freedom, but does not constitute the whole of freedom. The 'I' here emerges from undifferentiated indeterminacy to become differentiated, to posit something determinate as its content and object [*Gegenstand*]. I do not merely will – I will something. A will which, as described in the previous paragraph, wills only the abstract universal, wills nothing and is therefore not a will at all. The particular [thing] which the will wills is a limitation, for the will, in order to be a will, must in some way limit itself. The fact that the will wills something is the limit or negation. Thus particularization is what as a rule is called finitude. Reflective thought usually regards the first moment, namely the indeterminate, as the absolute and higher moment, and conversely regards the limited as a mere negation of this indeterminacy. But this indeterminacy is itself merely a negation with regard to the determinate, to finitude: 'I' is this solitude and absolute negation. The indeterminate will is to this extent just as one-sided as that which exists in mere determinacy.

§ 7

(γ) The will is the unity of both these moments – particularity reflected into itself and thereby restored to universality. It is individuality [*Einzelheit*], the self-determination of the 'I', in that it posits itself as the negative of itself, that is, as determinate and limited, and at the same time remains with itself [*bei sich*], that is, in its identity with itself and universality; and in this determination, it joins together with itself alone. – 'I' determines itself in so far as it is the self-reference of negativity. As this reference to itself, it is likewise indifferent to this determinacy; it knows the latter as its own and as ideal, as a mere possibility by which it is not restricted but in which it finds itself merely because it posits itself in it. – This is the freedom of the will, which constitutes the concept or substantiality of the will, its gravity, just as gravity constitutes the substantiality of a body.

Every self-consciousness knows itself as universal, as the possibility of abstracting from everything determinate, and as particular, with a determinate object [*Gegenstand*], content, and end. But these two moments are only abstractions; what is concrete and true (and everything true is concrete) is the universality which has the particular as its opposite, but this particular, through its reflection into itself, has been reconciled [*ausgeglichen*] with the universal. This unity is individuality, but not in its immediacy as a single unit – as in our common idea [*Vorstellung*] of individuality – but rather in accordance with the concept of individuality (see *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, §§ 112–114);¹ in other words, this individuality is in fact none other than the concept itself. The first two moments – that the will can abstract from everything – and that it is also determined (by itself or by something else) – are easy to accept and grasp, because they are, in themselves [*für sich*], moments of the understanding and devoid of truth. But it is the third moment, the true and speculative (and everything true, in so far as it is comprehended, can be thought of only speculatively), which the understanding refuses to enter into, because the concept is precisely what the understanding always describes as incomprehensible. The task of proving and explaining in more detail this innermost insight of speculation – that is, infinity as self-referring

negativity, this ultimate source of all activity, life, and consciousness – belongs to *logic* as purely speculative philosophy.

– The only thing which remains to be noted here is that, when we say that *the will* is universal and that *the will* determines itself, we speak as if the will were already assumed to be a *subject* or *substratum*. But the will is not complete and universal until it is determined, and until this determination is superseded and idealized; it does not become will until it is this self-mediating activity and this return into itself.

Addition (H). What is properly called the will contains both the preceding moments. 'I' as such is primarily pure activity, the universal which is with itself [*bei sich*]; but this universal determines itself, and to that extent is no longer with itself but posits itself as an other and ceases to be the universal. Then the third moment is that 'I' is with itself in its limitation, in this other; as it determines itself, it nevertheless still remains with itself and does not cease to hold fast to the universal. This, then, is the concrete concept of freedom, whereas the two previous moments have been found to be thoroughly abstract and one-sided. But we already possess this freedom in the form of feeling [*Empfindung*], for example in friendship and love.² Here, we are not one-sidedly within ourselves, but willingly limit ourselves with reference to an other, even while knowing ourselves in this limitation as ourselves. In this determinacy, the human being should not feel determined; on the contrary, he attains his self-awareness only by regarding the other as other. Thus, freedom lies neither in indeterminacy nor in determinacy, but is both at once. The will which limits itself exclusively to a *this* is the will of the stubborn person who considers himself unfree unless he has *this* will. But the will is not tied to something limited; on the contrary, it must proceed further, for the nature of the will is not this one-sidedness and restriction. Freedom is to will something determinate, yet to be with oneself [*bei sich*] in this determinacy and to return once more to the universal.

§ 8

The further determination of *particularization* (see § 6 above) constitutes the difference between the forms of the will: (a) in so far as determinacy is the *formal [formelle]* opposition between the *subjective* on the one hand and the *objective* as external immediate existence

[*Existenz*] on the other, this is the *formal [formelle]* will as self-consciousness, which *finds* an external world outside itself. As individuality [*Einzelheit*] returning in determinacy into itself, it is the process of *translating the subjective end into objectivity* through the mediation of activity and of a[n external] means. In the spirit as it is in and for itself, whereby its determinacy is absolutely true and *its own* (see *Encyclopaedia*, § 363),³ the relation of consciousness constitutes no more than the *aspect* of the will's *appearance*. This aspect will not be separately [*für sich*] considered any further here.

Addition (H). The consideration of the will's determinacy is the task of the understanding and is not primarily speculative. The will is determined by no means only in the sense of content, but also in the sense of form. Its determinacy with regard to form is its end and the accomplishment of its end. At first this end is only *subjective* and internal to me, but it should also become *objective* and throw off the deficiency of mere subjectivity. One may ask here why it has this deficiency. If that which is deficient does not at the same time stand above its deficiency, then its deficiency does not exist for it. For us an animal is deficient, but not for itself. In so far as an end is still only ours, it is for us a deficiency, for to us, freedom and will are the unity of the subjective and the objective. Hence the end must be posited objectively, and it thereby attains not a new one-sided determination but only its realization.

²*Translator's note:* The distinction between the adjective *formal* and the preceding *formell* appears to carry no particular significance. On subsequent occasions in the *Rechtsphilosophie* (for example, § 123 and Hegel's Remarks to §§ 13, 15, 115, 135, 139, 261, etc.), Hegel uses only *formell*.

§ 9

(b) In so far as the will's determinations are *its own* – that is, its *internally* reflected particularization in general – they are its *content*. This content, as the content of the will, is its end in accordance with the form specified under (a) above – either its inner or subjective end as represented in the act of willing, or its end as actualized and accomplished through the mediation of its activity as it translates the subjective into objectivity.

§ 10

This content, or the distinct determination of the will, is primarily *immediate*. Thus, the will is *free only in itself or for us*, or it is in general the will in *its concept*. Only when the will has itself as its object [*Gegenstand*] is it *for itself* what it is *in itself*.

Finitude, according to this determination, consists in the fact that what something is *in itself* or in accordance with its concept is different in its existence [*Existenz*] or appearance from what it is *for itself*; thus, for example, *in itself* the abstract mutual externality of nature is space, but *for itself* it is time. Two points should be noted in this connection: first that, because the true is simply the Idea, we do not yet possess an object or determination in its truth if we grasp it only as it is *in itself* or in its concept; and secondly, that something as *concept* or *in itself* likewise exists, and this existence [*Existenz*] is a shape proper to the object (as with space in the above example). The separation which is present in the finite world between being-in-itself and being-for-itself at the same time constitutes the finite world's mere *existence* [*Dasein*] or *appearance* (immediate examples of this will arise in connection with the natural will and then with formal right, etc.). The understanding stops at mere *being-in-itself* and therefore calls freedom in accordance with this being-in-itself a *faculty* [*Vermögen*], since it is indeed in this case a mere *potentiality* [*Möglichkeit*]. But the understanding regards this determination as absolute and perennial, and takes the relationship [*Beziehung*] of freedom to what it wills, or in general to its reality, merely as its *application* to a given material, an application which does not belong to the essence of freedom itself. In this way, the understanding has to do with the abstract alone, not with the Idea and truth of freedom.¹

Addition (G). The will which is a will only in accordance with its concept is free in itself but at the same time unfree, for it would be truly free only as a truly determinate content; in the latter case, it is free for itself, has freedom as its object, and *is* freedom. Whatever is still only in accordance with its concept, whatever is merely in itself, is only immediate, only natural. We are also familiar with this in representational thought [*in der*

Vorstellung). The child is *in itself* a human being; it has reason only *in itself*, it is only the potentiality of reason and freedom, and is therefore free only in accordance with its concept. Now what exists as yet only in itself does not exist in its actuality. The human being who is rational *in himself* must work through the process of self-production both by going out of himself and by educating himself inwardly, in order that he may also become rational *for himself*.

§ 11

The will which is free as yet only *in itself* is the *immediate or natural* will. The determinations of the difference which is posited within the will by the self-determining concept appear within the immediate will as an *immediately* present content: these are the *drives, desires, and inclinations* by which the will finds itself naturally determined. This content, along with the determinations developed within it, does indeed originate in the will's rationality and it is thus rational in itself; but expressed in so immediate a form, it does not yet have the form of rationality.¹ For *me*, this content is admittedly entirely *mine*; but this form and that content are still different, so that the will is a *finite* will *within itself*.

Empirical psychology relates and describes these drives and inclinations and the needs derived from them as it encounters them, or believes it encounters them, in experience, and attempts to classify this given material in the usual way. We shall discuss below what the *objective* element of these drives is, what shape this element assumes in its truth (without the form of irrationality which it possesses as drive), and also what shape it assumes in its existence [*Existenz*].

Addition (H). The animal, too, has drives, desires, and inclinations, but it has no will and must obey its drive if nothing external prevents it. But the human being, as wholly indeterminate, stands above his drives and can determine and posit them as his own. The drive is part of nature, but to posit it in this 'I' depends upon my will, which therefore cannot appeal to the fact that the drive is grounded in nature.

§ 12

The system of this content as it is *already present* in its immediacy in the will exists only as a multitude of varied drives, each of which is mine in *general* along with others, and at the same time something universal and indeterminate which has all kinds of objects [*Gegenstände*] and can be satisfied in all kinds of ways. Inasmuch as the will, in this double indeterminacy, gives itself the form of *individuality* [*Einzelheit*] (see § 7), it is a resolving will, and only in so far as it makes any resolutions at all is it an actual will.

To resolve on something [*etwas beschließen*]^a is to cancel [*aufheben*] that indeterminacy in which each and every content is initially no more than a possibility. But our language also contains the alternative expression *sich entschließen* ['to decide'],^b which indicates that the indeterminacy of the will itself, as something neutral yet infinitely fruitful, the original seed of all existence [*Dasein*], contains its determinations and ends within itself, and merely brings them forth from within.

^aTranslator's note: Literally, 'to close something'.

^bTranslator's note: Literally, 'to unclothe oneself'.

§ 13

By resolving, the will posits itself as the will of a specific individual and as a will which distinguishes itself from everything else. But apart from this *finitude* as consciousness (see § 8), the immediate will, because of the difference between its form and its content (see § 11), is purely *formal*; its only appropriate function is that of *abstract resolution*, and its content is not yet the content and product of its freedom.

In so far as intelligence is a *thinking* power, its object [*Gegenstand*] and content remain *universal* and the intelligence itself behaves as a universal activity. In the will, the universal also means essentially 'that which is mine', as *individuality* [*Einzelheit*]; and in the immediate, i.e. formal will, it signifies abstract individuality which is not yet filled with its free universality. It is therefore in the will that the *proper* [*eigene*] *finitude* of intelligence begins, and it is only by raising itself

once more to the level of thought and by conferring immanent universality upon its ends that the will cancels [*aufhebt*] the difference of form and content and makes itself objective, infinite will. Thus those who believe that the human being is infinite in the realm of the will in general, but that he – or reason itself – is limited in the realm of thought, have little understanding of the nature of thinking and willing.¹ In so far as thinking and willing are still distinct, it is rather the converse which is true, and thinking reason, as will, is [reason] deciding [*sich entschließen*] on its own *finitude*.

Addition (H). A will which resolves on nothing is not an actual will; the characterless man can never resolve on anything. The reason [*Grund*] for such indecision may also lie in an over-refined sensibility which knows that, in determining something, it enters the realm of finitude, imposing a limit on itself and relinquishing infinity; yet it does not wish to renounce the totality which it intends. Such a disposition [*Gemüt*] is dead, even if its aspiration is to be beautiful.² 'Whoever aspires to great things', says Goethe, 'must be able to limit himself.'³ Only by making resolutions can the human being enter actuality, however painful the process may be; for inertia would rather not emerge from that inward brooding in which⁴ it reserves a universal possibility for itself. But possibility is not yet actuality. The will which is sure of itself does not therefore lose itself in what it determines.

¹Translator's note: As T. M. Knox (Knox, p. 230, note) surmises, the *der* of the original must surely read *dem*. Gans, who compiled the 'Additions', has simply taken this error over from Hobbo's transcription of Hegel's lectures (cf. VPR III, 131).

§ 14

The finite will, purely with regard to its form, is the self-reflecting infinite 'I' which is with itself [*bei sich selbst*] (see § 5). As such, it *stands above* its content, i.e. its various drives, and also above the further individual ways in which these are actualized and satisfied. At the same time, since it is only formally infinite, it is *tied* to this content as to the determinations of its nature and of its external actuality (see §§ 6 and 11); but since it is indeterminate, it is not restricted to this or that content in particular. To this extent, this content is only a possible one for the reflection of the 'I' into itself; it may or may not be mine; and 'I' is the *possibility* of determining myself to this or to

something else, of *choosing* between these determinations which the 'I' must in this respect regard as external.'

§ 15

The freedom of the will, according to this determination, is *arbitrariness*, in which the following two factors are contained: free reflection, which abstracts from everything, and dependence on an inwardly or externally given content and material. Since this content, which is necessary *in itself* as an end, is at the same time determined as a possible content in opposition to free reflection, it follows that arbitrariness is *contingency* in the shape of will.

The commonest idea [*Vorstellung*] we have of freedom is that of *arbitrariness* – the mean position of reflection between the will as determined solely by natural drives and the will which is free in and for itself. When we hear it said that freedom in general consists in *being able to do as one pleases*, such an idea [*Vorstellung*] can only be taken to indicate a complete lack of intellectual culture [*Bildung des Gedankens*]; for it shows not the least awareness of what constitutes the will which is free in and for itself, or right, or ethics, etc. Reflection, the *formal* universality and unity of self-consciousness, is the will's *abstract* certainty of its freedom, but it is not yet the *truth* of this freedom, because it does not yet have itself as its content and end, so that the subjective side is still something other than the objective [*die gegenständliche*]; the content of this self-determination therefore also remains purely and simply finite. Instead of being the will in its truth, arbitrariness is rather the will as *contradiction*. – In the controversy which arose chiefly at the time of Wolff's metaphysics as to whether the will is actually free or whether our knowledge of its freedom is merely a delusion, it was arbitrariness which people had in mind.' To the certainty of this abstract self-determination, *determinism* rightly opposed the *content*, which, as something encountered, is not contained in that certainty and therefore comes to it *from outside* – although 'outside' here denotes drive or representation [*Vorstellung*], or simply the fact that the consciousness is filled in such a way that its content is not derived

from its own self-determining activity as such. Accordingly, since only the formal element of free self-determination is immanent within arbitrariness, whereas the other element is something given to it, arbitrariness may indeed be called a delusion if it is supposed to be equivalent to freedom. In all reflective philosophy, as in that of Kant and subsequently in Fries's utterly superficial revision of it, freedom is nothing other than this formal self-activity.²

Addition (H). Since I have the possibility of determining myself in this or that direction – that is, since I am able to choose – I possess an arbitrary will, and this is what is usually called freedom. The choice which I have lies in the universality of the will, whereby I can make this or that [thing] mine. This [thing] which is mine is a particular content and is therefore incompatible with me; thus it is separate from me and is only potentially mine, just as I am only the potentiality of uniting with it. The choice therefore lies in the indeterminacy of the 'I' and the determinacy of the content. Because of this content, the will is consequently not free, although it has in itself the aspect of infinity in a formal sense. None of these contents is in keeping with it, and it does not truly have itself in any of them. It is inherent in arbitrariness that the content is not determined as mine by the nature of my will, but by *contingency*; thus I am also dependent on this content, and this is the contradiction which underlies arbitrariness. The common man thinks that he is free when he is allowed to act arbitrarily, but this very arbitrariness implies that he is not free. When I will what is rational, I act not as a particular [*partikulares*] individual, but in accordance with the concepts of ethics in general: in an ethical act, I vindicate not myself but the thing [*die Sache*]. But a person who does something perverse gives the greatest prominence to his particularity [*Partikularität*]. The rational is the high road which everyone follows and where no one stands out from the rest. When great artists complete a work, we can say that it *had* to be so; that is, the artist's particularity has completely disappeared and no *mannerism* is apparent in it. Phidias has no mannerisms; the shape itself lives and stands out. But the poorer the artist is, the more we see of himself, of his particularity and arbitrariness.³ If we stop our enquiry at arbitrariness, at the human being's ability to will this or that, this does indeed constitute his freedom; but if we bear firmly in mind that the content of what he wills is a given one, it follows that he is determined by it and is in this very respect no longer free.