

HEGEL'S POLITICAL WRITINGS

TRANSLATED BY

T. M. KNOX

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY BY

Z. A. PELCZYNSKI

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In the German character one feature, if not a rational one, at least to some extent a noble one, is that it regards law as such, whatever its basis or consequences, as something sacrosanct. If Germany is perishing as a separate and independent state, as it to all appearance is, and if the German nation is finally perishing altogether as a people, it is ever a pleasing spectacle to see [15] in the vanguard, amidst the spirits of destruction, the fear of the law.

Such a spectacle the political situation and the constitutional law of Germany would afford if Germany were to be regarded as a state. Its political situation would have to be treated as legal anarchy, its constitutional law as a legal system opposed to the state. But everything harmonizes with the view that Germany is no longer to be regarded as a unified political whole but only as a mass of independent and essentially sovereign states. Yet, it is said, Germany is an 'empire', 'a body politic', it stands under 'a common imperial head' in an 'imperial union'. To these expressions as legal titles no disrespect is to be paid; but an essay concerned with concepts can make nothing of titles of this sort; though from the definition of the concepts it may make clear what meaning such titles may possess. Of course expressions like 'Empire', 'Imperial Head' are often taken for concepts, and they must be makeshifts in emergency.

The constitutional lawyer who cannot call Germany a state any longer, because otherwise he would have to grant many inferences which follow from the concept of a state, and which he yet may not grant, has recourse, since Germany is still not to count as a 'non-state', to taking the title of 'Empire' as a concept. Or, since Germany is neither a democracy nor an aristocracy but has been supposed to be essentially a monarchy, while the Emperor on the other hand is not to be regarded as a monarch, his title of 'Imperial Head' is used as a makeshift even in a system where not titles but defined concepts are supposed to rule.

By the use of the quite general concept of 'Imperial Head', the Emperor is consigned to a category along with the one-time Doge of Venice and the Sultan of Turkey. These equally are heads of states, but the former was the most restricted head of an aristocracy, while the latter is the most unrestricted head of a despotism. And since the concept of a 'Head' covers all sorts of variations in the scope of the supreme authority of the state, it is completely

vague and [16] therefore valueless. It professes to express something and at bottom has expressed nothing.

In the scientific and historical field we must fight shy of such meaningless expressions, even if in actual life the German genius uses them as expedients. Grant the stubbornness of the German character in continually resting on its own will in civil life; grant separate and irreconcilable state interests in the political field; but suppose that for other important reasons a unity is none the less to be established in civil life or in politics: then there is no better means to the end than to find some general expression which satisfies both sides and which yet leaves both sides at home with their own will. The result is that the difference remains as it was before, or, if in fact one side must give in, then at least the acknowledgement of giving in is evaded by the use of this general expression.

With such general expressions the Germans have kept alive for centuries a show of union in which in fact no member has yielded one jot of its claims to independence. Reflection on this phenomenon, at any rate if it is to be scientific, must cling to concepts, and, in judging whether a country is a state, must not dally with general expressions but must bring into consideration the range of power left to what is to be called a state. Since closer examination reveals that what is called in general terms 'constitutional law' [or rights of the state] consists in rights *against* the state, the question would arise whether in spite of all this a *power* still accrues to the state in virtue of which it really is a state. If what is necessary to this end is examined more closely and compared with the condition of Germany in respect of the state's power, it will appear that Germany cannot in strictness be called a state any longer. We proceed to go through the various chief powers which must be found in a state.

[§ 1. CONCEPT OF THE STATE]

[17] A multitude of human beings can only call itself a state if it be united for the common defence of the entirety of its property. What is self-explanatory in this proposition must none the less be stated, namely that this union has not merely the intention of defending itself; the point is that it defends itself by actual arms, be its power and its success what they may. There will be no one

to deny that Germany is united in law and in words for its common defence; but in this matter we may not distinguish between laws and words on the one hand, and facts and actuality on the other, nor may we say that Germany [18] is armed in common, not of course in fact and actuality, but still by law and in words. Property and its defence by a political union are things which refer wholly and entirely to reality; whatever their ideal existence may be, it cannot be a state.¹

Plans and theories claim reality in so far as they *can* be carried out, but their value is the same whether they be actualized or not. A theory of the state, however, signifies state and constitution only in so far as it is actual. If Germany were to profess to be a state and a constitution, although its constitutional forms were without life, and the theory of them without actuality, it would be speaking an untruth. But if it were to promise in words to afford common defence in actuality, we would have to ascribe to it the weakness of age, which still wills though it can no longer do, or the dishonesty which does not abide by its promises.

If a multitude is to form a state, then it must form a common military and public authority. The manner, however, in which the consequential particular operations and the aspects of union are present, or the particular type of constitution [adopted] is immaterial for the formation of a multitude into an authority. [19] These particular details may in general be present in an extreme multiplicity of ways, and, even in some specific state, complete irregularity and heterogeneity may obtain in these matters. In dealing with this topic we must keep two things distinct: first, what is necessary if a multitude is to be a state and a common authority, and, secondly, what is only a particular modification of this authority and what belongs not to the sphere of the necessary but, as regards theory, to the sphere of the greater or lesser good, and, as regards actuality, to the sphere of chance and caprice.

This distinction has an aspect very important for the peace of states, the security of governments, and the freedom of peoples. If the general public authority demands from the individual only what is necessary for itself, and if it restricts accordingly the arrangements for ensuring the performance of this minimum, then beyond this point it can permit the living freedom and the individual will of the citizens, and even leave considerable scope to

¹ Reading, with Mollat, *ein Staat ist*.

the latter. Similarly the public authority, concentrated necessarily at the centre, in the government, is regarded by the individuals at the periphery with a less jaundiced eye when it demands what it regards as necessary and what everyone can see as indispensable for the whole. This would avoid a danger: for if both the necessary and the more arbitrary are alike in the power of the centre of the public authority, and if they are both demanded with the same strictness, as by the government, the citizens may confuse both things together, become as impatient with the one as with the other, and bring the state, as regards its necessary claims, into jeopardy.

In that part of a state's actual existence which belongs to chance, we must include the actual manner in which the whole public authority may exist in a supreme point of union. [20] Whether the holders of authority be one or many, whether the one or the many are born to this distinction or elected to it, is immaterial for the one thing necessary, i.e. the formation of a multitude into a state, just as immaterial as the uniformity or lack of uniformity of civil rights between the individuals who are subjects of the general public authority. Similarly beside the point is the inequality of nature, talent, and mental energy, which makes a more powerful difference than inequality of civil relationships. The fact that a state counts amongst its subjects villeins, burghers, free noblemen, and princes with subjects of their own in turn,¹ and the fact that the relationships of these particular classes as particular members of the state do not exist in a pure form but in infinite modifications, is as little a hindrance to the formation of a multitude into a state as the fact that the particular geographical members of the state constitute provinces variously related to the internal constitutional law.

So far as strictly civil laws and the administration of justice are concerned, a similarity of laws and legal procedures would no more make Europe a state than a similarity of weights, measures, and money; [21] nor does a difference in these things cancel the unity of a state. If it did not lie in the concept of the state that the more detailed determination of legal relationships affecting the property of one individual against another's did not concern the state as

¹ 'The Czar of Russia has villeins amongst his subjects, burghers of towns which have municipal constitutions, free noblemen, and princes who themselves in turn have subjects, people so uncivilized, still in the state of nature, that they hardly know even the name of law and government. So too in every other European state the relation of the citizens to the supreme political power is the reverse of uniform' (H. in another draft [20 fn.]).

a public authority (since the latter has to determine only the relationship between the state and property as such), the example of almost all European states could teach us this, since the more powerful of the genuine states amongst them have laws that are thorough and through the reverse of uniform. Before the Revolution, France had such a multiplicity of laws that, apart from Roman Law, which prevailed in several provinces, Burgundian Law, Breton Law, &c., ruled elsewhere, and almost every province, indeed almost every city, had its own customary law. A French writer said truthfully that a traveller in France changed laws as often as he changed post-horses.

Equally outside the concept of the state is the question to which particular power legislation belongs or how far and in what proportion the various estates or the [22] citizens in general are to participate in it. Equally irrelevant is the character of the courts, i.e. whether in the various instances the members of the court are to be hereditary or appointed by the supreme authority or freely entrusted with responsibility by the burghers or commissioned by the courts themselves. What scope a specific jurisdiction should have, whether that jurisdiction should be fixed by chance, whether there is a common court of the last instance for the whole state, &c.—these questions too are irrelevant.

Equally independent of the [concept of the] state is the form of administration in general, and it may thus be multifarious, like the arrangements for magistracies, the rights of cities and estates, &c. All these things are only relatively important for the state, and for its true essence the form of their organization is immaterial.

Inequality of taxes on the different classes in accordance with their *material* resources is to be found in all European states and so, to a greater extent, is inequality on the *ideal* side, i.e. inequality in fiscal *rights* and *duties* and in the origin of these. The fact that through the inequality of wealth there arises an inequality in the contributions made to state expenditure is so little a hindrance to the state that on the contrary modern states [23] are based on it. The state is just as little affected by the unequal basis on which payments are made by the different estates of the nobility, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasantry;¹ and, apart from everything

¹ 'Apart from differences between estates, the enormous difference between provinces in France is well known. . . . In some provinces salt was under 6 sous per lb. and in others it was over 12 sous' (H. in another draft [23 fn.]).

called privilege, the difference between the estates provides the reason for their contributing in different proportions, because the proportion can be determined only in regard to what is produced and not by the fundamental element in what is taxed, i.e. not by labour, which cannot be computed and is inherently unequal.¹

Whether the different geographical parts of a state are differently taxed, what changes and subordinate systems² taxation passes through, whether in respect of one and the same field a city has the land tax, a private individual the ground rent, an abbey the tithes, the nobleman the hunting rights, the commune the grazing rights, &c., and whether different estates and bodies of all kinds become individually circumstanced in relation to tax paying; all these matters and others like them are accidentalities remaining outside the concept of the public authority, for which, as the centre, only the fixed quantum is essential, while the disproportionate convergence of the revenue is immaterial so far as its origin goes. Thus in general the whole arrangement of the revenue may lie outside the state itself; yet the state may none the less be very powerful whether (i), as under the old feudal system, the vassal's personal exertions in times of emergency [24] provide at the same time everything he needs in the [course of the] service he gives to the state, while for everything else the state has the source of its revenues in the crown lands, or whether (ii), as is also conceivable, overall expenditure is defrayed in this latter manner, in which event the state would not, even as a money power, as it must be in modern times, be a centre to which taxes were paid. On the contrary, what the state receives as taxes, in accordance with the exact arrangements governing most of them, is on the same footing of particular rights as [the revenues of] others who in relation to the state are private individuals.³

¹ Hegel is maintaining that the fundamental difference between the Estates of the Realm (or, here, social classes) is a difference in wealth; that the essential thing in wealth is the labour which produces it; but only something quantified can be taxed, and therefore taxes must be on wealth and not on labour, which differs qualitatively from person to person and is not in itself quantifiable. Cf. *Ph.d.R.*, § 299 *Ann.*

² This phrase, which occurs again below [27], refers to different levels in the German constitutional hierarchy, e.g., city, village, commune.

³ The meaning, especially of the last clause, is obscure, and the entire sentence is suppressed altogether by Mollat. 'Under the feudal system what now has the form of a general impost for defraying state expenditure had the form rather of

In our day the tie between members of a state in respect of manners, education, language may be rather loose or even nonexistent. Identity in these matters, once the foundation of a people's union, is now to be reckoned amongst the accidents whose character does not hinder a mass from constituting a public authority. Rome or Athens, like any small modern state, could not have subsisted if the numerous languages current in the Russian Empire had been spoken within their borders, [25] or if amongst their citizens manners had been as different as they are in Russia or, for that matter, as manners and education are now in every big city in a large country. Difference in language and dialect (the latter exacerbates separation even more than complete unintelligibility does), and difference in manners and education in the separate estates, which makes men known to one another in hardly anything but outward appearance—such heterogeneous and at the same time most powerful factors the preponderating weight of the Roman Empire's power (once it had become great) was able to overcome and hold together, just as in modern states the same result is produced by the spirit and art of political institutions. Thus dissimilarity in culture and manners is a necessary product as well as a necessary condition of the stability of modern states.

Religion is that wherein men's innermost being is expressed, and, even if all other external and separated things may be insignificant, men yet recognize themselves in religion as a fixed centre; only thereby could they have been able to transcend the variety and mutability of their other relationships and situations and so to win confidence in one another and become sure of one another. Here in religion at least an identity might have been thought necessary, but this identity too is something which modern states have found that they can do without.

In northern Europe, religious unity has hitherto always been the private property and right of the feudal overlord who defrayed from his domains the expense of suzerainty, administration, justice, embassies, &c. . . . Expenditure for war had to be defrayed by each vassal himself' (H. in another draft [40 fn.]). Under the alternative which Hegel visualizes, state expenditure would be met from the crown lands, and any other revenue which the state received it would receive only from some particular property which was burdened in some particular way, i.e. it would receive it as a private property right. Hence the state would in this respect be on the same footing with the nobleman, city, abbey, &c., mentioned earlier in the paragraph. The whole passage depends on distinguishing between a constitutional right to the proceeds of taxation and a private property right to income from, e.g., land.

the fundamental condition of a state. Nothing else was known, and without this original oneness no other oneness or trust has been found possible. Occasionally this very bond has become so potent that [26] more than once it has suddenly transformed into one state peoples which were otherwise strange to one another and national enemies. The state so produced has not been merely a holy community of Christians, nor yet a coalition uniting their interests and their activity in pursuit of these. On the contrary, as a single worldly power, as a state too and as one people and army, it has conquered the fatherland of its eternal and temporal life in a war against the East.¹

Before this time, and also later when Christendom was divided into nations, similarity of religion has no more prevented wars or united peoples into a state than dissimilarity of religion has in our day rent the state asunder. The state's authority, as purely and simply the state's right, has known how to separate itself from the religious authority and its right, how to maintain stability enough on its own account, and how so to organize itself as to have no need of the Church, to separate the Church again from the state, and to put it once more into the position which in its beginnings it occupied in relation to the Roman state.

Of course on the political theories of our day, partly propounded by would-be philosophers and teachers of the rights of man and partly realized in tremendous political experiments,² everything we have excluded from the necessary concept of public authority (except what is most important of all, language, education, manners, and religion) is subjected to the immediate activity of the supreme public authority and in such a way that it is settled by that authority itself and driven by it down to the last detail.

It is to be taken for granted that the highest public authority must carry the supreme oversight of these afore-mentioned aspects of the domestic relationships of a people and their organization (which has been settled by chance and ancient arbitrary decisions); equally obvious is it that these aspects may not hinder the chief activity of the state, since on the contrary this activity must secure itself before all else, and to this end it is not to spare the

¹ This reference to the Crusades may be compared with Hegel's treatment of the same subject in his *Philosophy of History*.

² The reference is to Fichte's police state described in his *Naturrecht* (1796) (cf. Hegel, *Werke*, vol. i, pp. 234-43, and *Ph.d.R.*, Preface) and to the French Revolution.

subordinate systems of rights and privileges. Nevertheless, it is one great virtue of the old states in Europe that while the public authority is secure so far as its needs and its progress are concerned, it leaves free scope to the citizens' own activity in details of the administration, judicial and others, partly in the nomination [27] of the necessary officials, partly in the management of current affairs and the administration of law and customary usages.¹

The size of modern states makes it quite impossible to realize the ideal of giving every free individual a share in debating and deciding political affairs of universal concern. The public authority must be concentrated in one centre for deciding these matters and, as government, for executing these decisions. If this centre is secure on its own account in virtue of the awe of the masses, and is immutably sacrosanct in the person of a monarch appointed in accordance with a natural law and by birth, then a public authority may without fear or jealousy freely hand over to subordinate systems and bodies a great part of the relationships arising in society and their maintenance according to the laws. Each estate, city, town, commune, &c., can itself enjoy freedom to do and to execute what lies within its area.

Just as laws on these matters have gradually proceeded as a hallowed tradition directly from custom itself, so the constitution, the organization of the lower jurisdiction, the rights of the citizens therein—i.e. rights of municipal management, collection of taxes, whether national or those necessary for the municipalities themselves, and the legal application of the latter—all these things and those connected with them have been set up by native impulse. They have grown up of themselves, and since ever they saw the light they have maintained themselves similarly.

The organization of the ecclesiastical establishments, which is so far-reaching, has just as little been created by the supreme public authority, and the whole ecclesiastical estate maintains and perpetuates itself more or less internally. The huge sums paid annually in a large state for the poor, and the consequential and wide-ranging arrangements which pervade all parts of a country, are not defrayed by levies which the state would have to adjust, nor is it at the state's [28] command that the whole system is maintained and carried on. The mass of the relevant property and contributions depends on foundations and gifts by individuals, and so does

¹ This presages *Ph.d.R.*, § 260, and Hegel's conception of 'civil society'.

the whole system and its administration and realization, without any dependence on the highest public authority. Most of the internal social arrangements for each special sphere of need have been made by the free action of the citizens, and their continuation and life has been maintained by just this freedom, which has been undisturbed by any jealousy or anxiety on the part of the supreme public authority, except that of course the government sometimes supports them and sometimes checks the over-abundant growth of one provision of this sort which might otherwise suppress other necessary provisions.¹

However, in recent theories, carried partly into effect, the fundamental presupposition is that a state is a machine with a single spring which imparts movement to all the rest of the infinite wheel-work, and that all institutions implicit in the nature of a society should proceed from the supreme public authority and be regulated, commanded, overseen, and conducted by it.

The pedantic craving to determine every detail, the illiberal jealousy of [any arrangement whereby] an estate, a corporation, &c., adjusts and manages its own affairs, this mean carping at any independent action by the citizens which would only have some general bearing and not a bearing on the public authority, is clothed in the garb of rational principles. On these principles not a shilling of the public expenditure on poor relief in a country of 20 or 30 million inhabitants may be incurred unless it has first been not merely allowed but actually ordered, controlled, and audited by the supreme government. The appointment of every village school-master, the expenditure of every penny for a pane of glass in a village school or a village hall, the appointment of every toll-clerk or court officer or local justice of the peace, is to be an immediate emanation and effect of the highest authority. In the whole state every mouthful of food is brought from the ground that produces it to the mouth that eats it along a line examined, computed, adjusted, and directed by state, law, and government.

[29] This is no place to argue at length that the centre, as the public authority, i.e. the government, must leave to the freedom of the citizens whatever is not necessary for its appointed function of organizing and maintaining authority and thus for its security at home and abroad. Nothing should be so sacrosanct to the

¹ This passage appears to bear the stamp of Hegel's study of English newspaper reports of parliamentary debates.

government as facilitating and protecting the free activity of the citizens in matters other than this. This is true regardless of utility, because the freedom of the citizens is inherently sacrosanct.

But, as regards utility, if we are to reckon what advantage is produced by the citizens' management of their affairs through special bodies, their courts, their appointments to the offices entailed in these, &c., then the reckoning is threefold. The first calculation concerns something tangible, namely the money which flows on this system into the hands of the supreme public authority; the second concerns intelligence and the excellence with which everything happens in a machine at a uniform pace in accordance with the shrewdest calculation and the wisest ends; but the third concerns the vitality, the contented mind, and free and self-respecting self-awareness which arises when the individual will participates in public affairs so far as their ramifications are matters of indifference to the supreme public authority.

On the first reckoning, the tangible one, the state whose principle is universal mechanism fancies, without hesitation, that it has the advantage over the state which leaves detail in great part to the rights and individual action of its citizens. But it must be noticed in general that the machine state cannot possibly have the advantage unless it imposes heavier taxes on everyone. Since it takes over all branches of government, the administration of justice, &c., it must be burdened at the same time with the expense of all this, and if the whole machine is organized as a universal hierarchy, then this expense must be covered by systematic taxation. On the other hand, (i) if the state hands over to the individual bodies interested the making of arrangements requisite for such purely contingent and individual matters as the administration of justice, educational expenses, [30] contributions in support of the poor, &c., and also for providing the cost of these, then it sees these costs defrayed otherwise than in the form of taxes. The man who requires a judge or an attorney or a teacher, or who cares for the poor of his own volition, pays and pays then only; there is no question of a tax; no one pays for a court, an attorney, a teacher, a priest unless he needs one. (ii) If, for the lower official appointments in the court or the management of municipal or corporation affairs, one of the members of one of these bodies is chosen, then he is paid by the honour which thereby accrues to him, while if he is supposed to be the servant of the state, then he has to demand pay from the

state because here this inner honour is lacking. These two points, (i) and (ii), even if, as is not to be expected, more money might have to be contributed by the people under (i), produce the following effects: the first produces the difference that no one pays out money for something he does not need, for something which is not a universal requirement of the state; while the second produces an actual saving for everybody. The net result is that the people feel themselves treated under (i) with reason and by necessity and under (ii) with trust and freedom: (ii) constitutes the prime difference revealed by the second and third modes or reckoning.

A mechanical hierarchy, highly intellectual and devoted to noble ends, evinces no confidence whatever in its citizens and can thus expect nothing from them. It has no assurance in any action not ordered, carried out, and arranged by itself; thus it bans free-will gifts and sacrifices; it displays to its subjects its conviction of their lack of intellect, its contempt for their capacity to assess and do what is compatible with their private interests, and its belief in general profligacy. Thus it cannot hope for any vital action, any support from its subjects' self-respect.

There is a difference here so great as to be beyond the grasp of the statesman who allows for nothing which cannot be reckoned in hard cash. It shows itself primarily in the ease and welfare, the honesty and contentment of the inhabitants in one state, as compared with the dullness, the baseness (continually lapsing into [31] shamelessness), and the poverty [of those] in another. Where, in things of the greatest moment, it is only the contingent aspect of the event that lies on the surface, a state of the latter kind determines this contingency and makes it necessary.

It makes an infinite difference whether the public authority is so organized that everything on which it can count is in its own hands while for this very reason it can count on nothing else, or whether apart from what is in its own hands it can count also on the free devotion, the self-respect, and the individual effort of the people—on an all-powerful invincible spirit which the hierarchical system has renounced and which has its life only where the supreme public authority leaves as much as possible to the personal charge of the citizens. How dull and spiritless a life is engendered in a modern state where everything is regulated from the top downwards, where nothing with any general implications is left to the management and execution of interested parties of the

people—in a state like what the French Republic has made itself—is to be experienced only in the future, if indeed this pitch of pedantry in domination can persist. But what life and what sterility reigns in another equally regulated state, in the Prussian, strikes anyone who sets foot in the first town there or sees its complete lack of scientific or artistic genius, or assesses its strength otherwise than by the ephemeral energy which a single genius¹ has been able to generate in it for a time by pressure.

Thus we do not merely distinguish in a state, on the one hand, the necessary element which must lie in the hands of the public authority and be directly determined by it, and, on the other, the element which is necessary indeed simply for the social unification of a people but which for the public authority is in itself contingent. We also regard that people as fortunate to which the state gives a free hand in subordinate general activities, just as we regard a public authority as infinitely strong if it can be supported by the free and unregimented spirit of its people.

In Germany there is no fulfilment of the illiberal demand that laws, administration of justice, imposition and collection [32] of taxes, &c., language, customs, education, and religion be regulated and governed by one centre of power: on the contrary there is the most disparate multiplicity in the ordering of these matters. But this would not hinder Germany from being a state if in other respects it were organized as a public authority.² . . .

[§ 2. MILITARY POWER]

. . . The propagation of this martial talent proves in itself that these hosts of armed men are not useless. For centuries past there has been no important war between the European powers in which German courage has not won honour at least, if not laurels, in which rivers of German blood have not flowed.

Despite the abundance of its inhabitants, their martial talents, the readiness of its men to shed their blood, and despite its wealth of the requisites, inanimate and animate alike, for war, no country is so defenceless as Germany, less capable of self-defence, let alone conquest. Merely to aspire to self-defence, not to speak of attempting it, is still significantly honourable.

¹ i.e. Frederick the Great.

² At this point there is a gap in the manuscript. In Lasson's view, however, the missing part cannot have been considerable.

Military power consists of course in the soldiery of the greater and smaller estates. As for the latter, these armies, forces, corps, or whatever they may be called, may generally be no more than soldiers on parade or police duty, not warriors who know nothing higher than the fame of their regiment and their service. The military spirit which uplifts the heart of every warrior in a great regiment when he hears the words 'our army', this pride in his profession and service, the soul of a regiment, cannot flourish in the watchmen of an Imperial city or the bodyguard of an abbot. The sort of reverence for a still unknown individual which the sight of him in the uniform of a great regiment arouses cannot accrue to the uniform of an Imperial city. 'I have been twenty, thirty years in this service' on the lips [33] of the bravest soldier in a small estate of the Empire creates quite a different impression and effect from what the words produce when uttered by an officer in a great regiment. The self-respect of the man and the reverence that others have for him grows with the size of the whole to which he belongs. He shares in the fame accumulated for it by centuries.

The insignificance of the separate small military corps owing to their trifling numbers is bad enough without its being intensified by the clumsiness and other inconveniences in the arrangements they entail. There must be very great disadvantages if, on the outbreak of war, the smaller estates then enlist their soldiers for the first time, often do not appoint their officers till then, and so send untrained men into the field; if one estate has to supply the drummer and another the drums, &c.; if, owing to the number of estates which amalgamate their contingents, there is a dissimilarity in weapons, drill, &c., and the levies are unacquainted with their officers; and if each estate has the right itself to look after the victualling of its own forces, with the result that apart from the unnecessary expense, what has prevailed is the greatest disorder in the service and an embarrassing surfeit of civil personnel and camp followers. In theory there legally belong to a detachment of twenty men drafted from different estates precisely twenty forage clerks, bakers, &c., from the same estates. The Imperial quota¹ is some centuries old so that it no longer corresponds to the present

¹ *Matrikel*. See above, p. 151 n. Each estate was required to provide its own contingent with supplies, even on active service. One regiment might be made up of contingents drawn from a number of estates and each contingent required to have its own baggage wagons, bakers, hospital, &c. There was no general commissariat (Pütter, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 99 ff.).