

# ***Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus***

(original title *Der Satz* - "The Proposition")

by Ludwig Wittgenstein

as abridged by David Rathbone for [NGV Klimt+Wittgenstein Course](#)

## **1 The world is all that is the case.**

1.1 The world is the *Gesamtheit* of facts, not of things.

1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being *all* the facts.

1.12 For the *Gesamtheit* of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case.

1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.

1.2 The world divides into facts.

1.21 Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same.

## **2 What is the case (the fact) is the state of affairs.**

2.172 The picture cannot represent its form of representation; it shows it.

2.174 The picture cannot place itself outside of its form of representation.

2.203 The picture contains the possibility of the state of affairs it represents.

2.21 The picture agrees with reality or not; it is right or wrong, true or false.

2.22 The picture represents what it represents, independently of its truth or falsehood, through the form of representation.

2.225 There is no picture which is *a priori* true.

## **3 The logical picture of the facts is thought.**

3.02 What is thinkable is also possible.

3.1 In the proposition the thought is expressed perceptibly through the senses.

3.141 The proposition is not a mixture of words (just as the musical theme is not a mixture of tones). The proposition is articulate.

3.144 States of affairs can be described but not named,

3.202 The simple signs employed in propositions are called names.

3.221 Objects I can only name. Signs represent them. I can only speak *of* them. I cannot *assert* them. A proposition can only say *how* a thing is, not *what* it is.

3.262 What does not get expressed in the sign is shown by its application. What the signs conceal, their application declares.

3.3 Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition does a name have meaning.

## **4 Thought is significant propositions.**

4.001 The *Gesamtheit* of propositions is the language.

4.003 Most propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. (They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful). And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really *no* problems.

4.01 The proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a model of the reality as we think it is.

4.022 A proposition shows its sense. The proposition shows how things stand, *if* it is true. And it *says*, that they do so stand.

4.05 Reality is compared with the proposition.

4.1212 What can be shown cannot be said.

## 5 Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.

5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

5.61 What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore *say* what we cannot think.

5.62 This remark provides the key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a truth. What solipsism *means*, is quite right, only it cannot be *said*, but it shows itself. That the world is *my* world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of language (the language which I understand) means the limits of *my* world.

5.621 The world and life are one.

5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm).

5.631 The thinking, representing subject" there is no such thing.

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world but is a limit of the world.

5.633 *Where* in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted?

5.64 Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism.

## 6 The general form of a proposition is $[p, \xi, N(\xi)]$

(this says that all complex propositions are compounded out of simple propositions)

6.42 There can be no ethical propositions

6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one).

6.423 Of the will as the subject of the ethical we cannot speak.

6.43 If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language. In short, the world must thereby become quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane as a whole. The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy.

6.4311 Death is not an event of life. Death is not lived through. If by eternity is understood not endless temporal duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally who lives in the present. Our life is endless in the way that our visual field is without limit.

6.45 The contemplation of the world *sub specie aeterni* is its contemplation as a limited whole. The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical.

6.5 For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.

6.522 There is indeed the inexpressible. This *shows* itself; it is the mystical.

## 7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent.

