

The second half of J.H. Lambert's *Neues Organon* (1764), entitled "Phenomenology" is the source of Kant's occasional use of the term:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johann_Heinrich_Lambert

<http://www.jstor.org/pss/2176069>

http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/SearchResults?isbn=9783050006024&afn_sr=CJ&cm_ite=cj&cm_ven=aff

(this work appears to be untranslated into English)

The word "phenomenology" plays no significant role in Kant's technical terminology, although as the letter to Herz in this folder shows, he did initially use it to refer to what he later calls "Transcendental Aesthetic" - by which he means "the science of all principles of *a priori* sensibility"; i.e. what we can say about our capacity to have sensations, prior to any consideration of any contents of any particular sensations. According to Kant this is the knowledge that all sensations must happen in space and time.

The Aesthetic thus deals with the sensation half of Kant's sense/understanding split; the understanding half is then dealt with in the "Transcendental Analytic" - the analysis of the structure of concepts that the understanding brings to bear on the "booming and buzzing confusion" of sensations in space and time. The analysis reduces all concepts to specific combinations of four basic concepts called categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation & Modality. Raw sensations are quantized, qualified, related and en-coded (i.e. assigned the status of possible, extant, or necessary) when the categories are "schematized" time-wise to fit with the temporal form discovered in the Aesthetic. E.g. the category of quantity "one" gets schematized time-wise as "once". Kant says "sensations without understanding are blind; understanding without sensation is empty."

Hegel was the first philosopher to use the word "phenomenology" systematically, and by it he means "the science of the experience of consciousness". Note that in the pdf of the Preface to the Phenomenology in this folder, I have also included page 805 from the end of the book – the first time Hegel uses the word "phenomenology" in *The Phenomenology of Mind*, the preface having been written only after the conclusion was finished. At the end of writing the book describing the experience of consciousness through the history of its unfolding subjective forms, Hegel adopts the term Kant rejected, "Phenomenology," to designate the description of the subjective perspective – what it felt like "from the inside" to experience those forms of consciousness, in contrast to the objective perspective, describing what it looked like "from the outside" – the institutions, schools, communities and societies which are the objective moment of the whole story (lectures on hist of philosophy/religion/art & the *Philosophy of Right*).

The absolute perspective is then presented in the *Encyclopedia* (in 3 vols: logic/nature/mind) – the perspective of the whole (i.e. both the subjective and the objective perspectives "at once"). The ordering of the *Encyclopedia* is not the inner time of subjectivity, nor the world time of objectivity, but the a-temporal order of the logic of the concepts, presenting the idea as the concept of the concept. So "phenomenology" for Hegel is the subjective moment of the whole story, and not the whole story itself. I used the example of vowels and consonants to illustrate the concept of a "moment". Another is rhythm and melody in music. They can be separated in abstraction, but in concrete reality, each only appears with the other as aspects or moments of the one whole. We could say that for Hegel, phenomenology is the subjective background to the objective foreground, showing the whole, which is the ground *per se*.